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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This dissertation examines the political significance of the two leading strains of 
common sense thought in the history of American philosophy—Scottish Common Sense 
and Pragmatism—as suggested in the writings of John Witherspoon and James McCosh in 
the Scottish Common Sense line, and of the more famous co-founder of Pragmatism, 
William James.  These two strains of American common sense are placed in context of the 
larger Western common sense tradition.  Each is shown to aim at finding a solid middle 
ground epistemologically between skeptical doubt and idealistic certitude that could serve as 
a stable basis for moral and political life.  Witherspoon, the first great advocate and 
popularizer of Scottish Common Sense in America, gave the United States its first coherent, 
systematic common sense political theory, and that theory is here traced out as a common 
sense theory of politics for the first time.  The first systematic text-based treatment of the 
moral and social thought of McCosh, the last great proponent of Scottish Common Sense in 
the American setting, is also provided.  In James’ case, the first systematic treatment of the 
place of common sense in his philosophic worldview is rendered, and it is argued in the 
process that he is rightly understood as a kind of common sense philosopher.  Together, 
Witherspoon, McCosh, and James offer a vision of man and society that avoids the rigidity 
of dogmatic foundationalism, on the one hand, and the slackness of foundationless ethics 
and politics, on the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study considers the political significance of something called “common sense 
philosophy.”  I can imagine two likely reactions to the proposed topic:  Those generally 
skeptical about the value of philosophy for political life—who tend to see philosophy as 
either vicious or uselessTPF1FPT—will say, “It’s about time!  Finally, a common sense philosophy of 
politics!”  Those of a more philosophical bent, conversely, may well say, “What!  Crude 
common sense is precisely what philosophy wants to transcend!”  In my view, there is some 
validity in both responses.  The basic conviction motivating this work, in fact, is that 
common sense without philosophy is inadequate to address assaults on the foundations of 
society or to reinforce foundations already cracked, while philosophy, if not anchored in 
common sense, tends to radicalize and ultimately to corrode social order still further. 
The best way to manage this subject, as with most subjects, is to be as concrete as 
possible.  This is peculiarly essential in the matter of common sense philosophy, however, 
for the essence of common sense is to stay in close contact with life as it is lived, and the 
whole point of common sense philosophy is to keep our thinking concrete—that is, in touch 
with the particulars of real-world experience.  In the interest of concreteness, then, I herein 
consider common sense philosophy as exemplified by three thinkers in the American 
common sense tradition, two of them—John Witherspoon and James McCosh—immigrants 
from Scotland hailing from the Scottish Common Sense school, and one—William James—
a home-grown American product whose pragmatic “radical empiricism” breathed new life 
into common sense philosophizing.  William James is not ordinarily identified with common 
sense philosophy, and so, first, a few words about him.  James is most famous as a founder 
of Pragmatism (although he is more justly remembered for his classic magnum opus, The 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Plato’s Republic VI, 487d. 
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Principles of Psychology).  But one of the series of lectures published as Pragmatism, entitled 
“Pragmatism and Common Sense,” hints that the “pragmatic method” of philosophizing he 
recommends aims at a reworking of common sense, and presupposes that the common 
sense outlook is basically sound, though inadequate by itself—absent critical and scientific 
(and, it turns out, religious) support—for understanding the world and maximizing human 
fulfillment.  In The Meaning of Truth, the compilation of essays published as “A Sequel to 
Pragmatism,” James explains to his critics that, “The whole originality of pragmatism, the 
whole point of it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing.  It begins with concreteness, and 
returns and ends with it.”TPF2FPT  Moreover, James’ own version of pragmatic philosophy, radical 
empiricism, is deeply rooted in common sense impressions.  He repeatedly points out in his 
posthumously published Essays on Radical Empiricism close affinities between the radically 
empiricist way of seeing the world and the way of common sense.  (I would argue, further, 
that Pragmatism generally, in its classic form—in the writings of James, Charles S. Peirce, 
and John Dewey—exhibits the basic hallmarks of the common sense perspective.  But 
proving this in the cases of Peirce and Dewey is beyond the scope of this book.)  James has 
been one of the most written-about philosophers and public intellectuals in American 
history, TPF3FPT yet no one, to my knowledge, has until now ever systematically examined the role 
of common sense in James’ thought. 
                                                 
TP
2
PT James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism, eds. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), 115-16. 
TP
3
PT The volume of secondary literature on James is prodigious.  The best secondary work on James in the last 
fifteen years, in my view, is Charlene Haddock Seigfried, William James’s Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1990).  The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. Ruth Anna 
Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) provides a fine collection of fairly recent essays.  
Gerald E. Myers’ William James: His Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) is the most 
comprehensive critical interpretation of James’ thought, and serves as a less sympathetic answer to Ralph 
Barton Perry’s classic, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936).  
The most complete treatment of James’ social thought is George Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).  Richard M. Gale provides an interesting and engaging, if in 
my view flawed, recent interpretation of the relation between James’ moral and religious philosophy in The 
Divided Self of William James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  The most compelling 
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It is not hard to see why John Witherspoon and James McCosh should be thought of 
as common sense philosophers, adherents as they are of the Scottish Common Sense 
movement, but the reader may well wonder, Why these two in particular?  The answer is that 
Witherspoon and McCosh were the most influential members of the school in America, 
Witherspoon during the founding period and McCosh in the post-Civil War era.  The 
symmetry of their respective roles in the near century-long reign of Scottish Common Sense 
over the American academy is almost poetic.  Witherspoon was the first, and McCosh the 
last, of its major proponents in the history of American philosophy.  Witherspoon’s Lectures 
on Moral Philosophy at Princeton (published posthumously in 1810) and McCosh’s late Realistic 
Philosophy (republished, 1897) are effectively bookends of the movement.  Both men 
emigrated from Scotland to serve as presidents of Princeton (originally, the College of New 
Jersey, later to become Princeton University during McCosh’s tenure); both played pivotal 
parts in making Princeton into one of America’s leading institutions of higher learning; both 
taught courses in philosophy there; both actively participated in the major philosophical, 
social, and academic debates of their times; both were ordained Presbyterian ministers and 
continued preaching more or less regularly during their years at Princeton.  Witherspoon was 
primarily responsible for making Scottish Common Sense the leading philosophical 
movement in America, and it attained the status virtually of academic orthodoxy in 
American colleges shortly after his passing; and McCosh’s writings and public speeches 
represent its last hurrah before newer trends like German idealism and then Pragmatism 
                                                                                                                                                 
interpretation of James’ view of the spiritual self, I think, is provided by Eugene Fontinell, Self, God, and 
Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), and perhaps the best work on 
James’ metaphysical views is David C. Lamberth, William James and the Metaphysics of Experience (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).  Hunter Brown’s William James on Radical Empiricism and Religion (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000) is, as I see it, the soundest analysis of James’ religious philosophy available.  
Finally, Henry S. Levinson offers a highly stimulating account the religious motive behind James’ philosophic 
project in Science, Metaphysics, and the Chance of Salvation: An Interpretation of the Thought of William James (Missoula, 
Montana: Scholars Press, 1978).  A host of other secondary works on James deserve mention, but the ones I 
have named here are the ones I have found most telling and fruitful. 
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swept it from center stage, and almost from memory.  No systematic analysis of the 
common sense basis of Witherspoon’s moral and social philosophy has been made, nor of 
McCosh’s, either.  Jeffrey H. Morrison recently delivered a fine study of Witherspoon’s 
underappreciated role in America’s founding; Thomas Miller gave a good general treatment 
of Witherspoon’s thought in his introduction to an edition of the Scotsman’s more 
important writings; Mark A. Noll wrote an excellent chapter on Witherspoon’s legacy at 
Princeton in a 1989 study of that institution’s Christian intellectual origins; Jack Scott 
produced an Annotated Edition of Witherspoon’s Lectures on Moral Philosophy in 1982; and 
a number of scholarly articles on Witherspoon have been published in recent decadesTPF4FPT—but 
none has made a systematic textual analysis of Witherspoon’s common sense political 
philosophy.  Only one scholarly work of note has been written on McCosh in recent times, 
an intellectual biography by J. David Hoeveler, Jr.TPF5FPT 
Our direct concern here is with the political significance of American common sense 
thought, and Witherspoon, McCosh, and James speak to this in rather different ways.  
Witherspoon is the only one of the three who directly presented a theory of politics.  Neither 
McCosh nor James ever did much political theorizing, but each of them said a good deal 
about ethics and the moral life, and each was much concerned with the social consequences 
of personal morality and the moral quality of social life itself.  Between the two of them, 
                                                 
TP
4
PT Jeffrey H. Morrison, John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic (South Bend, Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2005); The Selected Writings of John Witherspoon, ed. Thomas Miller (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1990); Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic, 1768-1822: The Search for a Christian 
Enlightenment in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), chs. 3-4; An 
Annotated Edition of Lectures on Moral Philosophy by John Witherspoon, ed. Jack Scott (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1982).  Articles:  Ned C. Landsman, “Witherspoon and the Problem of Provincial Identity in 
Scottish Evangelical Culture,” in Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment, eds. Richard B. Sher and 
Jeffrey R. Smitten (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard B. Sher, “Witherspoon’s Dominion of 
Providence and the Scottish Jeremiad Tradition,” in ibid.; Robert Kent Donovan, “The Popular Party of the 
Church of Scotland and the American Revolution,” in ibid.; Thomas P. Miller, “Witherspoon, Blair and the 
Rhetoric of Civic Humanism,” in ibid. 
TP
5
PT J. David Hoeveler, Jr., James McCosh and the Scottish Intellectual Tradition, from Glasgow to Princeton (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981). 
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however, McCosh was much more interested than James in elucidating fundamental ethical 
principles; James thought that abstract principles weren’t much help in hard cases and 
therefore preferred to concentrate his energies on working out and clarifying a 
comprehensive moral vision.  What all three have in common, beyond a generally consistent 
common sense view of things, is a distinctive project:  to find a via media between skepticism, 
on the one hand, and idealism, on the other.  Each of them was especially worried about the 
moral and spiritual consequences of modern skepticism.  The emergence of Scottish 
Common Sense as a self-conscious philosophical movement had been motivated by the 
skepticism in particular of David Hume.  In McCosh’s and James’ day (the two were 
contemporaries, although McCosh was many years James’ senior), the specter of materialism 
loomed large, as increasing numbers of Western intellectuals took the establishment of 
evolutionary science to imply the death of God, or at least his irrelevance to human affairs, 
and by the same token to suggest the transience and arbitrariness of moral convictions.  On 
the other side, idealism did not seem to our three thinkers to be any kind of solution.  
Berkeley’s idealism, after all, had only paved the way for Hume’s skeptical conclusions, and 
the philosophy of the “Absolute” of Hegel and his successors was too far removed from 
common sense to win honest belief from more than a relative handful of hyper-intellectuals.  
No, the only hope for modern man lay in some common middle ground between idealistic 
certitude and radical doubt.  This ground Witherspoon, McCosh, and James were 
determined to explore, illuminate, and map out for their contemporaries.  In what follows, I 
try to trace their steps and describe the territory as they saw it. 
Before going there, however, it will help to give some further context.  In the 
remaining introduction, I try to clarify the general meaning of “common sense” as it has 
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been understood philosophically in ancient and modern times, and in doing so to show how 
deep—how very deep—the roots of American common sense go.  
BACKGROUND 
The philosophical import of common sense is strikingly suggested in a passage of 
Eric Voegelin’s Autobiographical Reflections.  The passage has the additional merit of 
highlighting the surprising philosophic richness of American culture and outlook.  As a 
young German scholar studying in America ca. 1922 at Columbia University in New York, 
Voegelin found himself “overwhelmed by a new [cultural and intellectual] world of which 
hitherto I had hardly expected the existence.”  He took courses with John Dewey among 
others and, repairing often to the university library, “started working through the history of 
English philosophy and its expansion into American thought.”  His account of what he 
learned in the process is illuminating. 
 
I discovered English and American common sense philosophy.  More immediately, the 
impact came through Dewey’s recent book, Human Nature and Conduct, which was based on 
the English common sense tradition.  From there, I worked back to Thomas Reid and Sir 
William Hamilton.  This English and Scottish conception of common sense as a human 
attitude that incorporates a philosopher’s attitude toward life without the philosopher’s 
technical apparatus, and inversely the understanding of Classic and Stoic philosophy as the 
technical, analytical elaboration of the common sense attitude, has remained a lasting 
influence in my understanding both of common sense and Classic philosophy.  It was during 
this time that I got the first inkling of what the continued tradition of Classic philosophy on 
the common sense level, without necessarily the technical apparatus of an Aristotle, could 
mean for the intellectual climate and the cohesion of a society. 
 
Precisely this tradition of common sense I now recognized to be the factor that was signally 
absent from the German social scene, and not so well developed in France as it was in 
England and America.  In retrospect, I would say that the absence of political institutions 
rooted in an intact common sense tradition is a fundamental defect of the German political 
structure that still has not been overcome…  During my year in New York, I began to sense 
that American society had a philosophical background far superior in range and existential 
substance, though not always in articulation, to anything that I found represented in the 
methodological environment in which I had grown up. TPF6FPT 
                                                 
TP
6
PT Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1989), 28-29.  Voegelin’s last words here are particularly remarkable in light of the fact that “the 
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The passage indicates the meaning of “common sense,” its importance in the history of 
philosophy, and the political ramifications of its presence or absence as a cultural force.  Let 
me consider each of these points in turn. 
The philosophic attitude prior to or shorn of a highly technical vocabulary:  this is a 
good general expression of what the common sense philosophers meant by “common 
sense.”  It is a certain mental disposition, an openness of consciousness to all that experience 
may show.  What it means more particularly and substantively will be made plain, I trust, in 
the body of the book, but a few early indications will help the reader find his bearings.  Fritz 
van Holthoon and David R. Olson have suggested—rightly, I think—that all the various 
employments of the term “common sense” are rooted in two related notions:  common 
sense as “judgment, the capacity to recognize self-evident truths,” and common sense as the 
body of knowledge constituted by such truths.TPF7FPT  Self-evident truths are truths about existing 
facts, which can only be known experientially.  If someone points at this lamp and demands 
to know how we know the lamp is really there, the answer can only be, “Why, we know the 
lamp by experiencing it, and there is no other way it can be known.”  Similarly, if it be true 
that “all men are created equal, and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights, [including] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” we know it to be true only by 
“seeing” it through lived experience, by observing, for example, the necessity of life and the 
free pursuit of happiness for meaningful human existence, and the absurdity of denying 
                                                                                                                                                 
methodological environment” in which he grew up was forged, as he notes in this same passage, by “men like 
Max Sheler, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Alfred Weber, Karl Mannheim.”  I think by this Voegelin means 
to suggest that, brilliant as such men were, their sense of the full range of human experience could not that of 
the ancients. 
TP
7
PT Frits van Holthoon and David R. Olson, “Common Sense: An Introduction,” in Common Sense: The Foundations 
for Social Science, eds. Holthoon and Olson (New York: University Press of America, 1987), 2-3.  I am greatly 
indebted to Holthoon and Olson’s book for helping me understand the full amplitude of meanings and 
implications of common sense.  The collection of essays therein serves as an excellent introduction to the 
theoretic significance of the idea. 
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these to anyone arbitrarily.  Self-evident truths are not necessarily evident to everyone:  they 
are evident only to those who have seen the evidence, who have viewed the relevant facts 
with sufficient attention.  They are truths that every clear-eyed, unbiased observer would 
recognize if only he looked in the right place.  Generally, then, common sense is an appeal to 
“what can be commonly sensed” TPF8FPT—what can be sensed, not necessarily what is sensed. 
 “Common sense philosophy” was a philosophical movement of the late eighteenth 
and the first half of the nineteenth centuries that had its roots in England, grew up in 
Scotland, and found its warmest reception in America.  Pragmatism, that home-grown 
American philosophy, has its roots in this earlier movement, and must be accounted, as I will 
try to show, an extension of the “tradition of common sense” Voegelin speaks of.  But the 
classical and Stoic philosophers had recognized the importance of the existential posture 
Voegelin calls the “common sense attitude” long before Anglo-American common sense 
philosophy was ever born, and conceptually the latter tradition owes much to those ancient 
philosophic pioneers.  The classic and Stoic philosophers as well as the British and American 
thinkers of later times took the common sense attitude as the starting point for philosophy, 
and the former as well as the latter thought it imperative in all their theorizing to keep in 
working touch with it.  Indeed, as Voegelin suggests, the fundamentals of truth and right 
were to all of them simply a working out and elaboration of that mental orientation and all 
that it revealed. 
 Herman Parret traces “two rough lines of interest in common sense in the history of 
philosophical doctrines”:  1) “the Aristotelian line [—extending “from Aristotle to the 
Scottish and English empiricism,” continuing “even as far as George Edward Moore”—] 
introduces common sense as a category in the theory of perception:  common sense is used 
                                                 
TP
8
PT Ibid., 5. 
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to explain the consciousness of perception;” and 2) one “rooted in the notion of koinai 
ennoiai developed by the Stoics and used for the axioms of theories (and geometry and pure 
mathematics, too),” and leading to “Kant’s Gemeinsinn.” TPF9FPT  Actually, these are the two lines of 
epistemological interest in common sense—there is a third line of interest critical to the present 
inquiry, and that is in common sense as a community’s sense of what is good and right.  This 
third line finds its classic expression in Vico.  While certainly distinct from the purely 
epistemological question, the phenomenon of the sense of a community is nonetheless 
inseparably connected to it:  common sense as communal sense is usually thought to be 
grounded in perceptual or intuitive experience. 
Aristotle was the first to use “common sense” as a technical term, and something of 
his meaning has persisted through the whole history of the concept.  In De Anima (On the 
Soul), Aristotle describes koine aesthesis, common sensation, as the awareness of external 
objects through a pooling of our special sensations (sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell)— 
i.e., perception of “things” and their varying states and modes.TPF10FPT  It is what enables us to 
perceive “movement, rest, number, shape and size, such being not special to any one sense 
but common to all.”TPF11FPT  He does not in De Anima unequivocally indicate a faculty or power of 
soul that performs this operation, but most interpreters of Aristotle have taken him there to 
imply such a faculty, TPF12FPT something he in fact explicitly affirms in Parva Naturalia. TPF13FPT  As Peter 
van Kessel puts it, this faculty is “the sense which converts the impressions given by the five 
senses into one unity of sensations connected to the one object and origin of these 
                                                 
TP
9
PT Ibid., 18. 
TP
10
PT De Anima 425a27ff. 
TP
11
PT De Anima, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1986), 172. 
TP
12
PT See Lawson-Tancred’s discussion of why he believes this to be a mistake in the introduction to his translation 
of De Anima, 81-2. 
TP
13
PT Aristotle considers this faculty and its activity fairly extensively in Parva Naturalia, finding it to be the 
differentia specifica of animal life (what sets it apart from mere biological life).  See especially “On Sense and 
Sensible Objects,” the first part of Parva Naturalia, in Aristotle: On the Soul; Parva Naturalia; On Breath, Loeb No. 
288 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
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impressions.” TPF14FPT  Aristotle’s faculty of common sense, then, is that inner sense by which we 
perceive objects immediately before us as objects, rather than as heaps of disconnected 
sensations.  Aquinas later translated Aristotle’s term sensus communis—the Latin basis, of 
course, of our English “common sense.”  But in Aquinas’ handling, as Frits van Holthoon 
says, “sensus communis became almost a synonym for reason.” TPF15FPT  In the Summa Theologica, 
Aquinas describes the faculty this way: 
The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which 
come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green.  But 
neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet:  because what discerns between two 
things, must know both.  Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the 
common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be 
referred:  and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when 
someone sees what he sees.TPF16FPT 
 
Thomas thus seems to go beyond Aristotle to make sensus communis “the locus of the 
discerning judgment.”TPF17FPT 
 Sensus communis was a term widely used during Roman times, in both formal and 
informal contexts.  Aquinas thus chose for his translation of koine aesthesis a term of great 
currency.  Cicero had made several references to sensus communis in his writings and public 
speeches, but had never made use of it as a technical philosophical concept.  He had used it 
in the popular sense of “the notions or norms men in society hold in common.”  He seemed 
to be close, however, to fusing its meaning with that of another term that bulked large in his 
political philosophy:  humanitas, a word rich in connotations, signifying variously 1) “human 
nature, humanity, the qualities, feelings and inclinations of mankind,” 2) “humane or gentle 
conduct toward others, humanity, philanthropy, kindness, politeness,” and 3) “mental 
                                                 
TP
14
PT Holthoon and Olson, 116. 
TP
15
PT Ibid., 100. 
TP
16
PT Summa I, 3 (London: Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1912), 87; quoted in Holthoon and Olson, 
101. 
TP
17
PT Ibid.  Holthoon credits C. Werner with this formulation, citing Werner’s Der Heilige Thomas van Aquino, die 
Lehre, vol. 2 (Regensburg; reprint New York, 1889). 
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cultivation befitting a man, a liberal education, good breeding, refinement, elegant manners.”  
S. E. W. Bugter says that, “Humanitas in classical Latin is the counterpart of our modern 
common sense, gezond verstand (in Dutch), gesunder Menshenverstand (German), or le bon sens (in 
French).”TPF18FPT  The meanings of humanitas, Bugter points out, correspond closely to the four 
connotations of sensus communis that C.S. Lewis delineates in his essay on “Sense” in Studies in 
Words:  1) “the elementary mental outfit of normal man,” 2) “sensus communis as a social 
virtue,” 3) sensus communis as common wit,” and 4) “sensus communis [as] a collection of all our 
experiences, emotions, thoughts, opinions, etc.,” i.e., “the collection of all the sensus that we 
have in common, because they are ‘normal.’”TPF19FPT 
The Stoic koine ennoiai (“common conceptions”) are “the axioms of theorizing and 
the norms of practical life,” “principles of reason in theory and practice, and are thus 
transcendental pre-conditions of reasoning (theoretically and practically).” TPF20FPT  The koine 
ennoiai, then, are something like Aristotle’s first principles—indemonstrable, self-evident 
principles that are primary in the sense that they are and must be presupposed, taken for 
granted, in all our reasonings.TPF21FPT  Kant’s Gemeinsinn (common sense) has a similar meaning.  
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant presents Gemeinsinn as the “possibility ground of the 
conditions” (Parret’s language) of both theoretical and practical reason—i.e., common sense 
provides the pre-conditions of both.  It is thus the very root of rationality.  Parret explains 
that, “Common sense [for Kant] appears just at the parting of theory and practice, or at the 
crossroads where conditions of valid knowledge and conditions of good life meet.”TPF22FPT 
                                                 
TP
18
PT Holthoon and Olson, 91-2.  Bugter takes these definitions of humanitas from C.T. Lewis and C. Short’s Latin 
Dictionary (1980). 
TP
19
PT Ibid., 83-4.  C.S. Lewis, Studies in Words (Cambridge, 1967). 
TP
20
PT Ibid., 28. 
TP
21
PT See Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I.1-4 and II.8-10, 19. 
TP
22
PT Holthoon and Olson., 28-9. 
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In the early eighteenth century, Vico employed the Latin sensus communis in his theory 
of common sense, giving it, however, a rather more involved significance than Aquinas 
contemplated.  Vico’s sensus communis, in fact, combined the meanings of koine aesthesis and 
koine ennoiai together with the notion of the sense of a community to produce the very rich 
conception of “the primary truths residual in society,” primary truths that are universal but 
linguistically and culturally mediated.TPF23FPT  As John D. Schaeffer observes, Vico’s sensus communis 
contains a sense of the natural law in recognizing the “underlying agreements” about basic 
human needs and utilities that obtain among all nations.TPF24FPT  At the same time, according to 
Vico’s understanding, “The sensus communis cannot be merely a static set of values embodied 
in a literary cannon [but rather] is a capital constantly changing its outline as it is invested in 
various causes.  The sensus communis is constantly reinterpreted and reshaped by the decisions 
of the community.” TPF25FPT 
Vico may have been influenced in his thinking about sensus communis by Anthony 
Ashley Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury, who may fairly be considered the originator of British 
common sense philosophy.  Shaftesbury was Vico’s contemporary and lived in Italy for a 
time.  According to John D. Schaeffer, the two men may have had opportunity to meet and 
exchange ideas. TPF26FPT  Shaftesbury had been working on a theory of sensus communis before Vico 
developed his own theory in De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (On the Study Methods of Our 
Time) and further in the New Science.  Shaftesbury, however, traced the English “common 
sense” back to koinonoemosune (objectively: the commonly perceived or thought; subjectively: 
likemindedness) rather than to koine aesthesis.  In his essay on Sensus Communis, he provides in 
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a footnote a remarkable account of the early development of the concept.  I beg the reader’s 
leave to quote the somewhat lengthy passage in full: 
The Greek word is κοινονοημοσύνη, which Salmasius interprets the moderate, the usual and 
respected mind of a man, which takes thought for the communal good in some way and does not refer 
everything to its own advantage, and also has regard of those with whom it is engaged, thinking modestly and 
reasonably about itself.  But on the other hand, all the conceited and arrogant think that they are born only 
for themselves and their own benefits and, in favour of themselves, they disdain and neglect others.  And these 
are those who can properly be said not to possess sensus communis.  For so Juvenal understood ‘sensus 
communis’ in Satire 8.  Galen calls ‘philanthropy and goodness’ what Marcus, speaking of himself, calls 
κοινονοημοσύνη and, elsewhere, when he speaks about the same thing, ‘moderation and good judgment,’ 
which is how Marcus expressed his gratitude to him [Galen] for accompanying him to the German war.  In 
the same manner, Isaac Casaubon, who says that Herodian calls this the mean and equal 
measure:  Indeed, Antoninus adds as though interpreting this saying, ‘and the injunction to friends neither to 
dine with him at all nor necessarily to go off abroad with him.’   This, I am persuaded, is the sensus 
communis of Horace (Satires I.3.66) which has been unobserved (as far as I can learn) by any 
of his commentators: it being remarkable withal that in this early satire of Horace, before his 
latter days and when his philosophy as yet inclined to the less rigid assertors of virtue, he 
puts this expression (as may be seen by the whole satire taken together) into the mouth of a 
Crispinus, or some ridiculous mimic of that severe philosophy, to which the coinage of the 
word κοινονοημοσύνη properly belonged.  For so the poet again (Satires I.4.77-8) uses the 
word sensus, speaking of those who without sense of manners or common society, without 
the least respect or deference to others, press rudely upon their friends and upon all 
company in general without regard to time or place or anything besides their selfish and 
brutish humour: Not asking whether they do that without sense, whether they do it at an inopportune 
time.  Obliviously, as old [Dionysius] Lambinus interprets it, though without any other 
explanation, referring only to the sensus communis of Horace in that other satire [on p. 48 of 
his edition (Frankfurt, 1577) of Horace, which Shaftesbury owned.]  Thus Seneca:  Thus you 
will avoid hatred from the offense by harming nobody gratuitously: from which sensus communis will protect 
you (Epistles 105.4).  And Cicero accordingly: It is the business of justice not to harm men; of finer 
feeling, not to cause offence (On Duties I.28.99).  It may be objected possibly, by some particularly 
versed in the philosophy above-mentioned [Greek], that the κοινός νους to which the 
κοινονοημοσύνη seems to have relation is of a different meaning.  But they will consider 
withal how small the distinction was in that philosophy between the ύπόληψις and the vulgar 
άίσθησις, how generally passion was by those philosophers brought under the head of 
opinion.  And when they consider, besides this, the very formation of the word 
κοινονοημοσύνη upon the model of the other femalized virtues, the εύγνωμοσύνη, 
σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, etc., they will no longer hesitate on this interpretation. — The reader 
may perhaps by this note see better why the Latin title of Sensus Communis has been given to 
this second treatise [of Shaftesbury’s Characteristics].  He may observe, withal, how the same 
poet Juvenal uses the word sensus in Satires 15.133: Sensus is the best part of us.TPF27FPT 
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Shaftesbury sums up the old meaning of sensus communis (as generally understood by Juvenal, 
Marcus Aurelius, Horace, Seneca, and Cicero) as the “sense of the public weal and the 
common interest, love of the community or society, natural affection, humanity, 
obligingness, or that sort of civility which rises from a just sense of the common rights of 
mankind, and the natural equality there is among those of the same species.”TPF28FPT  Vico clearly 
drew on these overlapping Roman connotations in his theory of sensus communis, as did 
Shaftesbury.  Whether they did so independently, or Vico was motivated to work out his 
own more systematic view by Shaftesbury’s beginning, remains a mystery. 
 In any case, Shaftesbury theory was in its own right a brilliant synthesis and 
extension of the Roman senses of the concept.  He conceived of sensus communis as a kind of 
social recognition of natural right, marked by an abiding concern for the public good.  It was 
a kind of rationally substantive public spiritedness.  This public spiritedness was rooted in 
natural social “affection,” and the naturalness of this affection, when persisted in, became 
self-evident to men of common sense, ultimately revealing timeless truths of human value.  
“A public spirit,” Shaftesbury says, “can come only from a social feeling or sense of 
partnership with humankind.”  Fortunately, the requisite “social feeling” is natural. 
If eating and drinking be natural, herding is so too.  If any appetite or sense be natural, the 
sense of fellowship is the same.  If there be anything of nature in that affection which is 
between the sexes, the affection is certainly as natural towards the consequent offspring and 
so again between the offspring themselves, as kindred and companions, bred under the same 
discipline and economy.  And thus a clan or tribe is gradually formed, a public is recognized, 
and, besides the pleasure found in social entertainment, language and discourse, there is so 
apparent a necessity for continuing this good correspondency and union that to have no 
sense or feeling of this kind, no love of country, community or anything in common, would 
be the same as to be insensible even of the plainest means of self-preservation and most 
necessary condition of self-enjoyment.TPF29FPT 
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Only “a more contracted public” (sub-national) can have genuine community, Shaftesbury 
says.  Sensus communis is there direct and palpable, while on the level of “the body politic at 
large,” only the idea of it holds.  The idea of it, or rather a passionate attachment to the idea 
of it, is nonetheless absolutely essential for the health of the body politic.  For without a 
spirited devotion to the notion of sensus communis, political society will inevitably be rent by 
the “spirit of faction,” which is after all “no other than the abuse or irregularity of that social 
love and common affection which is natural to mankind.”TPF30FPT 
It is patent to Shaftesbury that self-interest is inadequate as a source of social order.  
He blasts the “modern projectors,” the “narrow-minded philosophers”—he seems to have 
Hobbes and Locke chiefly in mind—who aim at “conquering nature” in order to “build after 
a more uniform way.”  “You have heard it, my friend, as a common saying that ‘interest 
governs the world.’  But, I believe, whoever looks narrowly [closely] into the affairs of it will 
find that passion, humour, caprice, zeal, faction and a thousand other springs, which are 
counter to self-interest, have as considerable a part in the movements of this machine.  
There are more wheels and counterpoises in this engine than are easily imagined.”TPF31FPT  
Shaftesbury rejects the forced simplicity of Hobbesian and Lockean conceptions of society.  
Such artificial schemes do not do justice to the complexities of human nature.  At the root of 
the modern tendency to proffer reductionistic accounts of human affairs, Shaftesbury thinks, 
is modern philosophy’s departure from common sense.  Common sense judges matters on 
the whole, according to “the justness of a whole,”TPF32FPT and opts for richness over logical 
tidiness.  The modern rejection, or neglect, of common sense entails serious moral 
consequences.  “As notions stand now in the world with respect to morals,” Shaftesbury 
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laments, “honesty is like to gain little by philosophy or deep speculations of any kind.  In the 
main, it is best to stick to common sense and go no further.”  He continues: 
Men’s first thoughts in this matter [of morals] are generally better than their second, their 
natural notions better than those refined by study or consultation with casuists.  According 
to common speech as well as common sense, ‘honesty is the best policy,’ but, according to 
refined sense, the only well-advised persons as to this world are arrant knaves, and they 
alone are thought to serve themselves who serve their passions and indulge their loosest 
appetites and desires.—Such, it seems, are the wise and such the wisdom of this world! 
An ordinary man talking of a vile action in a way of common sense says naturally and 
heartily, ‘He would not be guilty of such a thing for the whole world.’  But speculative men 
find great modifications in the case, many ways of evasion, many remedies, many 
alleviations.TPF33FPT 
 
Shaftesbury is not anti-philosophical—he understands his own writings to be a species of 
philosophy—but he is certain that we are better off to “moralize…according to common 
sense and without canting.”  After all, “Some moral and philosophical truths there are, 
withal, so evident in themselves, that it would be easier to imagine half mankind to have run 
mad and joined precisely in one and the same species of folly, than to admit anything as 
truth which should be advanced against such natural knowledge, fundamental reason and 
common sense” as may be seen in the long run of human experience.  Shaftesbury is 
distressed by the incapacity of many modern thinkers to see man complete and full-blooded, 
and the piling up of theoretical technicalities only seems to him to accentuate the substantive 
emptiness of their sense of human affairs.  And the less theoretical modern approaches to 
understanding politics seem to him just as vacuous.  “Some modern zealots,” he says, 
“appear to have no better knowledge of truth, nor better manner of judging it, than by 
counting noses.  By this rule, if they can poll an indifferent number out of a mob, if they can 
produce a set of Lancashire noddles, remote provincial headpieces or visionary assemblers to 
attest a story of a witch upon a broomstick and a flight in the air, they triumph in the solid 
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proof of their new prodigy and cry, The truth is great and it will prevail!”TPF34FPT  Both variants of 
modern political scienceTPF35FPT have lost sight of common sense and therefore of the quality of 
human community. 
 The key to preserving common sense, for Shaftesbury, is “wit”—a clever sense of 
“humour” that tests opinions by good-natured “raillery” or jesting.TPF36FPT  We saw Shaftesbury 
employing wit just now in that comment on the dubiousness of polling as a measure of 
social truth.  It is an attitude akin to the serious play or playful seriousness we see in a 
Socrates.  It takes opinions seriously but not too seriously.  Shaftesbury seems to play with 
the double meaning of “humour” in his discussion of wit—the humor of a people, their 
mood or emotional outlook, and what we would call a “sense of humor,” an ability to see 
absurdity in matters typically treated gravely or earnestly.  A person of wit possesses the 
latter and appeals to the former:  knowing well the humor of his fellows,TPF37FPT he can exploit 
their mood and make them see things in a different light, a truer light.  Sensus communis for 
Shaftesbury emerges as a kind of mean between “zealotry” and frivolity,TPF38FPT a mean revealed 
by open debate, criticism, and especially good-natured, humane ridicule.TPF39FPT 
 Vico likewise saw wit as the essence of good sense and pivotal for directing the sense 
of the community.  As Schaeffer explains:  “The Baroque notion of wit [acutezze] becomes, in 
Vico’s hands, the mode of uniting metaphor with the sententiae [wise sayings, proverbs that 
would be recognized by ordinary people as containing obvious truths] and the topoi 
[commonplace elements of argument in rhetoric, ready tools for the forensic specialist].”  
“Vico claims that conceits [apt metaphors which reveal similarity in dissimilar things and 
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bring a vast range of experience together in an image or turn of phrase] are arguments, that 
they teach by uniting beauty and truth in an oral performance.  The orator creates the 
conceit by the force of his ingenuity working on the case at hand.  The audience seizes it as 
simultaneously true and beautiful…  The orator must use the common sense of the audience 
as that which connects his metaphor to the case.”TPF40FPT  Vico works out this understanding of 
wit engaging the sensus communis in De nostri temporis studiorum ratione.  Vico was a professor of 
rhetoric at the University of Naples and hit upon this formulation in his rhetorical studies.  
“Classical rhetorical theory revealed,” he thought, “ that there were at least two possible 
roots for sensus communis:  Aristotle’s what is held to be true by all, by most, or by the 
wisest—and Quintillian’s—a public utterance or ‘sentence’ traced to sensus, feeling, or 
opinion.  Thus sensus for Vico had the dual meaning that sense still retains in English, a 
feeling or sensation, and an intellectual grasp on an idea, that is, ‘making sense.’  In his 
treatment of the conceit Vico intertwines these two linguistic roots into a concept of 
metaphor as argument.  In the De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, he cultivates those roots to 
produce a theory of sensus communis.” TPF41FPT 
 Shaftesbury’s sensus communis was, like Vico’s after him, a kind of aesthetic judgment, 
but this judgment, while not a product of ratiocination, was clearly rational.  It was a form of 
rational intuition.  It was a sense of beauty or fitness, but also of truth.  By it we may see the 
fit of a certain response to a certain circumstance to be self-evidently right, and this sense of 
rightness, in matters of any weight, is pregnant with normative implications.  Indeed, sensus 
communis, for both Shaftesbury and Vico, is preeminently a moral attitude.  Schaeffer helpfully 
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describes sensus communis in terms of its “form,” “function,” and “content”:  its form is 
“aesthetic beauty,” its function is “judgment,” and its content is “moral consensus.”TPF42FPT  
Neither Shaftesbury nor Vico mean to suggest that there is one and only one right response 
to a given circumstance—not at all—simply that some responses can be seen to fit, and 
others to be out of joint.  The essential thing is that the man of wit finds something to say 
that works for the occasion, that meets the needs of the community for an answer. 
 Shaftesbury’s influence on Vico may be uncertain, but his influence on the course of 
thought in Britain is beyond question.  In particular, his ideas on moral sentiments spurred 
the thinking of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume.  According to McCosh, Hutcheson 
“did little more than expound [Shaftesbury’s] views, with less versatility, but in a more 
equable, thorough, and systematic manner.”TPF43FPT  Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson saw the moral 
sense as a kind of aesthetic faculty.  But as Knud Haakonssen convincingly argues, for 
Hutcheson, “Moral perception is not a subjective affective experience; and moral judgements 
are thus not simply the expressions of such experience.  Whether we make moral judgements 
of our own behavior or that of others, our moral perception and thus our moral judgement 
are explicitly representative, and thus either true or false.”TPF44FPT  When we judge another to be 
virtuous, Hutcheson says, “the Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside 
in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him.” TPF45FPT  The moral sense 
perceives the moral quality of a person’s motivation, and judges it to be excellent or flawed, 
dignified or unworthy.  Although the determinations of the moral sense are often attended 
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with pleasure or pain, these affective reactions are incidental.TPF46FPT  The determinations 
themselves are objective:  the quality observed either is or is not a moral quality; it either 
does or does not reflect human excellence.  The substance of Hutcheson’s “moral 
excellence” is love or benevolence, a tendency to actions that “contribute to the over-all 
happiness of the moral creation, the ‘moral system.’”TPF47FPT  The moral sense cannot function, 
however, without help of reason:  “reason prepares moral judgements by establishing the 
subject of such judgements, namely the (likely) motivation to moral behavior in each 
particular case.”TPF48FPT  The renderings of the moral sense are literally irrelevant in cases where 
the motivation has been wrongly ascertained. 
 The similarity between Hutcheson’s moral sense and Shaftesbury’s common sense is 
evident.  Both involve aesthetic moral judgments about attitudes and the acts (including 
speech acts) that flow from them, and in each case the quality of the attitudes and acts in 
question is determined by their tendency to promote the common good.  Shaftesbury’s sensus 
communis in fact presupposes a moral sense that functions just as Hutcheson says it does.  In 
his “Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit,” Shaftesbury claims to have shown that, “Sense of 
right and wrong [is] as natural to us as natural affection itself, and [is] a first principle in our 
constitution and make.”TPF49FPT  “Natural affection” is what gives rise to sensus communis, and the 
highest moral quality approved by the moral sense is the willful embrace of affection for 
others as the best and noblest thing in human nature.TPF50FPT 
Like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume understands morality in aesthetic terms.  
Also like them, he is alert to the dangers of “zealotry”:  we noticed already Shaftesbury’s 
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recommending the use of wit to puncture the excess; Hutcheson, too, was famously keen to 
oppose zealotry of all kinds, political as well as religious; and opposing zealotry—or as he 
called it, “enthusiasm”—was a central motive of Hume’s political theorizing.TPF51FPT  Hume even 
agrees with Hutcheson’s account of the moral sense on all essential points.  If David Fate 
Norton’s account of Hume’s moral theory is accurate—and he makes a strong textual 
caseTPF52FPT—one must conclude that Hume was a moral realist, in exactly the sense that 
Hutcheson was.  In his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume explicitly rejects moral 
skepticism.TPF53FPT  But Hume is generally taken—rightly, I believe—to have espoused 
philosophical positions that fatally undermine moral objectivity.  In particular, his 
epistemological skepticism casts serious doubt on the possibility of moral knowledge.  It was 
precisely this that motivated Thomas Reid to undertake his painstaking analyses of the 
operations of the mind in An Inquiry into the Human Mind and the Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers.  Hume seems to have thought that instinct, habit, and utility would prevent 
skepticism from spreading out beyond members of the intellectual class, and he himself 
thought that, beyond the obvious usefulness of moral distinctions for personal and social 
life, the instinct to believe in objective reality, including moral facts, was well nigh 
irresistible.TPF54FPT  Reid was concerned, however, that others would follow who would take 
Hume’s epistemological skepticism with less equanimity—would take it as a revolutionary 
insight that “changes everything,” as we say—and, as a result, feel freer to ignore their 
natural beliefs.  In the case of morality, such neglect of the plain verdicts of common sense 
could be disastrous.  Reid was also troubled about the moral implications of Hume’s 
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theological skepticism.  Hume was satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for morality in 
human nature such that no supernatural reference is necessary.TPF55FPT  But Reid was concerned 
that skepticism about a divine ground of moral order would altogether undermine people’s 
confidence in the validity of their moral perceptions.TPF56FPT 
Thomas Reid’s name quickly became, after his death, virtually synonymous with 
common sense philosophy.  For the better part of a century—from the late eighteenth to the 
latter nineteenth centuries—Reid’s Common Sense philosophy “enjoyed enormous 
popularity in the United States, Great Britain, and France.” TPF57FPT  But for much of the last 
century and a quarter, he has not been thought to be a philosopher of great importance, and 
the reputation of common sense philosophy suffered along with his own flagging fortunes.  
That is beginning to change.  A recent resurgence of Reidian scholarship testifies to a 
growing sense that Reid was a philosopher ahead of his time.  Nicholas Wolterstorff’s 
judgment that Reid was “one of the two great philosophers of the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, the other being of course Immanuel Kant,”TPF58FPT is no longer an implausible 
position, as witness the impressive collection of essays in the recently compiled Cambridge 
Companion to Thomas Reid.  Part of the reason for Reid’s disappearance from the story of 
modern philosophy TPF59FPT was Kant’s publicly expressed view that Scottish Common Sense 
thought was not worthy of serious consideration.  The great German philosopher’s dismissal 
of that school in the preface of his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics has become 
legendary.  Because his statement there is so forceful and apparently devastating, and 
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because any common sense philosopher wishing to be taken seriously must answer to Kant, 
I submit it here in full: 
Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood.  It is 
positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly 
Priestley, missed the point of the problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that 
which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he 
never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion [that reason is 
completely in the dark about the connection between cause and effect] that everything 
remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened.  The question was not whether 
the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, 
for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a 
priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, 
implying a more widely extended usefulness, not limited merely to objects of experience.  
This was Hume’s problem.  It was a question concerning the origin of the concept, not 
concerning its indispensability in use.  Were the former decided, the conditions of its use and 
the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. 
But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker 
should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with 
pure thought—a task which did not suit them.  They found a more convenient method of 
being defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to common sense.  It is indeed a great gift of 
heaven to possess right or (as they now call it) plain common sense.  But this common sense 
must be shown in deeds by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by 
appealing to it as an oracle when no rational justification of oneself can be advanced.  The 
appeal to common sense when insight and science fail, and no sooner—this is one of the 
subtle discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely 
enter the lists with the most thorough thinker and hold his own.  But as long as a particle of 
insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge.  Seen in a clear 
light, it is but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher 
is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it.  I should think Hume 
might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie and, in addition, to a critical 
reason (such as the latter did not possess), which keeps common sense in check and 
prevents it from speculating, or, if speculations are under discussion, restrains the desire to 
decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own principles.  By this means alone can 
common sense remain sound.  Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, 
but for etching we require an etcher’s needle.  Thus common sense and speculative 
understanding are both useful, but each in its own way:  the former in judgments which 
apply immediately to experience; the latter when we judge universally from mere concepts, as 
in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so called in spite of the inappropriateness of 
the word, has no right to judge at all. TPF60FPT 
 
Now virtually every word of this scorching critique is fairly applied to Beattie and Oswald 
and Priestley.  Indeed, to the extent that Scottish Common Sense in the early nineteenth 
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century fell out of favor in Germany and other parts of the Western world, these men may 
be held primarily responsible.  But nothing Kant says in those lines is true of Reid. 
 Take first the matter of causation.  As Terence Cuneo observes, “Reid is a Humean 
about (non-agent) causation.”TPF61FPT  As Reid himself writes in an unpublished manuscript, “MPr P 
Humes reasoning on this Subject In <his> Essay on Necessary Connexion would have 
convinced me if I have not been convinced before, by S. I Newton.”TPF62FPT  But that Reid 
appreciated the problem with which Hume (and later, Kant) was concerned is clear enough 
from his published writings.  In his Essays on the Active Powers, Reid writes: 
Nature is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects which fall 
daily under our observation.  But, if it be asked what nature is—whether the first universal 
cause or a subordinate one, whether one or many, whether intelligent or unintelligent—upon 
these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we 
can rest.  And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are sensible that they know nothing 
of the matter. 
 From the course of events in the natural world, we have sufficient reason to 
conclude the existence of an eternal intelligent First Cause.  But whether He acts 
immediately in the production of those events, or by subordinate intelligent agents, or by 
instruments that are unintelligent, and what the number, the nature, and the different offices, 
of those agents or instruments may be—these I apprehend to be mysteries placed beyond 
the limits of human knowledge.  We see an established order in the succession of natural 
events, but we see not the bond that connects them together.TPF63FPT 
 
 
Wolterstorff sums up Reid’s view on causation succinctly:  “We know that we ourselves, in 
the exercise of our active powers, are efficient causes; we know that God must be an 
efficient cause.  That’s all we know about efficient causality.” TPF64FPT  We know nothing of other 
efficient causes that may be at work in nature, much less why they should work as they do, 
and we know nothing of why, or even how, divine and human efficient causality work as 
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they do.  We are able to discover laws of nature—regularities in the way things happen—and 
explain many of these laws by subsuming them under greater, related laws.  But we can say 
nothing meaningful at all about the nature of causation.  We can see that certain factors are 
involved in the production of certain effects but cannot see why things should work that 
way. TPF65FPT 
As Cuneo and Woudenberg note, Kant’s accusation that Reidian common sense is 
an “appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is 
ashamed…when no rational justification for one’s position can be advanced…when insight 
and science fail,” is “more than a little ironic, for Reid himself would not have denied that 
there is a sense in which appealing to common sense—to what it ‘is ridiculous to doubt’—is 
humiliating for the philosopher.”TPF66FPT  The passage from Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers 
that Cuneo and Woudenberg quote in support of their observation is too poignant to pass 
by: 
When I remember distinctly a past event, or see an object before my eyes, this commands 
my belief no less than an axiom.  But when, as a Philosopher, I reflect upon this belief, and 
want to trace it to its origin, I am not able to resolve it into necessary and self-evident 
axioms, or conclusions that are necessarily consequent upon them.  I seem to want that 
evidence which I can best comprehend, and which gives perfect satisfaction to an inquisitive 
mind; yet it is ridiculous to doubt, and I find it is not in my power.  An attempt to throw off 
this belief, is like an attempt to fly, equally ridiculous and impracticable. 
 To a Philosopher, who has been accustomed to think that the treasure of his 
knowledge is the acquisition of that reasoning power of which he boasts, it is no doubt 
humiliating to find, that his reason can lay no claim to the greater part of it.TPF67FPT 
 
In Reid’s case at least, Kant mistakes humility for subterfuge. 
Nor does Reid’s humility take the form of foreclosing questions about the 
“mysteries” that face him.  He probes deeply into the workings of the human mind and into 
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the workings of nature.  No, the great difference between Reid and Hume, and between Reid 
and Kant, is not the subtlety with which they think (Reid holds his own here) or the care 
with which they observe (although here Reid surely has the advantage) but the place from 
which they start their inquiries.  Reid starts with what is given in experience—everything given 
in experience—while Hume and Kant begin with Cartesian doubt.  Hume and Kant say, 
effectively, “Prove to me that what I seem to know is real;” Reid says, “How should I 
understand what I seem to know?”  Reid in the Inquiry describes the Humean and Kantian 
skeptic thus:  “The skeptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external object 
which you believe?…There is nothing so shameful in a philosopher as to be deceived and 
deluded; and therefore you ought to resolve firmly to withhold assent, and to throw off all 
this belief of external objects, which may be all delusion.”TPF68FPT  As Wolterstorff explains, 
“Reid’s skeptic is a foundationalist of the classically modern sort.”TPF69FPT  “To be a classical 
foundationalist with respect to some particular truth-relevant merit,” Wolterstorff continues, 
“is to hold that a condition of some judgment or belief possessing that merit is that it be an 
ideally formed belief,” a belief formed on the basis of direct acquaintance with facts.  “The 
classically modern foundationalist [my emphasis] is a classic foundationalist who embraces the 
position [that] the only source of acquaintance with facts is inner awareness, with reason 
understood as a special case thereof:  reason yields acquaintance with the logical properties 
of states of mind and their logical interconnections.”TPF70FPT  Reid thinks this “classically modern 
foundationalist” position cannot be safely assumed.  He thinks that we have no good reason 
a priori to privilege one kind of seeming awareness over others.  Our awareness of external 
objects seems as real as our awareness of logical relations, and seemings are all we have to 
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begin with in our investigation of what is.  In the course of his investigations, the 
philosopher notices certain regularities, and among these are Reid’s principles of common 
sense.  These are principles the philosopher must take for granted “in his posing of 
questions, in his raising of doubts, in his offerings of reasons.”  As he cannot help but take 
these principles for granted, Reid insists that he ought to treat them with respect and 
recognize their authority.  This does not mean he shouldn’t question and challenge these 
principles, only that he should recognize that the burden of proof is on him in doing so, not 
on those who take them to be reliable.TPF71FPT 
What are these principles of common sense?  Reid calls them “first principles or self-
evident truths,” and divides them into “first principles of contingent truths” and “first 
principles of necessary truths.”  Of the former, Reid lists twelve: 
1.  First, then, I hold, as a first principle, the existence of every thing of which I am 
conscious. 
2.  Another first principle, I think, is, that the thoughts of which I am conscious are 
the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person. 
3.  Another first principle I take to be, that those things did really happen which I 
distinctly remember. 
4.  Another first principle is our own personal identity and continued existence, as 
far back as we remember anything distinctly. 
5.  Another first principle is, that those things do really exist which we distinctly 
perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. 
6.  Another first principle, I think, is, that we have some degree of power over our 
actions, and the determinations of our will. 
7.  Another first principle is, that the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth 
from error, are not fallacious. 
8.  Another first principle relating to existence, is, that there is life and intelligence in 
our fellow men with whom we converse. 
9.  Another first principle I take to be, that certain features of the countenance, 
sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and 
dispositions of mind. 
10.  Another first principle, appears to me to be, that there is a certain regard due to 
human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of 
opinion. 
11.  There are many events dependent upon the will of man, in which there is a self-
evident probability, greater or less, according to the circumstances. 
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12.  The last principle of contingent truths I mention, is, that, in the phenomena of 
nature, what is to be, will probably be like to what has been in similar 
circumstances.TPF72FPT 
 
Reid calls these “contingent” because some of them depend on certain prior conditions, e.g., 
a normally functioning mind, and the rest because they might conceivably have been 
otherwise than they are.  The necessary truths could not be other than they are.  Reid names 
six classes of necessary truths: 
1.  There are some first principles that may be called grammatical:  such as, That every 
adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood; That every complete 
sentence must have a verb. 
2.  There are logical axioms:  such as, That any contexture of words which does not make a 
proposition, is neither true nor false; That every proposition is either true or false; That no 
proposition can be both true and false at the same time; That reasoning in a circle proves nothing; 
That whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus, may be truly affirmed of all the species, and all the 
individuals belonging to that genus. 
3.  Every one knows there are mathematical axioms. 
4.  I think there are axioms, even in matters of taste.  Notwithstanding the variety 
found among men, in taste, there are, I apprehend, some common principles, even in 
matters of this kind. 
5.  There are also first principles in morals.  That an unjust action has more demerit than an 
ungenerous one: That a generous action has more merit than a merely just one: That no man ought 
to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder: That we ought not to do to others what we 
would thing unjust or unfair to be done to us in like circumstances.  These are moral axioms, 
and many others might be named which appear to me to have no less evidence than 
those of mathematics. 
6.  The last class of first principles I shall mention, we may call metaphysical.  I shall 
particularly consider three of these, because they have been called in question by Mr 
Hume.  The first is, That the qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which 
we call body, and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind…  
The second metaphysical principle I mention is—That whatever begins to exist, must have a 
cause which produced it…  The third supposition is—That [causation] is to be admitted 
as a first or self-evident principle.  Two reasons may be urged for this.  The universal 
consent of mankind, not of philosophers only, but of the rude and unlearned 
vulgar…  That mankind not only assent to it in speculation, but that the practice of 
life is grounded upon it in the most important matters, even in cases where 
experience leaves us doubtful; and it is impossible to act with common prudence if 
we set it aside.TPF73FPT 
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Reid takes pains to show in the text why all the foregoing must be taken as first principles.  
What sets him apart from Hume and Kant, and what in his view generally sets the man of 
common sense apart from the skeptic, is that he does not think our inability to explain these 
principles in itself gives any reason to doubt them. 
 Witherspoon was well acquainted with the works of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, 
and Reid, discussed them in his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, and recommended them to his 
students for closer study.  Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue and his Moral System were particularly important for the lectures:  Witherspoon clearly 
used them as a template for organizing the course, despite keeping up a running dispute with 
Hutcheson on certain key points throughout.  McCosh likewise knew Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Hume, and Reid well, and was especially impressed and influenced by Reid’s 
works.TPF74FPT  Of course, both Witherspoon and McCosh were deeply immersed in the Scottish 
school, and so had read a great many other books of Scottish philosophy beyond those of 
Hutcheson, Hume, and Reid. 
 The last great common sense philosopher with whom we need concern ourselves—
for purposes of this study—is Sir William Hamilton.  McCosh calls him “the most learned of 
all the Scottish metaphysicians.”TPF75FPT  McCosh ought to have known, for he studied under 
Hamilton at the University of Edinburgh.  Hamilton tried to synthesize the insights of Reid 
and Kant, with varying success.  Perhaps his greatest contribution to common sense 
philosophy was his remarkable scholarly essay “On the Philosophy of Common Sense; or 
Our Primary Beliefs Considered as the Ultimate Criterion of Truth,” which must be 
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considered a classic, perhaps the best short account of the subject ever written.TPF76FPT  Therein he 
describes common sense principles as “the primary elements of cognition”—“primary 
propositions…cognitions at first hand…fundamental facts, feelings, beliefs…that as 
elements of our mental constitution—as the essential conditions of our knowledge—must by 
us be accepted as true.”TPF77FPT  The formulation “primary propositions,” which Hamilton uses 
frequently, is unfortunate, as it gives the impression that these fundamental principles of the 
mind appear as propositions, when what he means to convey is that these spontaneous 
primary beliefs may, on being noticed, be easily expressed in propositional form, as Reid 
expresses them above.  “To argue from common sense,” Hamilton says, “is simply to show, 
that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial of some original datum of 
consciousness; but as every original datum of consciousness is to be presumed true, that the 
proposition in question, as dependent on such a principle, must be admitted.”  The original 
data of consciousness must, if the deliverances of consciousness are to be trusted at all, be 
presumed true until proved false.  This much, however, as Hamilton points out, is 
uncontroversial.  “The facts of consciousness, as mere phenomena, are by the unanimous 
confession of all Sceptics and Idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above the reach of 
question,” and Hamilton gives a list of citations to prove it.  The real debatable issue is 
whether these bare phenomena may be “viewed as attestations of more than their own 
existence, seeing that they are not, in this respect, placed beyond the possibility of doubt.”TPF78FPT  
That is, can we trust the data of consciousness as indicators of really existing things beyond 
the mind? 
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On examination, Hamilton finds ten principles relevant to philosophy that are 
“either self-evident, or admit of easy proof”: 
1.  The end of philosophy is truth; and consciousness is the instrument and criterion 
of its acquisition.  In other words, philosophy is the development and application of 
the constitutive and normal truths which consciousness immediately reveals. 
2.  Philosophy is thus wholly dependent upon consciousness; the possibility of the 
former supposing the trustworthiness of the latter. 
3.  Consciousness is to be presumed trustworthy, until proved mendacious. 
4.  The mendacity of consciousness is proved, if its data, immediately in themselves, 
or mediately in their necessary consequences, be shown to stand in mutual 
contradiction. 
5.  The immediate or mediate repugnance of any two of its data being established, 
the presumption in favour of the general veracity of consciousness is abolished, or 
rather reversed.  For while, on the one hand, all that is not contradictory is not 
therefore true; on the other, a positive proof of falsehood, in one instance, 
establishes a presumption of probable falsehood in all. 
6.  No attempt to show that the data of consciousness are (either in themselves, or in 
their necessary consequences) mutually contradictory, has yet succeeded. 
7.  No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth or disclaimed the authority of 
consciousness; but few or none have been content implicitly to accept and 
consistently to follow out its dictates.  Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness, 
to draw from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic speculator looked 
only into consciousness, there to discover his preadopted opinions. 
8.  The first and most obtrusive consequence of this procedure has been, the 
multiplication of philosophical systems in every conceivable aberration from the 
unity of truth. 
9.  The second, but less obvious, consequence has been, the virtual surrender, by 
each several system, of the possibility of philosophy in general.  For, as the 
possibility of philosophy supposes the absolute truth of consciousness, every system 
which proceeded on the hypothesis, that even a single deliverance of consciousness 
is untrue, did, however it might eschew the overt declaration, thereby invalidate the 
general credibility of consciousness, and supply to the sceptic the premises he 
required to subvert philosophy, in so far as that system represented it. 
10.  And yet, although the past history of philosophy has, in a great measure, been 
only a history of variation and error…yet the cause of this variation being known, we 
obtain a valid ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in future.  Because, since 
philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent with itself, only in being inconsistent with 
the dictates of our natural beliefs…it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to 
natural consciousness.TPF79FPT 
 
Hamilton then offers three guidelines for keeping philosophy from so much variation and 
error: 
 
                                                 
TP
79
PT Ibid., 746-7. 
 32
1) That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of consciousness, or the 
legitimate consequence of such a datum; 
2) That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, and all their legitimate 
consequences; and 
3) That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, neither distorted nor 
mutilated, and in its relative place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination. TPF80FPT 
 
Here, then, is the key point in responding to the skeptic:  that included in the data of 
consciousness during an act of perception is a sense or awareness of the externality and 
independent existence of an object perceived.  “In the act of sensible perception, I am 
conscious of two things;—of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality, in 
relation with my sense, as the object perceived.  Of the existence of both these things I am 
convinced:  because I am conscious of knowing each of them, not mediately, in something 
else, as represented, but immediately in itself, as existing.  Of their mutual independence I am no 
less convinced; because each is apprehended equally, and at once, in the same indivisible 
energy, the one not preceding or determining, the other not following or determined; and 
because each is apprehended out of, and in direct contrast to, the other.”TPF81FPT  One must 
abstract from the originary experience, from the original contents of consciousness, to take 
seriously the notion that we know nothing of the world beyond our minds. 
 All this may seem far removed indeed from matters of politics, and in fact Hamilton 
wrote little of direct applicability to political life, but his writings are nonetheless part of a 
broad effort of common sense thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to combat 
a growing philosophical skepticism they took to be dangerous in the long term to moral and 
political order.  As Haakonssen demonstrates, this movement emerged out of the larger 
Protestant natural law tradition that can be traced back to Grotius’ seventeenth-century 
classic De iure belli ac pacis (The Law of War and Peace) and extends to the American founding 
                                                 
TP
80
PT Ibid., 747. 
TP
81
PT Ibid. 
 33
and beyond, and which was itself preoccupied with overcoming modern skeptical 
tendencies. 
Scholastic natural law theory, as represented by [Francis] Suárez…was an obvious target for 
the sort of moral scepticism which had been revived at the Renaissance and which continued 
to have great influence in the formulations given it by thinkers such as Montaigne and 
Charron.  Scholastic natural law seemed to presuppose a degree of knowledge about God, 
the world, and human nature which it was only too easy for sceptical criticism to undermine.  
Not least, it operated with an idea of God and of the relationship between God and man 
which could hardly be considered ‘natural’ unless it could be shown to be persuasive outside 
the Christian world, for example in the new colonies in the Americas and elsewhere.  One of 
the main points of modern scepticism was that this was not the case.  Religious and moral 
notions were so relative to time and place that no theoretically coherent account could be 
given of them.  Not least, such notions were relative to each person’s interest or individual 
utility.  This connection of an Epicurean theme with Renaissance relativism was made with 
particular effect when Grotius in the ‘Prolegomena’ to his De iure belli ac pacis (1625) singled 
out Carneades as the classical representative of all skepticism.  A continuing ambition of 
modern natural law was therefore to overcome such scepticism.TPF82FPT 
 
This ambition manifestly animated Scottish natural jurisprudence and moral philosophy, and 
was the driving force behind Scottish Common Sense philosophy, for which natural law and 
natural justice were central concerns.  Indeed, common sense for the Scottish Common 
Sense philosophers contained within itself the rudiments of natural right and natural law.  
According to Haakonssen, “The mainstream of Scottish moral philosophy in the eighteenth 
century [is] a basically cognitivist and realist tradition.  It stretches from Francis Hutcheson 
and George Turnbull via Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, Thomas Reid, and the Common 
Sense philosophers, to Dugald Stewart and his circle; and it forms the philosophical 
backbone of more popular moralizing by enlightened clergymen and others, such as the 
group of ‘moderate literati’ now so well explored.  Though exhibiting variations in moral 
psychology, epistemology, and ontology, as well as theology, these thinkers generally claimed 
that mankind’s potential for moral knowledge has an extent and a certainty quite beyond that 
allowed by Hume and [Adam] Smith, and they took this to have important political 
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implications.”  Hume and Smith, then—the best remembered Scottish philosophers today—
were decidedly out of the mainstream of the Scottish moral philosophy of the time. TPF83FPT 
In fact, while Hume and Smith were read and respected by the American founders, 
other Scottish thinkers cumulatively may well have had a larger influence on them.  With 
some of the founders they certainly did.  Witherspoon and James Wilson, the two leading 
Scotsmen of the founding generation, favored Hutcheson and especially Reid over Hume 
and Smith. TPF84FPT  James Madison was a student of Witherspoon’s at Princeton, shared 
Witherspoon’s basic religious convictions and political philosophy, and maintained close ties 
to the older man as long as the latter lived, and so seems likely to have shared the professor’s 
criticisms of Hume as well as his appreciation for Hume’s practical political wisdom. TPF85FPT  The 
other leading founders certainly read Hutcheson, Kames, and Ferguson, if not always Reid,TPF86FPT 
as well as Hume and Smith.  (Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, incidentally, was as well 
known to the founding generation as his later, ultimately better remembered Wealth of 
Nations.) 
In any event, the idea of common sense, in a form most familiar from Scottish 
writings, was firmly embedded in the American psyche.  When Thomas Paine wrote his 
famous pamphlet in 1776, its title resonated with the American public in a way we can 
scarcely appreciate today because of the pervasive influence of the Scottish philosophy 
among the educated of the time.  Jefferson, writing to Henry Lee in 1825, said that the 
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Declaration of Independence was meant “not to find out new principles, or new arguments, 
never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to 
place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to 
command their assent.”  It was meant at the same time to express the common sense of the 
American people, to be “an expression of the American mind” and of “the harmonizing 
sentiments of the day,” not of opinions peculiar to Jefferson or other founders.TPF87FPT  Jefferson’s 
Declaration thus expressed both senses of the old common sense:  common sense as self-
evident truth (“We hold these truths to be self-evident”) and common sense as the sense of 
the community grounded in common convictions and understandings that are universally 
valid. 
William James, for his part, said at the outset of his Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh 
on The Varieties of Religious Experience that his philosophic imagination had been lastingly 
animated by Scottish Common Sense:  “The glories of the philosophic chair of this 
university [Edinburgh] were deeply impressed on my imagination in boyhood.  Professor 
Fraser’s Essays in Philosophy, then just published, was the first philosophic book I ever 
looked into, and I well remember the awestruck feeling I received from the account of Sir 
William Hamilton’s class-room therein contained.  Hamilton’s own lectures were the first 
philosophic writings I ever forced myself to study, and after that I was immersed in Dugald 
Stewart and Thomas Brown.  Such juvenile emotions of reverence never get outgrown.”TPF88FPT  
This vignette is especially interesting in light of the similarity between Hamilton’s guidelines 
for philosophizing quoted above and James’ own account of the fundamental “postulate” 
underlying his own radical empiricism:  “The postulate is that the only things that shall be 
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debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.  
[Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the 
material for philosophic debate.]” TPF89FPT  Elsewhere James describes his “methodical postulate” 
this way:  “Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it says, except what can be experienced at some 
definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever so experienced, a definite 
place must be found somewhere in the final system of reality.  In other words:  Everything 
real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must 
somewhere be real.”TPF90FPT  The resemblance of James’ philosophic method as expressed here to 
Hamilton’s in the latter’s essay on common sense is remarkable.  I cannot help but wonder 
whether the germ of James’ vision for a radically empirical philosophy was caught in his early 
study of Hamilton.  In any case, the common sense attitude expressed in Hamilton’s 
guidelines is unmistakably the same attitude James adopts as fundamental to his philosophic 
enterprise. 
James’ attitude toward skepticism, moreover, bears a striking resemblance to Thomas 
Reid’s.  Reid’s skeptic, you will recall, says in effect, “There is nothing so shameful in a 
philosopher as to be deceived and deluded; and therefore you ought to resolve firmly to 
withhold assent, and to throw off all this belief of external objects, which may be all 
delusion.”TPF91FPT  This sounds very much like the skeptical posture James challenges in “The Will 
to Believe.”  There James responds to W. K. Clifford’s claim that, “It is wrong, always, 
everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”TPF92FPT  Like Reid, 
James suggests that such commitments are passional rather than rational and reflect an 
unaccountable privileging of the desire to avoid error over the desire to discover the truth, 
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whatever the risk.  Clifford’s position, he thinks, stems from a “horror of becoming a dupe.”  
But James “can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this 
world,” and finds “a certain lightness of heart [about the possibility of error] healthier than 
this excessive nervousness” about it.TPF93FPT  James’ attitude here exhibits the playful seriousness 
Shaftesbury called for, an attitude perhaps nowhere more poignantly modeled than by 
Socrates in the Phaedo, in which he tries (waiting for his own death by execution!) to encourage 
his friends to adopt a more playful mood in exploring such uncertain matters as what 
happens to a man after he dies.  After making an educated guess as to what men are likely to 
face in the afterlife, Socrates says to them, “Of course, no reasonable man ought to insist 
that the facts are exactly as I have described them.  But that either this or something very like 
it is a true account of our souls and their future habitations—since we have clear evidence 
[from the preceding argument] that the soul is immortal—this, I think, is both a reasonable 
contention and a belief worth risking, for the risk is a noble one.” TPF94FPT  James himself doubted 
the existence of the soul as classically conceived, but he shared Socrates’ attitude toward the 
possibility of immortality and, more to the point, he took the “risk” of believing for the sake 
of discovering true goods to be more reasonable than a cringing withdrawal from the search 
for fear of going astray.  In the end, “Scepticism…is not avoidance of option; it is option of 
a certain particular kind of risk.  Better risk loss of truth than chance of error—that is your faith-
vetoer’s exact position.”  He concludes:  “A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent 
me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would 
be an irrational rule,” and “this command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts 
and courage, and wait—acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religion [and by 
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implication, a greater meaning of human life] were not true—till doomsday, or till such time 
as our intellect and senses working together may have raked in evidence enough—this 
command, I say, seems to me the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic 
cave.”TPF95FPT 
 One of the things for James worth the risk of believing, both because the 
probabilities seem to lie that way and because the payoff for being right could be enormous, 
was that a deeper moral order guaranteeing our highest ideals is available to us, though it 
cannot be proved beyond all doubt.  He was cautiously confident with Witherspoon and 
McCosh that he had found sufficient grounding for a robust, rich, and well-ordered moral 
life.TPF96FPT 
The ultimate aim of the present study is to consider common sense as a cultural and 
political force.  In many respects, the influence of common sense on politics and culture is 
indirect, and therefore it is not always easily observable.  The significance of a deeply rooted 
tradition of common sense is most easily seen negatively, in its absence.  Eric Voegelin’s 
comment (quoted, p. 6 above) on the absence of a tradition of common sense in twentieth-
century Germany is instructive.  He had been driven to study ancient Greek philosophy—
which he came to understand as a philosophical differentiation of the common sense 
attitude—by his perplexity over how an ideological movement as monstrous as National 
Socialism could have resonated in the advanced German culture in which he grew up.  His 
conclusion that it was the absence of a common sense tradition in Germany that made the 
phenomenon of Nazism possible there should give us pause.  A tradition of common sense 
does not guarantee a noble politics, but it does serve as a powerful antidote to ideological 
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depredations.  What more common sense portends politically, I will try to show in the 
following chapters. 
 40
WITHERSPOON’S ‘PLAIN COMMON SENSE’TPF97FPT 
 
John Witherspoon’s moral philosophy represents a nascent form of the Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy that reached its apex in the thought of Thomas Reid.  
Witherspoon was acquainted with Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind by the time he penned 
the lecture notes that compose his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, but his lectures owed much 
less to Reid than to Francis Hutcheson, from whose Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of 
Beauty and Virtue and System of Moral Philosophy he borrowed extensively. TPF98FPT  Jack Scott, editor 
of an annotated edition of the Lectures, fairly sums up Witherspoon’s importance in the 
history of American common sense philosophy in saying that, “In terms of Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy, Witherspoon’s thought is neither original nor profound.  
Rather, his real significance is in making Princeton a citadel of Scottish realism—a citadel 
that, in turn, dominated philosophical thought in American higher education for many 
decades.”TPF99FPT  However, while few of the ideas in the Lectures are original to Witherspoon, his 
synthesis of the ideas of others—Joseph Butler, Anthony Ashley Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), 
Samuel Clarke, Hume, Locke, and others, as well as Hutcheson—is.  His own unique 
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synthesis helped shape the contours of American political theory during the founding era 
through his classes at Princeton, the “School of Statesmen,” TPF100FPT through the widespread use 
of his lectures at universities across the country,TPF101FPT and through his most famous student, 
James Madison, whose leading political principles bear strong resemblance to ideas 
emphasized in the Lectures. TPF102FPT 
Broadly stated, Witherspoon’s own brand of common sense philosophy is grounded 
in experience, structured by human nature, and motivated by a high-minded pragmatism.  
The experience to which Witherspoon’s commonsense approach appeals is the combined 
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experience of the individual social scientist and of mankind generally through the ages.  As a 
social scientist, Witherspoon begins with an inductive exploration of political reality, of man 
and society, and complements this personal kind of knowing by acquaintance with a broad 
knowledge of the common experience of man as revealed in the seminal works (both ancient 
and contemporary) of philosophy and history. TPF103FPT  This deep and broad experience of political 
reality discloses a human nature consistent through time and intimating in its structure and 
dynamics a tolerably clear natural order and purpose for individual and social human affairs.  
Human nature thus becomes, at least in its essential elements, a constant in political reality, a 
coherent form out of which fundamental ethical and political principles may be drawn.  The 
commonsense analysis of man is directed and driven by a noble pragmatism that asks what 
will enable man to be true to his evident essential nature (this constitutes his duty) and what 
will enable him to maximize his potentiality (this constitutes his freedom).  “Common sense,” 
then, in Witherspoon’s case, is not only the ordinary good sense of ordinary people 
(although it certainly includes that), but also the funded good sense of educated and engaged 
men across the centuries – men well acquainted with the great meditations on human nature 
and the perennial human problems, not detached from the experiences of ordinary people or 
lost in abstract speculations, but participating on all levels in the world of which they are part 
and drawing their principles and constructing their theories from the concrete facts of 
human existence as they present themselves “on the ground.” 
Common sense philosophy has historically always been concerned with exploring a 
middle way between skepticism and dogmatism,TPF104FPT and Witherspoon’s version of it is no 
exception.  Skepticism in Witherspoon’s day was represented most formidably by David 
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Hume, who had called into question the mind’s ability to know anything beyond its own 
perceptions, which themselves had no definite demonstrable relation to the outside world.  
Dogmatism (as Witherspoon saw it, at least) took the shape of Bishop George Berkeley’s 
“immaterialism” or spiritualism, an early form of idealism that made the universe a 
constellation of ideas in the minds of its inhabitants.  In the Lectures, Witherspoon tries to 
forge a via media between skepticism and idealism, reaffirming the mind’s spiritual quality and 
capacity to know objective moral truth, on the one hand, and its rootedness in the body and 
the material world, on the other.  The search for foundations, as Witherspoon suggests in his 
“Recapitulation” of the Lectures, had taken a different form in modernity than it had among 
the ancients: “I am not sensible that there is any thing among the ancients, that wholly 
corresponds with the modern dispute upon the foundation of virtue.”  He explains: 
The great inquiry among the ancients was, what was the summum bonum? by which it seems 
they took it for granted, that virtue and happiness were the same thing.  The chief 
combatants here, were the Stoics and the Epicureans.  The first insisted that virtue was the 
summum bonum, that pleasure was no good, and pain no evil: the other said that the summum 
bonum consisted in pleasure, or rather that pleasure was virtue: the Academics and Platonists 
went a middle way between these.TPF105FPT 
 
(One gets the sense here that Witherspoon admires the Academics and Platonists for taking 
a middle way.)  Ancient philosophers generally had been preoccupied with human ends 
(human potentiality and destiny), modern philosophers with beginnings (origins and 
foundations).  For the ancients, virtue was especially a question of ends, but for the moderns 
the critical question concerning virtue was its foundation, its source.  Witherspoon admirably 
addresses both foundations and ends in the Lectures.  For him, foundations and ends are 
directly and inseparably connected: the foundation of human virtue is the design of human 
nature, and this design suggests a purpose and an end for man. 
                                                 
TP
105
PT Jack Scott, An Annotated Edition of Lectures on Moral Philosophy, by John Witherspoon (Newark:  University of 
Delaware Press, 1982), 187.  Cited hereafter as LMP. 
 44
Witherspoon derives his ethics from human nature, and his politics from his ethics.  
In the introductory lecture of the series, Witherspoon defines “moral philosophy” as “that 
branch of Science which treats of the principles and laws of Duty or Morals.”TPF106FPT  It is the 
“superior science” to which all other sciences – including mathematics and natural science – 
are “but hand-maids”TPF107FPT and includes under its rubric both ethics and politics.  At its most 
fundamental level, moral philosophy is really “nothing else but the knowledge of human 
nature.”TPF108FPT  Duty is subjection to “some law [or] to some superior, to whom we are 
accountable,” TPF109FPT and the “principles of duty … must be drawn from the nature of man.  That 
is to say, if we can discover how his Maker formed him, or for what he intended him, that 
certainly is what [he] ought to be.”TPF110FPT  The principle or law determining our duties as human 
beings is ultimately the design of human nature itself, and the superior to whom we are 
accountable is God, the architect of human nature.TPF111FPT 
CORRUPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 
What, then, is the design of human nature?  This is not immediately obvious, 
unfortunately, thanks to its corruption.  Because of “the depravity and corruption of our 
nature,” we are “apt” to take “many things as dictates of human nature, which are in reality 
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propensities of nature in its present state, but at the same time the fruit and evidence of its 
departure from its original purity.”TPF112FPT  The problem of corruption is apparent in the 
manifestly self-destructive and anti-social tendencies of man, in man’s all-too-obvious 
proclivity for injustice.  In a sermon, Man in His Natural State, Witherspoon tries to show that 
the corruption of human nature reveals itself not only in Scripture but also in “the visible 
state of the world, and our experience.”  He says that the tendency toward evil and the 
aversion to good in man is evident in human beings from childhood, and offers as 
corroboration the following observations:  the difficulty of raising a child well and the fact 
that wrongdoing does not need to be taught but requires only “license” to be learned; the 
difficulty of overcoming the propensity to evil even for the religiously committed; the 
“pernicious effects” of immorality on societies and private persons; the testimony one hears 
about the behavior and attitudes of others; the testimony of one’s own conscience about 
one’s own motives and actions; the universal practice of offering sacrifices among ancient 
nations; the misery so pervasive in the human experience; and the “natural terror and fear, 
with which men are possest of the presence of God, or any remarkable token of his power, 
which is an indication of guilt, or an apprehension of wrath.” TPF113FPT  There is, Witherspoon 
suggests, a virtually endless supply of empirical evidence for the fact of human depravity or, 
to use the Christian term, “sin.”TPF114FPT 
It would be a mistake, however, to take this corruption as the standard of normality.  
Indeed, the very notion that man is corrupt, that he is not what he should be, suggests a 
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standard by which he may be judged and against which he falls short.  A common theme in 
the philosophy of man in Witherspoon’s day, derived most directly from Hobbes but evident 
as early as Machiavelli, was that man’s selfishness is what is most basic to his nature and is 
therefore the proper foundation for a theory of politics.  To Witherspoon, selfishness is 
indeed endemic to human nature in its current state, but he thinks the facts elucidated above 
suggest that selfishness is man’s ruin rather than his true shape.  This corruption, 
furthermore, is not total; man retains in his twisted state a capacity for goodness and may, 
with grace and discipline, approximate his original, unspoiled nature in some measure.  The 
problem of selfishness is quite real and must be taken seriously as a realistic limitation on 
political endeavors, but the statesman should take his moral and political bearings from the 
uncorrupted form of man rather than from the corrupted if he is to attain the best political 
life possible in the circumstances. 
COMPOSITION OF HUMAN NATURE 
Given the problem of corruption, what can we say with confidence about human 
nature in its proper form?  The most basic observation, to Witherspoon, is that man “is a 
compound of body and spirit.”TPF115FPT  This was not an uncontested point even in Witherspoon’s 
day.  Hobbes had already reduced man to an organic machine—nature, including human 
nature, was at its most irreducible level merely matter-in-motionTPF116FPT—and even Locke, an 
apparently genuine proponent of the Christian religion, had through his sensationalist 
epistemology called into question the degree to which man could really know the spiritual in 
any meaningful sense, provoking a heroic but unsuccessful effort by Berkeley to restore 
“spiritual substance” to the theoretic centrality it assumed in premodern Christian 
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philosophy. TPF117FPT  Witherspoon, for his part, clearly understood the spirit of man as something 
real, fully as real as his body, not separable from the body short of death but distinct from it. 
Witherspoon does not at this point in the Lectures provide evidence for the existence 
of spiritual substance, but he does try to give something like a proof of spirituality in his 
discussion of the attributes of God in Lecture VI.  While he freely acknowledges that, “we 
cannot at present form any complete or adequate ideas of a spirit,” he is convinced that 
"mind or intelligence must be a substance altogether distinct from matter,” given that “all 
the known properties of matter are incapable of producing thought.”TPF118FPT  This immaterial 
locus of intelligence is for Witherspoon also that part of man capable of interaction with 
divine reality.  He attempts in several of his writings to address this dimension of human 
spirituality empirically, looking to his own and others’ actual experiences.  In a number of his 
sermons Witherspoon speaks of “vital” or “inward” religion as a growing intercourse with 
divine “presence,” most remarkably in The Object of a Christian’s Desire in Religious Worship, in 
which he meditates on the meaning of “true piety.”  True piety, he says, “is the same in 
substance in all ages, and points at one thing as its centre and its rest, the knowledge and 
enjoyment of God.”  Through the course of the sermon Witherspoon makes clear that he 
does not mean by this merely an intellectual appreciation of God’s nature but an experience 
of his presence, a “real, inward, and sensible communion with God.”  He goes on to say that 
“the real and proper knowledge of the glory of God is by inward and spiritual illumination . . 
. It is one thing to think, and speak, and reason on the perfections of God, as an object of 
science, and another to glorify him as God, or to have a deep and awful impression of him 
upon our hearts.  Real believers will know this by experience.  A discovery of the glory of 
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God, is not to inform them of a truth which they never heard before, but to give lively and 
penetrating views of the meaning and importance of those truths which they had, perhaps, 
heard and spoken times without number.”  Further on Witherspoon emphasizes the 
importance of “that overwhelming sense of his presence which believers have sometimes in 
his worship in public or in secret.”  Such experiences of God, he thinks, while perhaps not 
frequent and anything but ordinary, are meant to be the driving center of men’s lives, for 
“man was made for living upon God.” TPF119FPT  Significantly, Witherspoon clearly understood such 
religious experiences to have direct relevance for political life, as we shall see. 
On the most basic level, then, man is body and spirit, two distinct but connected 
substances.  But Witherspoon explicitly rejects attempts (such as those of Descartes with his 
strict duality of body and spirit) to separate starkly the physical and spiritual dimensions of 
man.  According to Witherspoon, “body and spirit have a great reciprocal influence one 
upon another.”  The body influences “the temper and disposition of the soul,” and the soul 
impacts “the state and habit of the body.  The body is properly the minister of the soul, the 
means of conveying perceptions to it, but nothing without it.”TPF120FPT  Nothing related to man, it 
seems, is either a purely physical or a purely spiritual affair.  Everything human, by virtue of 
being human, is a mixture of animal and spirit.  Politics deals primarily with outward 
behavior, but its quality is determined by the spiritual condition of those who collectively 
make up society, for no political system can facilitate a good life for them if they lack the 
inward integrity to carry out their duties and respect the rights of others, and “true religion” 
is the only sure ground of good morals. TPF121FPT  Religion, conversely, is specially interested in the 
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soul but is also much concerned with the body.  As Witherspoon says in another of his 
sermons,  “True religion is nothing else but an inward temper and outward conduct suited to 
your state and circumstances in providence at any time [emphasis added].”TPF122FPT 
Witherspoon devotes most of the Lectures on Moral Philosophy to outlining duties 
related to outward conduct, but he begins them with an analysis of soul.  He discovers three 
basic “faculties” of the soul, or “mind” – “the understanding, the will, and the affections.”  
These faculties are not discrete, insular parts of the mind but rather distinct “qualities” of the 
one substance, “different ways of exerting the same simple principle.  It is the soul or mind 
that understands, wills, or is affected with pleasure or pain.”TPF123FPT  “Faculty,” then, should be 
understood on this account to mean “function.”  The understanding “seems to have truth 
for its object;” its function is, to put it precisely, “the discovering of things as they really are 
in themselves, and in their natural relations one to another.”TPF124FPT  The acts of will can be 
reduced to “desire and aversion, or in other words, chusing [sic] and refusing,”TPF125FPT and the 
function of the will seems to be to choose the true and the good, or the best of available 
alternatives, and to refuse the false and bad.  Affections—“called also passions because often 
excited by external objects”—are “strong propensities, implanted in our nature, which of 
themselves contribute not a little to bias the judgment, or incline the will,”TPF126FPT and their 
appropriate function, as ensuing lectures seem to indicate, is to support judgment and will in 
favoring the right and the good.  It would seem, then, that misplaced affections are the 
source of human corruption—clouding the understanding, misdirecting the will, in short, 
undermining the normal functioning of the soul.  We have an early suggestion, then, that 
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restraining and redirecting the affections will be central to the project of recovering human 
excellence. 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
After describing the soul’s essential faculties, Witherspoon plunges into a lengthy 
discussion of epistemology, which occupied a central place in Witherspoon’s moral 
philosophy, as it did in Scottish philosophy generally.  This special attention to 
epistemological concerns was motivated by a desire to restore a confidence in reason that 
had been badly shaken in the modern epoch.  Witherspoon said that the function of the 
understanding was “the discovering of things as they really are in themselves, and in their 
natural relations one to another.”  Unlike the great skeptic David Hume, Witherspoon seems 
to think that the mind of man can actually penetrate to the essence of things and can see, to 
some degree at least, the true nature both of what they are and how they are related.  Like 
many others of his day, Witherspoon was alarmed at the spiritual and moral implications of 
Humean skepticism:  if Hume was right that we cannot know anything beyond sensational 
impressions in the mind, then it seemed to him impossible that we could know spiritual 
realities or moral truths. TPF127FPT  Skeptical epistemology needed be answered to show that moral 
philosophy has solid objective foundations. 
Understanding adequately the epistemological problem as it appeared in the late 
eighteenth century requires descending to its roots.  Hume’s skepticism emerged out of a 
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things; Witherspoon evidently thinks that he can.  The centrality of duty to his moral philosophy 
notwithstanding, Witherspoon’s response to the challenge of skepticism had much more in common with 
Reid’s than with Kant’s. 
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particular philosophic context.  Aristotelian and Scholastic principles, which long dominated 
Western higher education, had begun in previous centuries to harden into a dogmatic system 
of ideas that it was philosophic (and sometimes theological) heresy to question.  These 
principles were not necessarily wrong, but they had lost whatever meaning they once had 
because they had become disconnected from the primary experience of reality, had become 
merely a body of superficially examined abstractions that one could take or leave as a block, 
and it is not surprising that some of the deeper thinkers of the modern age decided to leave 
it, finding it intellectually and spiritually unsatisfying.  Francis Bacon’s analysis of the 
philosophical legacy of Aristotle and the Scholastics in his Novum Organum captured the 
growing sentiment of modern philosophers:  “Aristotle . . . corrupted natural philosophy by 
logic—thus he formed the world of categories, assigned to the human soul, the noblest of 
substances, a genus determined by words of secondary operation . . . and imposed 
innumerable arbitrary distinctions upon the nature of things; being everywhere more anxious 
as to definitions in teaching and the accuracy of wording of his propositions, than the 
internal truth of things;” the Scholastics, for their part, took the preoccupation with 
definitions and propositions to new extremes, and further corrupted philosophy “by the 
mixing of it up with superstition and theology.”TPF128FPT  Bacon did not perhaps give the 
Aristotelian tradition its due, but he did seem here to have fingered a real problem in ancient 
philosophy: an excessive formalism and tendency to flights of ungrounded speculation that 
sometimes led philosophers away from the real substance of things. 
By Witherspoon’s day the situation in philosophy had become quite unsettling: The 
salutary impulse to reconnect philosophy to man’s primary experience of reality was resulting 
in a discrediting not only of the defects noted by Bacon but of Aristotle and the Scholastics 
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in general.  The entire Aristotelian-Scholastic regime was being dismantled, including its 
highly differentiated analyses of psychic and social order, but offering in its place no viable 
alternative.   Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics, ethics, and politics continued to be 
studied to some degree (a lesser degree), but without much depth of penetration, and David 
Hume had taken the criticism of reason to its furthest extreme yet, casting serious doubt on 
our ability to know the reality even of the physical world, much less of the soul or God or 
spiritual order.  In this context, it was inevitable and essential that epistemology be given a 
central place in moral and political reasoning, for the sake of restoring confidence in reason’s 
ability to grasp the truth of reality. 
Witherspoon’s epistemology is, in the tradition of the so-called “British empiricists” 
(Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) and of the Scottish Common Sense philosophers (most 
notably Hutcheson and Reid), inductive.  As he says in his “Recapitulation” at the end of the 
Lectures:  “It is always safer in our reasonings to trace facts upwards, than to reason 
downwards, upon metaphysical principles.”TPF129FPT  The social scientist must begin with the facts 
on the ground, so to speak, and construct his theory to fit the facts rather than impose a 
theoretical construct and try to arrange the facts within it; otherwise, he distorts reality for 
the sake of theoretical neatness and convenience.  When important new facts are discovered 
that do not fit into the theory, the theory must be reconfigured, or reconstructed 
altogether.TPF130FPT  Witherspoon no doubt agreed with the approach articulated in Reid’s Inquiry 
into the Human Mind: 
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Conjectures and theories are the creatures of men, and will always be found very unlike the 
creatures of God.  If we would know the works of God, we must consult themselves with 
attention and humility, without daring to add anything of ours to what they declare.  A just 
interpretation of nature is the only sound and orthodox philosophy:  whatever we add of our 
own, is apocryphal, and of no authority. TPF131FPT 
 
Witherspoon’s epistemology is generally based on that of Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding.  This appears problematic at first blush because Hume’s skepticism was 
largely the product of a radicalization of Locke’s epistemology in the Essay.  Locke had said 
that all knowledge is derived indirectly through reflection on the sensations received from 
the sense organs and on the operations of the mind in organizing and interpreting the 
information they convey. TPF132FPT  Witherspoon follows Locke in finding only “two ways in which 
we come to the knowledge of things, viz. 1PstP, Sensation, 2PndP Reflection.” TPF133FPT  Unlike Locke, 
however, Witherspoon—following Hutcheson—divides the sensations into external and 
internal varieties,TPF134FPT suggesting that the spirit senses as well as the body.  Locke had 
understood all sensation to be external (seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, tasting) while 
reflection (on the impressions in the mind made by external sensations and on the 
operations of the mind in response to sensory experience) was internal. Witherspoon agrees 
with Locke that sensory experience is the foundation of all knowledge:  he takes as “a first 
                                                                                                                                                 
poignantly illustrated by the fact that professional pride and hunger for recognition so often outweigh a 
concern for truth among so many in the scientific world.  Humility, openness, and commitment to truth above 
personal considerations would seem the hallmarks of the true scientist. 
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principle” that “our senses are to be trusted in the information they give us,” and this is 
important because “they are the foundation of all our after reasonings.”TP F135F PT Like Locke, he 
believes that each external sensation carries with it a “supposition . . . that it is produced by 
an external object.”  He seems to stop short, as Locke does, of supposing that we can 
perceive external objects directly, suggesting that we perceive only the sensations created by 
the actions of such objects on our senses:  we have a kind of mediated perception of the 
world.  Thomas Reid shows through his careful observations of human perception that in 
fact our perception of external objects is quite distinct from the sensations produced in us by 
them; the hardness perceived in a table top, for example, is distinguishable from the feeling 
in the hand when pressed down on the table’s surface.TPF136FPT   Witherspoon, who read at least 
Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, TPF137FPT does not seem to have 
taken sufficient notice of the implications of such findings, the most important of which was 
that we perceive external objects as directly as we perceive the sensations within us produced 
by the objects; you directly perceive the hardness of the table quite as much as the pressure 
on your hand as you press down.  Hardness, while felt by the hand, is not perceived to be a 
quality of hand, but of table.  Thus, your perception of external things is as reliable as your 
perception of your own sensations, so that, as Reid contended, if you doubt your perception 
of the table you must, on the same grounds, doubt your perception of the sensation you feel 
in your hand.  Hume can radically doubt his ability to perceive anything beyond his 
sensations, but he cannot consistently continue to trust in his perception of the sensations 
themselves.  Reid argues in essence that Hume is not a consistent skeptic.  In fact, Hume’s 
behavior betrays him:  he continues to act as if he has a real awareness of the external world.  
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He continues to work; he continues to meet and correspond with friends; he continues, in 
short, to live as a normal human being.  It is one thing to question one’s perceptions; it is 
quite another to disbelieve them.TPF138FPT 
The great difficulty with perception is the possibility of being deceived.  We have all 
had the experience of thinking we saw water on a sun-baked highway only to discover that it 
was a mirage created by the sun’s rays reflecting off the asphalt surface.  Witherspoon is well 
aware of the problem of illusion and the possibility of mistaken perception, but holds that 
“The few exceptions of accidental irregularity in the senses, can found no just objection to 
[their status as the foundation of knowledge], as there are so many plain and obvious ways of 
discovering and correcting it.”TPF139FPT  In the example just given, we can correct our 
misperception of water on the highway by attaining a more direct view of the stretch of 
pavement in question.  “The reality of the material system,” Witherspoon says, “may be 
easily established, except upon such principles as are subversive of all certainty, and lead to 
universal skepticism; and persons who would maintain such principles, do not deserve to be 
reasoned with, because they do not pretend to communicate knowledge, but to take all 
knowledge from us.”TPF140FPT  Here is a clear example of Witherspoon’s high pragmatism, TPF141FPT a 
pragmatism recognizing that if we are to understand anything at all about the human 
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situation or to be capable of any meaningful action we must have some minimal trust in our 
ability to know. 
The other major epistemological approach in Witherspoon’s day (besides 
skepticism), as hinted before, was that of idealism, with its reduction of all experience and 
indeed of all reality to mental phenomena.  Idealism reached its full flower in Germany, of 
course, especially with Hegel, but it had already appeared in Witherspoon’s time in the form 
of Jonathan Edwards’s and more prominently of Bishop Berkeley’s “Immaterialism.”TPF142FPT  
Berkeley was among the first to recognize the materialist and skeptical implications of 
Locke’s Essay—of Locke’s grounding all knowledge in the five senses—and he endeavored 
in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge to make a solid case for the existence 
and primacy of spiritual substance.  According to Berkeley’s theory of knowledge, the 
material world exists only as perceived by the mind.  We can certainly know our own 
spiritual existence by the inescapable fact of our mental life, as Descartes recognized, but we 
cannot know objects external to ourselves apart from perceiving them with our minds.  
Berkeley’s conclusion from this is that there is no real existence of external objects apart 
from the mind’s perception of them:  the material world is contingent on the spirit, in which 
we participate.  Ironically, Berkeley’s calling into question the independent existence of 
physical realities paved the way for Hume’s skepticism.TPF143FPT 
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To Witherspoon, Edwardsean and Berkeleyan immaterialism was no more 
convincing than Humean skepticism.  Both were reductions of reality unwarranted by the 
empirical evidence.  The most fundamental problem with immaterialism, Witherspoon 
suggests, is that it annihilates the “distinction between truth and falsehood”:  if the material 
world is a product of the knowing mind, the content of what is known cannot be said to be 
true or false; it has no absolute basis in reality.  The upshot is that “truth” is nothing more 
than a phantasmic creation of the mind and necessarily as contingent and changeable as 
one’s own stream of thought.  Witherspoon concludes that the “immaterialist system” is “a 
wild and ridiculous attempt to unsettle the principles of common sense by metaphysical 
reasoning, which can hardly produce anything but contempt in the generality of persons who 
hear it, and which I verily believe, never produced conviction even in the persons who 
pretend to espouse it.”TPF144FPT  By “metaphysical reasoning,” Witherspoon means not theorizing 
per se but making deductions from groundless speculative assumptions.  Berkeley’s 
spiritualism is as much opposed to common sense as Hume’s skepticism.  Again, we all act 
as if, and cannot help acting as if, the physical objects we perceive around us are actual 
objects existing independently of our thoughts about them, to which we must to some 
degree take into account and adjust ourselves.  It might seem odd that such considerations 
are necessary, but such was the crisis of thought in late eighteenth-century Western 
civilization.  But while these epistemological debates no longer preoccupy our public 
intellectuals, the uncertainty they left behind about our capacity to know truth and reality 
remains. 
Witherspoon’s common sense philosophy, then, tries to steer clear of both the Scylla 
of skepticism and the Charybdis of idealism, even with regard to external sensation.  It is 
                                                 
TP
144
PT LMP, 74. 
 58
with internal sensation, however, and particularly with the “moral sense,” that the ethical and 
political ramifications of Witherspoon’s commonsense approach emerge most clearly.  Some 
internal sensation, according to Witherspoon, also arises from external objects, “but by 
abstraction,” perceiving in them “something farther than merely the sensible qualities” such 
as “a sense of beauty,” “pleasure in imitation,” “a sense of harmony,” and “a sense of order 
or proportion.”TPF145FPT  In addition to these “reflex senses,”TPF146FPT which spontaneously and 
reflexively arise on the experience of various outer phenomena, there is another internal 
sense, distinct from them, which “intimates and enforces duty, previous to all reasoning” – 
the moral sense.  The moral sense is “a sense and perception of moral excellence, and our 
obligation to conform ourselves to it in our conduct” and is “precisely the same thing with 
what, in scripture and common language, we call conscience.  It is the law which our Maker 
has written upon our hearts.”TPF147FPT  Witherspoon’s formulation here is significant: the moral 
sense “intimates and enforces duty previous to all reasoning.”  This means that moral truth is 
not achieved but rather clarified through reasoning.  Indeed, the moral sense is the motive force 
of all moral reasoning:  moral deliberation is a struggle to make sense of the faint 
impressions of conscience; the concern to be moral in the first place, the conviction to 
adhere to the right and the good, would not exist apart from its intimations and 
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commands.TPF148FPT  The moral sense will prove to be central to Witherspoon’s ethical and 
political theory. 
“The opposers of innate ideas” – Witherspoon explicitly references Locke, who 
argued in his Essay against any innate conceptions of morality, holding that all ideas, 
including moral concepts, are acquired (as opposed to being discovered) through experience—
“and of the law of nature, are unwilling to admit the reality of a moral sense, yet their 
objections are wholly frivolous.”TPF149FPT  Locke’s observation that no list of innate principles is 
universally recognized is not in itself, Witherspoon suggests, an adequate argument against 
their existence.  It may suggest only that such principles cannot be recognized and 
consistently practiced apart from diligent, careful, prolonged application.  The attainment of 
a mature ethics requires much study and practice just as does that of a refined appreciation 
for art.  The recognition of the need for cultivation to achieve a refined sense of morality 
hardly disproves the existence of an innate moral sense.  Indeed, it presupposes it; for how 
can one cultivate what is not there?  In the Essay Locke makes “frivolous” observation that 
many alleged innate ideas are not obvious to all; Witherspoon means to point out that 
certain truths about morality are self-evident, and therefore obvious, only on close 
inspection.  Self-evident truths are not necessarily always self-evident to all people 
everywhere (although they could be potentially); they are self-evident only to those who have 
observed carefully.  It is possible, then, according to Witherspoon, to articulate certain 
fundamental moral principles, and he in fact goes on in the course of the Lectures to try to do 
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so. TPF150FPT  These principles, themselves, however, are derived from something even more 
fundamental, from the moral sense, the “sense and perception of moral excellence” and the 
corresponding sense of “obligation to conform ourselves to [to this perceived moral 
excellence] in our conduct.” 
These moral principles are one sort – the most important sort, to Witherspoon’s 
mind – of common sense principles.  Witherspoon later in the Lectures speaks of Reid’s 
discovery of  “certain first principles or dictates of common sense, which are either simple 
perceptions, or seen with intuitive evidence.  These are the foundation of all reasoning, and 
without them, to reason is a word without a meaning.  They can no more be proved than 
you can prove an axiom in mathematical science.” TPF151FPT Reid includes among his examples of 
common sense principles (the reader will recall): (1) things we distinctly perceive with our 
senses actually exist and are what we perceive them to be; (2) the faculties by which we 
distinguish truth from error are not fallacious; (3) we have some power over our actions and 
wills; (4) there is “a self-evident probability” in many events contingent on human will; (5) 
what will be is likely to be similar to what has been in similar circumstances; (6) unjust 
actions are worse than merely ungenerous ones; (7) whatever begins to exist must have been 
produced by a cause; (8) signs of design and intelligence in what exists imply design and 
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intelligence in the its cause.TPF152FPT  Common sense principles such as these are the most 
fundamental elements of human understanding in that they have no antecedents.  Although 
they are the foundation of all reasoning, no logical reason for them can be given.  
Nevertheless, as constants in experience, they must be accepted as part of empirical reality.TPF153FPT 
The sense of “obligation” inherent in the moral sense is not to be confused with 
another internal sensation, the “sense of honor and shame.”  While this latter sense may be 
“an assistant or guard to virtue, by making us apprehend reproach from others for what is in 
itself worthy of blame,” it is no guarantor of virtue because others may be mistaken in their 
sentiments and opinions about what is, in fact, blameworthy or praiseworthy. TPF154FPT  The 
obligation of conscience, conversely—as “the law which our Maker has written on our 
hearts”—is authoritative, and should be obeyed even at the cost of public disapprobation.  It 
is not merely a personal “sentiment” or “opinion” but a “perception” of a fundamental, 
normative pattern in nature—a perception of the pattern of human nature evidently 
designed by the Creator and the moral obligation of each, in recognition of true human 
excellence, to conform himself to it in every way. 
Witherspoon’s common sense epistemology, then, to sum up, is inductive, realist, 
pragmatic, and balanced, and anchored in the moral sense.  Its starting point is an inductive 
exploration of the contents of human experience.  It is a form of realism in that it places 
reasonable confidence the general trustworthiness of human perception (with allowances for 
the need occasionally to correct misinterpretations of otherwise reliable information conveyed 
by external and internal senses) and affirms a correspondence between perception and reality 
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without collapsing the distinction between mind and matter.  It pragmatically insists on 
interpretations of the facts that do not restrict human consciousness or paralyze purposive 
action but leave room for human development and growth in meaning.  It aims at balance, 
trying to give due weight to all dimensions of human experience and all evidence of the 
senses.  Most importantly, for moral philosophy, it locates the foundation of human 
excellence in the moral sense and its perceptions of right and wrong. 
ETHICS 
 If moral principles are appropriately drawn from human nature, and human nature is 
as Witherspoon has described it, how exactly are the principles derived?   To begin to answer 
this question, Witherspoon returns to the moral sense and more specifically, to the obligation 
imposed by the perception of moral excellence.  How do we determine the precise nature of 
this obligation?  “One way,” he notes, “is to consider what indications we have from our 
nature of the way that leads to the truest happiness.”  Our nature, he says, echoing 
Hutcheson, would seem to indicate three basic paths to human happiness:  1) the 
“gratification of the external senses,” desiring “what is pleasing” and avoiding “what is 
disgustful” to the body; 2) the delight of “the finer powers of perception” – through “poetry, 
painting, music, &c. the exertion of genius, and exercise of the mental powers in general”—
which is a pleasure “much more refined” than the physical kind, “and which does not so 
soon satiate;” and 3) the delight in “moral excellence,” “a pleasure arising from doing what is 
dictated by the moral sense.”  He agrees with Hutcheson that the last is the superior kind of 
pleasure, “being most noble, pure, and durable,”TPF155FPT and therefore that the way leading to the 
truest happiness is a life of contemplating, and acting in accord with, moral excellence.TPF156FPT  
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However, he finds unconvincing Hutcheson’s thesis that moral obligation is grounded solely 
in the natural delight in moral excellence. TPF157FPT  It seems to Witherspoon that “the moral sense 
carries a good deal more in it than merely an approbation of a certain class of actions as 
beautiful, praiseworthy, or delightful, and therefore finding our interest in them as the most 
noble gratification.  The moral sense implies also a sense of obligation, that such and such 
things are right and others wrong; that we are bound in duty to the one, and that our 
conduct is hateful, blamable, and deserving of punishment, if we do the contrary; and there 
is also in the moral sense or conscience, an apprehension or belief that reward and 
punishment will follow, according as we shall act in the one way, or in the other.”TPF158FPT  
However elegant it may be from a speculative standpoint to make happiness the sole 
motivation of right behavior, the empirical fact is that we are often moved to moral conduct 
by a sense of duty, a feeling that we will be unworthy if we do otherwise.  This feeling, 
moreover, is based on a vision of right and wrong prior to it or to any process of reasoning. 
Witherspoon does not want, Kant-like, to remove considerations of happiness from 
ethical theory altogether—this too would be unfaithful to the facts of human nature—but 
                                                                                                                                                 
truest sense to be essentially love of the good.  The great Greek and Christian philosophers of the ancient 
world (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas) all saw moral excellence as a necessary prerequisite to philosophy, 
which they all understood as either a search for or a participation in the highest good and therefore as the way 
to the most complete happiness.  But this means that, for them, moral excellence is a step along the way to 
something better.  It is not that they thought that moral character, moral deliberations, moral behavior could or 
should be discarded at some point, but that the achievement of moral virtue, though good in itself, is for the 
sake of something higher.  Witherspoon seems to have been inconsistent on this point, in light of his 
describing man’s highest end in The Object of a Christian’s Desire in Religious Worship as “enjoying God” (see p. 9 
above). 
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on Hutcheson’s account delight is inherent in the recognition of moral excellence, the element of delight is not 
the basis of obligation.  See Haakonssen’s excellent treatment of the question in Natural Law and Moral 
Philosophy, 71-5.  Hutcheson defines the moral sense as “a natural and immediate determination to approve 
certain affections, and actions consequent upon them; or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not 
referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses or reasoning.”  Hutcheson, A System of Moral 
Philosophy, I.iv.4. 
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rather to clarify issues and establish priorities.  Part of what needs clarifying is what is meant 
by virtue. 
THE NATURE, FOUNDATION, AND OBLIGATION OF VIRTUE 
What is virtue?  Witherspoon has already suggested that virtue is faithful adherence 
to the design of human nature, and so it is appropriate that he defines it here functionally as 
“the rule by which I must try every disputed practice”—it is the nature of virtue to impose a 
rule or standard for practice.  What, then, is that rule?  All moral systems, in establishing the 
rule, “must have recourse to one or more of the following, viz. Conscience, reason, 
experience.” TPF159FPT  The leading moral systems of Witherspoon’s day located the foundation of 
virtue either in the will of God, “the reason and nature of things,” the public interest, or 
private interest. TPF160FPT  Witherspoon briefly evaluates the adequacy of each as a foundation for 
virtue and, evincing again his commonsense openness, balance, and resistance to formulaic 
dogmatism, concludes that, “there is something true in every one of them,” but that “they 
may be easily pushed to an error by excess.”TPF161FPT  Of the foundation of virtue, he concludes:  
“we ought to take the rule of our duty from conscience enlightened by reason, experience, 
and every way by which we can be supposed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention 
in creating us such as we are.  And we ought to believe that it is as deeply founded as the 
nature of God himself, being a transcript of his moral excellence, and that it is productive of 
the greatest good.”TPF162FPT 
Witherspoon thus incorporates conscience, reason, and experience all into virtue, 
and finds the foundation of virtue ultimately in the will of God and in the natural order that 
                                                 
TP
159
PT Ibid., 83. 
TP
160
PT Ibid., 85-6. 
TP
161
PT Ibid., 86. 
TP
162
PT Ibid., 87.  Witherspoon’s understanding of conscience as “a transcript of [God’s] moral excellence” strongly 
resembles St. Thomas’s notion of synderisis.  See footnote above, p. 20, on Thomas’s use of the term. 
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is a manifestation of that will.  Conscience, as the “transcript” of God’s character, is the 
authoritative rule of our duty, but our minds do not always clearly understand its dictates, so 
that conscience needs illumination.  Reasoning about our nature helps us to see it for what it 
is, to see in it the evidences of design, to trace its outlines, to understand how the human 
being is meant to function in light of it.  Experience—our own and that of others, as learned 
through observation and reading—shows us that we are often misled in our moral choices 
by strong desires, uncontrolled passions, bad advice, or distorted thinking.  Revelation, 
which we know to be for Witherspoon a most essential “way by which we can be supposed 
to learn the will of our Maker,” throws, comparatively speaking, a flood of light on the 
intimations of conscience.  Through all of these means, the obligation felt by the moral sense 
takes shape and meaning, the vaguely discerned becomes sharper and surer. 
What of public and private interest?  It turns out that each of them, properly 
understood, is part of virtue as well.  Their part becomes especially clear with respect to the 
obligation of virtue.  Duty is one half of the obligation of virtue; interest is the other half.  In 
terms of duty, the obligation of virtue “implies that we are under some law, or subject to 
some superior, to whom we are accountable.”  In terms of interest, it “implies that nature 
points [virtue] out to us as our own greatest happiness.”TPF163FPT  Doing our duty, then, is in our 
best interest, and interest is therefore a motive to virtue.  Or more precisely, our obligation 
to virtue is partly to God (duty) and partly to ourselves (interest).  The nature of the case, 
however, as Witherspoon suggests, requires a ranking of obligations.  Duty must come first, 
then the public, and then the private interest.TPF164FPT 
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Witherspoon provides a highly textured account of the obligation of duty.  He spoke 
previously of the sense of obligation inherent in the moral sense.  He now describes this 
obligatory thrust of the conscience more precisely as a sense “of self-approbation and 
remorse, which plainly show us to be under a law, and that law to have a sanction.” TPF165FPT  More 
precisely, conscience intimates “a natural sense of dependence” and “belief of a Divine 
Being” who is “not only . . . our Maker, preserver and benefactor, but . . . our righteous 
governor and supreme judge.”  The obligation of duty ultimately rests in “the being and 
perfections of God,” which excite admiration and urge recognition and honor by their 
intrinsic excellence.  The awareness of a righteous governor and supreme judge, moreover, 
carries with it a “belief or apprehension of a future state of rewards and punishments.”TPF166FPT  
These experiences of conviction, dependence, and belief in ultimate accountability, it seems, 
are fundamental to the human psyche and—as impressions of the divinely established moral 
sense—inherently ennobling. 
The obligation of interest seems inseparable from the obligation of duty.  Duty to 
God involves expectations of rewards and punishments, and these necessarily raise a 
concern for one’s own good.  Against Shaftesbury’s claim that consideration of rewards and 
punishments reduces virtuous living to a “mercenary” enterprise, Witherspoon insists that 
                                                                                                                                                 
interest, but warns that “to make the good of the whole our immediate principle of action, is putting ourselves 
in God’s place, and actually superceding the necessity and use of the particular principles of duty which he hath 
impressed on the conscience.”  Ibid., 87.  Witherspoon seems to think it arrogant to pretend to understand the 
dynamics of the public interest well enough to attempt to regulate all behavior by this principle.  Duty, as 
intimated by conscience, must remain the immediate rule of conduct even in public affairs. 
TP
165
PT Witherspoon’s account of conscience here and elsewhere in the Lectures bears many resemblances to that of 
Butler, Bishop of Durham, whose brilliant series of Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel is a classic of British 
moral theory.  Butler spoke of “conscience” as “a moral approving and disapproving faculty” that “from its 
very nature manifestly” claims “superiority” over all other principles of human nature, over all “appetites, 
passions, and affections.”  It is, Butler averred, as the rightfully supreme principle in man, the very law of 
human nature.  Our “obligation to obey” the dictates of conscience, therefore—as Witherspoon fully agreed—
is premised on the status of conscience as the law or standard of human nature.  The Works of Joseph Butler, 
D.C.L., Sometime Lord Bishop of Durham, ed. W.E. Gladstone, 2 vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), I: 327, II: 
54-5, 60. 
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rewards and punishments provide a “a secondary motive” to virtue—after a sense of virtue’s 
intrinsic excellence and the sense of duty and dependence on God—that is “absolutely 
necessary to reclaim men from vice and impiety” and to encourage them in the hope of the 
ultimate triumph of good over evil.  Of course, the benefits of virtue are not restricted to the 
afterlife:  there is a “manifest tendency of a virtuous conduct to promote even our present 
happiness.”  For Witherspoon, the obligation of virtue in the end includes all the following:  
“A sense of its own intrinsic excellence—of its happy consequences in the present life—a 
sense of duty and subjection to the Supreme Being—and a hope of future happiness, and 
fear of future misery from his decision.”TPF167FPT 
THE FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES OF MAN 
Interest is a critical part of the motivation to virtue, but duty alone determines 
principles.  Indeed, Witherspoon conceives of moral principles as “duties.”  Following 
Hutcheson, he considers the duties of man in light of the fundamental “states of man,” 
which may be subsumed under two general categories:  “natural” states and “adventitious” 
states.  The ethical imperatives of natural states are “necessary and universal”—they apply to 
all men, everywhere, at all times—while those of adventitious states apply only to individuals 
in special circumstances.TPF168FPT  The distinction between natural and adventitious states seems a 
recognition that human ethics are not based on the structure of human nature alone, but also 
on the human condition, the context within which man lives.  Human nature itself seems to 
point beyond itself, so that human excellence cannot be understood apart from an 
understanding of the fundamental relations of man to the larger reality in which he 
participates. 
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The fundamental human relations addressed by Witherspoon are man’s relation to 
God, to his fellow man, and with himself, and he correspondingly classes the duties of man 
as duties to God, duties to others, and duties to self.TPF169FPT  Before isolating the basic duties to 
God, Witherspoon gives a good deal of attention to various proofs of the existence of God 
and to God’s evident “perfections.”TPF170FPT  This is necessary, it seems, to establish God’s claim 
on our duty to him.  As God exists and is perfectly wise, just, and good, our general duty to 
God is “to obey him and submit to him in all things.”  This duty encompasses “every branch 
of moral duty to our neighbor and ourselves, as well as to God.”  “Every good action,” 
Witherspoon explains, is really “an act of obedience to God” because God is the source of 
all good and all justice.  Witherspoon previously observed that part of the foundation of 
virtue is “a sense of dependence and subjection to God.”  What, he asks, probing deeper, is 
“the foundation of the divine dominion”?  The foundation of God’s dominion is not merely 
his power and will, but also his “infinite excellence” and his ownership of the world and 
providence over it—his “original production and continual preservation of all creatures.”TPF171FPT  
God has a right to rule, a right to obedience and submission in all things as the Maker and 
Preserver of all, and because God is infinitely excellent, doing what is right—even for others 
or ourselves—necessarily involves conformity to his will and character in every case. 
Man’s special duties to God are those he owes immediately to him.  These include 
both “internal duties” and “external duties.”  The basic internal duties to God, according to 
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consequence, he neglects a potentially significant sphere of human ethics, man’s responsibilities to the earth 
and to non-human life.  But it seems likely he would range any such responsibility under man’s duties to God, 
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possess and use well.  It is probably no accident, in light of his Christian faith, that Witherspoon’s classes of 
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TP
170
PT LMP, 95-103. 
TP
171
PT Ibid., 103-4. 
 69
Witherspoon, are “love, fear, and trust.” TPF172FPT  Love to God involves “a disinterested love of 
God” for who he is, and a “desire” for him as the source of all good things and the one 
above all whose favor is meaningful.  The fear we owe God is not a “servile fear” of divine 
punishment—which is only appropriate for those who live in defiance against God—but a 
“veneration” of divine perfection and greatness.  Trust is “a continual dependence on God 
for every thing we need, together with an approbation of, and absolute resignation to, his 
providence.” TPF173FPT  Together, these seem to describe the soul or spirit rightly oriented toward 
God.  The external special duties to God include “all proper and natural expressions of the 
internal sentiments,” most notably “public and social worship” and prayer.TPF174FPT 
As some of his sermons, essays, and speeches indicate, both the internal and the 
external special duties to God are for Witherspoon foundational for sound political order.  
Public calls to worship and prayer provide opportunities for expressions of love, fear, and 
trust by the people at large.TPF175FPT  Witherspoon says in a sermon Delivered at a Public Thanksgiving 
after Peace, following the cessation of hostilities with Britain in 1781, that “impiety towards 
God” is “the true and proper cause of every disorder among men.” TPF176FPT  As Witherspoon has 
suggested, conscience—the source of moral order—communicates a sense of duty and 
subjection to God.  As surely as piety is the source of order, impiety is the root of disorder.  
It is therefore highly appropriate that citizens collectively acknowledge God’s goodness, 
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righteousness, and providence and call on him for forgiveness of wrongs and assistance in 
righting them.  If such expressions flow from genuine remorse and a deep awakening to 
society’s dependence on God, as well as its obligations to him, the ground is laid for a 
reordering of the psychic community of which society is composed.TPF177FPT 
The second great class of duties is man’s duties to man.  In general, the duty to man 
“may be reduced to a short sum, by ascending to its principle.  Love to others, sincere and 
active, is the sum of our duty.  Benevolence . . . ought not to be considered as the whole of 
virtue, but it certainly is the principle and sum of that branch of duty to others.”  This love 
to others, to be specific, “ought to have for its object their greatest and best interest and 
therefore implies wishing and doing them good in soul and body.” TPF178FPT  The application of this 
general principle to particular duties seems to Witherspoon to require an examination of “the 
rights or claims that one man has upon another.”  He immediately stresses that, “Rights and 
obligations are correlative terms.  Whatever others have a just right or title to claim from me, 
that is my duty, or what I am obliged to do to them.”TPF179FPT  This point is worth dwelling on a 
little because it highlights a very important fact about rights theory in the American founding 
era, that rights had not yet been divorced from right in the sense of “just.”  Witherspoon’s 
understanding of rights as necessarily correlative with duty was typical both of the founding 
clergy and of the leading lights of the founding generally, as a close examination of founding 
documents makes unmistakably clear.TPF180FPT 
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Witherspoon’s treatment of the subject is remarkable, however, for the clarity he 
brings to the issue: 
Right in general may be reduced, as to its source, to the supreme law of moral duty; for 
whatever men are in duty obliged to do, that they have a claim to, and other men are 
considered as under an obligation to permit them.  Again, as our own happiness is a lawful 
object or end, we are supposed to have each a right to prosecute this; but as our 
prosecutions may interfere, we limit each other’s rights; and a man is said to have a right or 
power to promote his own happiness by those means which are not in themselves criminal 
or injurious to others. TPF181FPT 
 
As Abraham Lincoln was later to observe, in the spirit of the founders, one “cannot logically 
say that anybody has a right to do wrong.”TPF182FPT  “Rights” in any meaningful sense are 
necessarily limited and consistent with what is right by nature.  The fundamental rights of 
man as Witherspoon presents them seem then to be the right to carry out one’s moral 
obligations without interference and the right to pursue one’s own happiness insofar as this 
pursuit does not prevent others from doing their duty and pursuing their reasonable 
happiness. 
Having clarified what he means by “rights,” Witherspoon presents several 
(overlapping) classifications of rights we have a duty to respect in others.TPF183FPT  The first 
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classification is “natural or acquired” rights, corresponding, apparently, to the “natural” and 
“adventitious” states of man.  “Natural rights,” he explains, “are such as are essential to man, 
and universal—acquired are those that are the fruits of industry, the effects of accident or 
conquest.”TPF184FPT  The second category of rights are “perfect and imperfect” rights, the former 
being rights so critical to social order or personal well-being that “we may make use of force 
to obtain them when they are denied us,” and the latter “such as we may demand, and others 
ought to give us,” but which do not justify the use of force to guarantee.  Self-preservation is 
an example of a perfect right, gratitude in return for a favor of an imperfect right. TPF185FPT  
“Alienable and inalienable” rights comprise the third category:  “The first we may, according 
to justice and prudence, surrender or give up by our own act; the others we may not.”  One 
may rightly surrender his “goods, lands, money” and even, for the common good, certain of 
his natural rights—he may give up, for example, some measure of self-defense and the 
handling of property disputes for the greater protection of all through the more powerful 
and impartial apparatus of the state.TPF186FPT  One either cannot or should not, however, surrender 
his “right to judge for himself in all matters of religion” or fully alienate his rights to life, 
liberty, and property. TPF187FPT  Finally, rights may be grouped according to their object: rights 
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pertaining to one’s own person and actions are called “liberty;” to personal possessions 
“property;” over the persons and actions of others “authority.”  There are also rights “in the 
things which are the property of others”—contract rights.TPF188FPT 
The inclusion of imperfect rights among the others sets Hutcheson’s and 
Witherspoon’s theory of rights apart from Locke’s.  Locke’s rights, as outlined in his Two 
Treatises of Government, imply only negative duties—duties not to interfere with others.  
Imperfect rights correlate to positive duties, requiring action on others’ behalf.  Witherspoon 
characterizes the negative duties as “justice,” and the positive ones as “mercy.”  In his 
discussion of the justice of God, he had defined justice as “an invariable determination to 
render to all their due.”TPF189FPT  He now describes justice more specifically as “giving or permitting 
others to enjoy whatever they have a perfect right to—and making such an use of our own 
rights as not to encroach on the rights of others,” and mercy as “the exercise of the 
benevolent principle in general, and of the several particular kind affections,”TPF190FPT springing 
from “a readiness to do all the good offices to others that they stand in need of, and are in 
our power.”  Acts of mercy, Witherspoon says, generally “belong to the class of imperfect 
rights, which are strongly binding upon the conscience, and absolutely necessary to the 
subsistence of human society; yet such as cannot be enforced with rigor and precision by 
human laws.” TPF191FPT  Mercy, it appears—the distinctly Christian virtue—completes justice on the 
level of society by reaching to those relations, attitudes, and actions that human laws cannot 
adequately address.TPF192FPT 
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 The last great class of duties consists of the duties to self, a “branch of duty . . . as 
real and as much founded in the moral principle, as any of the former.”  Witherspoon is 
adamant on this point:  “Conscience as clearly testifies the evil of neglecting [the duty to 
self]—and vicious conduct in this respect does and generally lead us not only to misery, but 
to shame.”  There are two kinds of duty to self:  “self-government” and “self-interest.”  Self-
government involves keeping “our thoughts, desires and affections, in due moderation.”  Due 
moderation is transgressed when personal indulgence interferes with our duties to God, 
others, or ourselves.TPF193FPT  The duty of self-interest is generally the duty to seek one’s own good, 
in soul and body. TPF194FPT  With regard to the soul, it requires attention to one’s “relation to the 
Divine Being” and to “procuring his favor.”  Perhaps our greatest duty to ourselves is “to 
guard against any thing that may be hurtful to our moral character, or religious hopes.”  
While the care of the soul takes priority, however, the care of the body is essential as well.  
Our duty to ourselves requires that we “take all proper methods to preserve and acquire the 
goods both of mind and body”—“to acquire knowledge, to preserve health, reputation, 
possessions.”TPF195FPT  In context, the obligation to pursue the goods of the body is clearly not an 
endorsement of unlimited acquisition.  Our pursuit of bodily well-being is limited by the 
duty of self-government—to moderate our passions—and the duty to care for our souls, as 
well as the duty to respect the rights of others.  “Most of our duties to ourselves,” 
Witherspoon says, closing out the subject, “resemble the duties of justice and mercy to 
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others.” TPF196FPT  He argues, then, that the Golden Rule applies equally in reverse:  we are to do to 
ourselves as we ought to do to others. 
WITHERSPOON’S COMMON SENSE ETHICS 
What can we conclude about Witherspoon’s ethical theory as a whole?  First, it is an 
outgrowth of his common sense understanding of human nature and human epistemology.  
It derives its ethical principles from perceptions of the moral sense, but applies those 
principles with a due consideration of human inclinations: interest is subordinated to duty, 
but happiness has its place.  Furthermore, duty and interest are for Witherspoon inseparably 
linked.  Interest points to duty, and duty supports true interest.  The common sense view of 
moral perception and the balanced, all-things-considered attitude of common sense is 
evident.  Second, Witherspoon’s theory of rights takes both duty and interest seriously.  Rights 
are coupled with duties because grounded in justice and mercy.  But part of what is owed to 
others and to self and therefore part of duty is respect for one’s own and others’ interests.  
This means most importantly taking care for spiritual and moral health, but it also means 
facilitating liberty of mind and body and material well-being.  Finally, looming in the 
background of Witherspoon’s ethical framework is the concept of law.  Witherspoon said 
early in his discussion of ethics that he was looking for a “rule by which I must try every 
disputed practice.”TPF197FPT  He has pointed to the laws of God’s character inscribed on the 
conscience, the laws of God’s providence, and human laws that guarantee the “perfect 
rights” of citizens.  Near the end of his discussion of ethics, he says explicitly that “morality 
in general” may be understood in terms of conformity to law. TPF198FPT  His law-based ethics do 
not, however, harden into rigid inflexibility.  They take full cognizance of the variety of 
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human circumstances.  In determining the moral status of actions, Witherspoon says, one 
must consider “(1) the good done (2) the principle from which it flows,—self-interest of the 
contracted kind, benevolence, or hope of reward (3) the hindrances or opposition that must 
be surmounted, as interest, inclination, difficulty.”TPF199FPT  For a more precise understanding of 
the implications of Witherspoon’s conception of law, we must turn to his political theory. 
POLITICS 
 Witherspoon’s politics are firmly grounded in the ethical guidelines he has derived 
from human nature.  Politics, in fact, is for Witherspoon simply an extension of ethics; it is 
“but another and more complete view of the same things drawn out more fully, and applied 
to particular cases.”  Political theory specifically concerns “the principles of social union, and 
the rules of duty in a state of society.” TPF200FPT  Witherspoon’s ethics aimed at the integrity of the 
person; his politics aims at the integrity of society.  Social cohesion for him seems specially 
to depend on moral order, and for this reason the civil law aims ultimately at reinforcing the 
laws of conscience: “Political law is the authority of any society, stampt upon moral duty.”TPF201FPT  
Consequently, Witherspoon devotes considerable space in the political portion of the Lectures 
to meditations on law. 
HUMAN SOCIETY 
 Like Locke, and like most eighteenth-century political theorists, Witherspoon tries to 
arrive at the “principles” upon which “society is formed” by imaginatively considering what 
man would be like outside the “social state.”  That is, he looks to the so-called “state of 
nature.”  Comparing Hobbes’s view of the state of nature as a state of perpetual war of all 
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against all with Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s that it is a “state of society,” that men are 
naturally drawn into society by their natural social affections, Witherspoon again stakes out a 
middling position.  He agrees with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson “that the principles of our 
nature lead to society—that our happiness and the improvement of our powers are only to 
be had in society . . . and that in our nature, as it is the work of God, there is a real good-will 
and benevolence to others,” but also accepts Hobbes’s argument “that our nature as it is 
now, when free and independent, is prone to injury, and consequently to war . . . that in a 
state of natural liberty, there is no other way but force, for preserving security and repelling 
injury,” making “the inconveniences of the natural state” numerous.TPF202FPT  Even outside civil 
society, Witherspoon suggests, man is sociable and drawn to live and commerce with others 
by natural benevolent affections; at the same time, man in his corrupted condition possesses 
within himself a countervailing tendency toward injustice, toward pursuing his own 
happiness (the baser sort) at the expense of the happiness and well-being of others.  Hence, 
it is “equally true” “that nature prompts to society, and . . . that necessity and interest oblige 
us to it.”TPF203FPT 
 Natural rights, it should not be surprising, exist in a state of nature; both “perfect” 
and “imperfect” rights can be found there.  It is worth quoting fully Witherspoon’s list of 
the perfect rights in the state of nature, as these rights compose the foundation of 
Witherspoon’s ideal political order.  They include: 
(1.) a right to life.  (2.) A right to employ [one’s] faculties and industry for his own use.  (3.) 
A right to things that are common and necessary, as air, water, earth.  (4.) A right to personal 
liberty.  (5.) A power over his own life, not to throw it away unnecessarily, but for a good 
reason.  (6.) A right of private judgment in matters of opinion.  (7.) A right to associate, if he 
so incline, with any person or persons, whom he can persuade (not force)—under this is 
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contained the right to marriage.  (8.) A right to character, that is to say, innocence (not 
fame). TPF204FPT 
 
The full list of rights seems reducible to a general right to the free and just use of one’s mind 
and body.  According to Witherspoon, “it would be unjust and unequal for any individual to 
hinder or abridge another in any one of them, without consent, or unless it be in just 
retaliation for injury received.”TPF205FPT  This comment implies, first, that natural liberties may in 
some degree be given up by consent for the sake of some greater good, and second, that one 
can forfeit some or all of his natural liberties by inflicting criminal injury on others.  
Witherspoon here says comparatively little about imperfect rights, among which are rights to 
“gratitude, compassion, mutual good offices,” except to note that they “must be the same in 
a natural and in a social state, because the very definition of an imperfect right is such as you 
cannot use force to obtain.”TPF206FPT 
 Witherspoon defines human society generally as “an association or compact of any 
number of persons, to deliver up or abridge some part of their natural rights, in order to 
have the strength of the united body, to protect the remaining, and to bestow others.”  
Society of any kind is formed for the sake of protecting natural rightsTPF207FPT—in essence, natural 
liberty—and of forging new rights, and it always implies some kind of contract.TPF208FPT  Liberty is 
a paramount concern for Witherspoon: “Liberty either cannot or ought not be given up in a 
social state,” and “the end of the [social] union should be the protection of liberty, as far as it 
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is a blessing.” TPF209FPT  Why is liberty so important?  Witherspoon gives some indication of why 
when he says later of civil liberty that its value “chiefly consists in its tendency to put in 
motion all the human powers.  Therefore it promotes industry, and in this respect 
happiness—produces every latent quality, and improves the human mind.”TPF210FPT  At stake in the 
protection of liberty is nothing less than the maximization of human potential.  “Reason,” 
therefore, “teaches natural liberty, and common utility recommends it.”TPF211FPT 
 The dual impetus of reason and utility becomes a central theme in Witherspoon’s 
discussion of politics.  As we shall see, Witherspoon points again and again to the necessity 
of uniting reason—or, as he sometimes says, “nature”—and utilitarian concerns in the 
working out of political order.  This is a good place to pause and make explicit some 
connections tying together Witherspoon’s conception of human nature, his ethics, and his 
politics.  Although we did not take notice of it before, Witherspoon had in his account of 
the psychic faculty of the understanding, which he said “seems to have truth for its object,” 
raised the question of whether “goodness” might instead be the true object of the 
understanding.  He there pronounced “the connection between truth and goodness” to be 
“a subject of great moment, but also of great difficulty.”  His own conclusion in the matter 
was that truth is the proper object of the understanding, and goodness of the “heart” or 
affections. TPF212FPT  The relation between the truth and the good, then, has its counterpart in 
human nature, and seems to be the ultimate ground for Witherspoon of the relation between 
duty and interest in ethics, and thereafter between reason and utility in politics.  The 
understanding recognizes the truth about human nature and human society and unfolds 
ethical and political principles on the basis of the truth perceived.  The basic laws for man 
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and society are recognized specifically in the moral sense.  Conscience, then, is more akin to 
the understanding than the affections.  But the dictates of conscience powerfully impact the 
affections—the heart “recognizes” them as good and is affected by them.  Unfortunately, it is 
also true that the understanding is sometimes deceived, and the affections sometimes drawn 
away by unworthy objects.  The great trick ethically speaking is to attach affections to what is 
right and best—or in other words to connect interest with duty by showing what duty 
demands to be in fact what is most desirable in its own right.  Politically, the great 
desideratum is to wed in the popular mind public utility to what is right by nature (by “the 
reason and nature of things”), to show that a firm attachment to the latter is in fact more 
useful, more practical, and more satisfying than any of the alternatives. 
This brings us to another, crucially important point about the liberty society is 
obliged to protect.  Witherspoon’s posited end of society to protect liberty “as far as it is a 
blessing” foreshadows the declared purpose of the U.S. Constitution, in its preamble, to 
“secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”  Witherspoon’s formulation, 
however, captures something integral to the founding generation’s conception of liberty that 
the Constitution’s language does not:  that there are definite limits to liberty, and that liberty 
deserves to be protected only insofar as it is a blessing.  Witherspoon, like a host of founding 
era clergymen, carefully distinguished between liberty and license, considering the latter a 
curse and in fact a hindrance, in the long run, to true liberty. TPF213FPT 
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Critical to the maintenance of liberty in society, Witherspoon believes, is the 
protection of material property.  The foundation of property, he says, is “every particular 
person’s having a confessed and exclusive right to a certain portion of the goods which serve 
for the support and conveniency of life.”  Private property is “essentially necessary” in civil 
societies of any size, and is “founded upon the reason of things and public utility.”  He gives 
four reasons why private property is so essential: 
Without private property 
[1.]  No laws would be sufficient to compel universal industry. 
2.  There is no reason to expect in the present [corrupted] state of human nature, 
that there would be a just and equal distribution to every one according to his necessity, nor 
any room for distinction according to merit. 
3.  There would be no place for the exercise of some of the noblest affections of the 
human mind, as charity, compassion, beneficence, &c. 
4.  [There would be] little or no incitement to the active virtues, labor, ingenuity, 
bravery, patience, &c.TPF214FPT 
 
Each of these points seems to reflect both the “the reason of things” and “public utility,” 
showing private property to be grounded in human nature and the human condition and 
useful to society at large as well as to individuals—necessitated, therefore, by nature and 
social well-being alike.  The precise way of establishing and protecting property is 
determined solely by “common utility,” however, and common utility requires securing “a 
right to the fullest use” of property (short of causing injury to others), “a right of exclusion” 
(prohibiting others from “any way intermeddling with what is our property”), and “a power 
to alienate” (to alter, exchange, or donate).TPF215FPT 
 Having adumbrated the basic function of society (protecting natural liberty and 
natural rights) and pointed out the primary material means by which this function is 
rendered effective (private property), Witherspoon proceeds to examine more closely the 
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structure of society.  Society is divisible into two fundamental parts: domestic and civil.  
Domestic society involves the relations “of marriage,” “of parents and children,” “of master and 
servant.” TPF216FPT  Civil society is “the union of a number of families in one state, for their mutual 
benefit.” TPF217FPT  The fundamental units composing civil society, then—significantly—are 
families, rather than, as Locke would have it, individuals.TPF218FPT  Witherspoon examines all the 
relations of domestic and civil society in terms of their naturalness, their utility, and 
especially the rights and duties of the different persons involved. 
DOMESTIC SOCIETY 
All of the relations of domestic society are jointly structured by nature and utility.  
Marriage is natural for human beings—as creatures “manifestly superior in dignity to the 
other animals”—for keeping them “reigned in by modesty” and for promoting “reason and 
friendship, and some of the noblest affections” between male and female.  According to 
Witherspoon, “reason and nature” suggest the following about the nature of “the marriage 
contract”:  1) It should be “between one man and one woman.”  2) “The fundamental and 
essential point of the contract is fidelity and chastity,” which are “essential to the purpose of 
the union.”  3) “The contract should be for life—otherwise it would be short, uncertain, and 
mutual love and industry greatly weakened.”  4) “If superiority and authority be given to the 
man”—a policy Witherspoon does not explicitly insist on—“it should be used with so much 
gentleness and love as to make it a state of as great equality as possible.”  5) Although there 
are some legitimate occasions for it, divorce should generally be discouraged. TPF219FPT  Marriage—
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as necessary for the upbringing and education of offspring—is also useful for the “public 
good” of having a well-bred and educated population. TPF220FPT 
 The relation between parents and children, Witherspoon observes, “is distinguished 
by the strongest instinct of parental affection,” which “seems necessary, as the education of 
children is a duty requiring so much time, care and expense, which nothing but the most 
rooted affection would submit to”—again, the relationship is both natural and useful.  
Parents and children each have certain natural rights vis-à-vis one another.  Parents have a 
right of authority, requiring the obedience of the children, and a right to the children’s 
gratitude.  The first, according to Witherspoon, is a perfect right, while the second, of 
course, is an imperfect right.  He stresses that the “end” of parents’ right of authority is the 
“instruction and protection” of the children, and is “limited by the advantage of the 
children;” parents do not, therefore, have a rightful power of life and death over them.  
Children, for their part, have a right, when they come of age, “to judge for themselves in 
matters of religion,” and presumably a right to protection and care.TPF221FPT  In speaking of 
the relation between “master and servant,” Witherspoon intends both employer-employee 
relations and relations between slaves and slaveholders.  The inclusion of the slave-
slaveholder relation in this discussion is significant, because in the discussion he places 
careful limits on the rights of masters and gives important rights to the servants.  The 
master-servant relation is natural, he suggests, in that “some are superior to others in mental 
powers and intellectual improvement,” while “some make it their choice, finding they cannot 
live otherwise better, to let out their labor to others for hire.”TPF222FPT  The relation is also useful 
for both parties in the relationship—the enterprising need help in executing their schemes, 
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and more ordinary folk need jobs.  Significantly, the naturalness of hierarchal work relations 
does not suggest any kind of right to domination.  The master’s right over the servant is 
limited to “a right to the labors and ingenuity of the servant, for a limited time, or at most 
for life,” and he has “no right either to take away life, or to make it insupportable by 
excessive labor.”  “The servant,” while he is obligated to contribute his labors and ingenuity 
pursuant to the terms of his contractual relationship to the master, “retains all his other 
natural rights.”TPF223FPT  Note that the servant comes into the master-servant relationship freely 
and for his own benefit—he chooses to let his labor out for hire.  With this stipulation 
Witherspoon seems to reject chattel slavery as necessarily illegitimate and a violation of 
natural rights.  In point of fact, Witherspoon does reject chattel slavery, as his comments on 
slavery in Lecture X demonstrate: “it is certainly unlawful to make inroads upon others, 
unprovoked, and take away their liberty by no better right than superior power,” and “it is 
very doubtful whether any original cause of servitude can be defended, but legal punishment 
for the commission of crimes.”TPF224FPT 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
All of the aforementioned domestic relations imply some kind of contract, either 
formal or informal.  Civil society is also a product of contractual relations, and in the case of 
civil society, the contract implies:  1) “The consent of every individual to live in, and be a 
member of that society.”  2) “A consent to some particular plan of government.”  3) “A 
mutual agreement between the subjects and rulers; of subjection on the one hand, or 
protection on the other.” TPF225FPT  Society, for Witherspoon, is again both natural and useful, and 
each of the elements of the social contract seem to be grounded both in nature and utility.  
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Every society consists of at least two classes, rulers and ruled, each having their own peculiar 
rights and duties.  The “essential” rights of rulers—“such as in general must be vested in 
rulers in every society”—include powers of legislation, taxation for public expenditures, 
administration, and representation. TPF226FPT  Some “less essential” rights of rulers—less essential 
“because they may be more varied than the others”—include “coining of money—
possessing or managing public edifices—conferring honors on officers, &c.”  The rights of 
subjects, Witherspoon tells us, “cannot be enumerated, but they may all be summed up in 
protection, that is to say, those who have surrendered part of their natural rights expect the 
strength of the public arm to defend and improve what remains.”TPF227FPT  The people do retain a 
right of revolution, but this right exists only when government exercises its power in a 
“manifestly tyrannical manner,” and then “only when it becomes manifestly more 
advantageous to unsettle the government altogether, than to submit to tyranny.”TPF228FPT 
Witherspoon has asserted that the social contract for civil society involved “consent 
to some particular plan of government.”  The possible forms of government to which the 
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members of society may give assent, he says, are monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or some 
combination thereof.  Witherspoon adopts Aristotle’s simple categorization of the “simple” 
(unmixed) forms by number of rulers—government ruled by one, few, or many—as most 
early moderns did, but unlike some modern thinkers retains Aristotle’s classification of 
regimes as good (in which the rulers govern for the common good of society) or bad (in 
which they use their powers for their own private interest).  He actually presents four criteria 
by which to judge regimes: 
(1) Wisdom to plan proper measures for the public good.  (2) Fidelity to have nothing but 
the public interest in view.  (3) Secrecy, expedition, and dispatch in carrying measures into 
execution, and (4) Unity and concord, or that one branch of the government may not 
impede, or be a hindrance to another. 
 
Applying these criteria to monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, Witherspoon concludes:  
“If the true notion of liberty is the prevalence of law and order, and the security of 
individuals, none of the simple forms are favorable to it.” TPF229FPT  The “true notion of liberty” 
expressed here recalls the distinction between liberty and license.  This kind of ordered 
liberty, the end of civil society, appears unattainable in any durable form by any of the simple 
forms of government because of the absence of safeguards against tyranny. 
 The solution to this difficulty is to devise a mixed or “complex” form of government 
“so that the one principle may check the other.”TPF230FPT  Witherspoon does not counsel ultimate 
reliance on any structure of government, no matter how well devised, being convinced that 
virtue in the people is the best guarantor of political liberty.  As he said in his influential 
political sermon Dominion of Providence over the Passions of Men on the eve of revolution, 
“Nothing is more certain than that a general profligacy and corruption of manners make a 
people ripe for destruction.  A good form of government may hold the rotten materials 
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together for some time, but beyond a certain pitch, even the best constitution will be 
ineffectual, and slavery must ensue.”TPF231FPT  Yet, as Madison was to say in Federalist 51, echoing 
his old master’s balanced view, while “dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government . . . experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.”  The way to effect such “auxiliary precautions” in Witherspoon’s thinking is to 
construct government in such a way that those “who have a share in managing it [are] so 
balanced, that when every one draws to his own interest or inclination, there may be an over 
poise upon the whole.” TPF232FPT  Madison’s solution in Federalist 51 is remarkably similar: 
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  The interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”  Witherspoon’s influence on Madison 
is apparent. TPF233FPT 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 Witherspoon has elaborated the rights and duties of individuals within society in all 
their relations, but it remains to be considered what are the reciprocal rights and duties of 
nations one to another.  For Witherspoon, the case is very similar between individuals and 
nations: “Separate and independent states are, with regard to one another, in a state of 
nature, as man to man before the commencement of civil society.”  He echoes Locke here.  
As “reason, conscience, and common utility” pointed to the natural rights and obligations of 
individuals, so also they point to “a law of nature and nations.”TPF234FPT  Nations have, according 
to Witherspoon, essentially the same perfect and imperfect rights as individuals, “save that 
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there is usually less occasion [in international relations] for the imperfect rights.”TPF235FPT  The 
“sanction” of the law of nature and nations “is no other than a general sense of duty, and 
such a sense of common utility, as makes men fear that if they notoriously break these laws, 
reproach and infamy among all nations will be the effect, and probably resentment and 
indignation by common consent.”  Again, conscience-reason-nature is united with utility.  
The only manner of enforcing the law of nature and nations is the use of force.  As a result, 
the “chief or only object” of this law is “the manner of making war and peace.”TPF236FPT 
 The main considerations regarding the question of war, Witherspoon says, are the 
occasions for just war, the legitimate timing for commencing hostilities, the legitimate 
duration of war, and the appropriate means of prosecuting war.TPF237FPT  The last three seem to be 
essentially special considerations of justice in wartime.  The legitimate cause of making war is 
generally “the violation of any perfect right—as taking away the property of the other state, 
or the lives of its subjects, or restraining them in their industry, or hindering them in the use 
of things common, &c.”—with the exception of the “right to character” (that is, the right of 
a nation not to have its reputation falsely maligned). TPF238FPT  From the standpoint of reason alone, 
any time after receiving an injury is an acceptable time to commence hostilities in a just war, 
but the custom of making declarations of war first, having been established, should be 
honored.  The duration of war “should be according to natural equity, till the injury be 
completely redressed, and reasonable security given against future attacks: therefore the 
practice, too common, of continuing a war for the acquisition of empire is to be 
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condemned.” TPF239FPT  Finally, the legitimate way of prosecuting war is generally “by force or open 
violence” against “the person and goods, not only of the rulers, but of every member of the 
hostile state;” however, “acts of cruelty and inhumanity” are to be carefully avoided, “and all 
severity that has not an immediate effect in weakening the national strength of the enemy is 
certainly inhumanity—Such as killing prisoners whom you can keep safely—killing women 
and children—burning and destroying everything that could be of use in life.”TPF240FPT 
 Although he allows the legitimacy of concealing plans and intentions and of strategic 
deception, he is dubious about the morality of direct deception in wartime.  For 
Witherspoon, even in war integrity is absolutely essential, in terms both of justice and utility.  
With respect to justice, not only must the reasons for going to war be just, but the war itself 
must also be conducted in good faith.  Anticipating the objection that “strict adherence to all 
the laws [of war] above laid down, would give any party a great advantage who should take 
the liberty of transgressing them,” Witherspoon suggests that such Machiavellian 
maneuvering actually undermines the viability of the forces who attempt them.  Breaking 
faith may indeed achieve a short-term tactical advantage, but it undermines the respect both 
of enemies and allies, and this could prove devastating in the long run.  Treachery provokes 
outrage, giving enemies newer and more powerful motivations for fighting and making them 
more willing to resort to treachery themselves, and making allies less willing to defend a 
partner who seems morally indefensible.TPF241FPT 
 Making peace—even more, it would seem, than making war—“ought to be [done] 
with the utmost sincerity.”  The basic guidelines for making peace are as follows:  “The 
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terms of peace ought to be agreeable to the end of making war.  Damages should be 
repaired, and security given against future injury.  We have often said that nation to nation is 
as man to man in a state of natural liberty; therefore treaties of peace between nations should 
in general proceed upon the same principles as private contracts between man and man.”TPF242FPT  
Witherspoon concludes the matter of the law of nature and nations with yet another 
affirmation of the union of natural justice and practicality:  “On the whole, those things that 
have been generally received as the law of nature and nations, are founded on the principles 
of equity, and when well observed, do greatly promote general utility.” TPF243FPT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 Witherspoon had said at the beginning of the Lectures, “Moral philosophy is divided 
into two great branches, Ethics and Politics, to [which] some add Jurisprudence, though this 
may be considered as a part of politics.  Ethics relate to personal duties, Politics to the 
constitution, government, and rights of societies, and Jurisprudence, to the administration of 
justice in constituted states.”TPF244FPT  In his discussion of ethics, Witherspoon found that ethical 
virtue is founded on conscience and enlightened by reason and the experience of mankind, 
and he tried to establish the fundamental duties of man to God, to others, and to self and to 
show that the cultivation of virtue and the performance of duty is very much in our best 
interest.  In his lectures on politics, he explored the natural basis and outlined the natural 
constitution of society and evaluated the relative functional merits and demerits of the 
various basic forms of government.  Up to this point, however, Witherspoon has given little 
attention to internal political dynamics—the activity of politics—focusing instead on natural 
norms and structural concerns:  social relations, rights and duties, and institutions.  He now 
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reveals that in his view the main business of politics is the enactment and administration of 
laws.  “Jurisprudence,” Witherspoon tells us, “is the method of enacting and administering civil 
laws in any constitution” [emphasis added].TPF245FPT  It is therefore the practical political art par 
excellence. 
 The jurisprudential starting point is the constitution of society.    As Witherspoon 
says, “a [political] constitution is excellent when the spirit of the civil laws is such as to have 
a tendency to prevent offences and make men good, as much as to punish them when they 
do evil.”  This preventive and formative role of law “is necessary in some measure” because 
“when the general disposition of a people is against the laws, they cannot long subsist, even 
by a strict and rigorous execution on the part of the rulers.” TPF246FPT  No system of government, 
however ingeniously constructed—as Witherspoon has suggested—can make good a society 
full of rotten people.  The political order that counts most, then, is not the political 
constitution, but the concrete constitution of the people.  A good political constitution will 
take this into account.  This leads Witherspoon to the question:  “how shall the magistrate 
manage this matter, or what can be done by law to make the people of any state virtuous?”  
He answers:  “If, as we have seen above, virtue and piety are inseparably connected, then to 
promote true religion is the best and most effectual way of making a virtuous and regular 
people.  Love to God, and love to man, is the substance of religion; when these prevail, civil 
laws will have little to do.”  Given the right of private judgment in matters of faith, however, 
the actions of public officials in promoting religion must be strictly limited to encouraging 
piety by example, promoting and encouraging those known for piety and virtue and 
discountenancing those of a contrary character, and enacting laws punishing “acts of 
profanity and impiety,” by which Witherspoon seems to mean acts that various religious 
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groups would consider desecrations of their respective faiths.  One more way—one of the 
most effective ways—for government to promote a strong religious presence in society is, 
perhaps surprisingly, to “defend the rights of conscience, and tolerate all in their religious 
sentiments that are not injurious to their neighbors.”TPF247FPT 
 The civil laws, Witherspoon says, really have three fundamental aims: 1) “To ratify 
the moral laws by the sanction of the society.”  2) “To lay down a plan for all contracts in 
the commerce or intercourse between man and man.”  3) “To limit and direct persons in the 
exercise of their own rights, and oblige them to show respect to the interfering rights of 
others.” TPF248FPT  The first object of the civil laws, then, is essentially to lend political support to 
the laws of conscience.  This is done through civil “punishments annexed to the 
transgression of the moral laws.”  Of course, not all immoral acts come under the purview 
of the civil laws, only those involving relatively serious wrongdoing, and it is vitally 
important that acts punishable by law are clearly defined, that some standard or uniform 
method be adopted for determining when crimes have actually been committed, and that 
guidelines for setting punishments be established.TPF249FPT 
 The second object of the laws is to regulate the making of contracts and disposal of 
property.  Witherspoon defines a contract as “stipulation between two parties before at liberty, 
to make some alteration of property, or to bind one or both parties to the performance of 
some service.”  He seems to understand contracts as, if not always completely natural, at 
least partly grounded in nature, a way human nature completes itself in practice:  “Contracts 
are absolutely necessary in social life,” and social life, as we know from what he has already 
said, is at least partly natural.  Witherspoon devotes (comparatively speaking) a great deal of 
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space in his account of jurisprudence to his discussion of contracts, and this may be in part 
because his notion of contracts is so broad, encompassing all formal and informal, 
contractual and quasi-contractual relations:  “Every transaction almost may be considered as 
a contract, either more or less explicit.”  An arrangement between parties is a contract, 
however, only if established by consent. TPF250FPT 
 There are different kinds of contracts and different degrees of contractual obligation, 
but the kind of contract with which the civil laws are primarily concerned seems to be the 
“complete contract, with consent on both sides, and obligation upon one or both.” TPF251FPT  The 
obligation of all contracts “rests ultimately on the obligation to sincerity in the social life,” 
which itself “arises from the testimony of conscience, and from the manifest utility and even 
necessity of sincerity to social intercourse.”TPF252FPT  Once again, the appeal is made to nature—
here, specifically to the dictates of conscience—and usefulness. 
 The last object of the civil laws, after lending political support to the moral laws and 
regulating contracts, is “limiting citizens in the exercise of their rights, so as they may not be 
injurious to one another, but the public good may be promoted.  This includes the giving 
directions in what way arts and commerce may be carried on, and in some states extends as 
far as the possessions of private persons.”  This last object of the laws is concerned with 
matters of public utility—“the manner of traveling, building, marketing, time and manner of 
holding all sorts of assemblies,” things “in themselves arbitrary and mutable.”  Laws of 
strictly public utility, being necessary to the public good, are nevertheless binding in 
conscience. TPF253FPT 
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CONCLUSION 
 Conscience is almost literally the last word in Witherspoon’s Lectures on Moral 
Philosophy, TPF254FPT and it certainly is the last word in his theory of common sense.  The moral 
sense is for Witherspoon the decisive faculty of the mind, the foundation of virtue, and the 
source of duty both in ethics and politics.  It is the ultimate basis of the civil laws, and only a 
firm adherence to its dictates, in Witherspoon’s view, will ensure the success of those laws.  
The good man, the good citizen, and the good society will take due account of interest and 
utility but will in the end always make these legitimate concerns conform to what conscience 
demands. 
 This in the end is Witherspoon’s great contribution to American thought: his was the 
only fully developed conscience-based theory of ethics and politics available at the founding, 
and it remains one of very few such theories articulated in the history of American 
philosophy.  No comprehensive American theory of ethics and politics, as far as I am aware, 
gives the same attention and priority to the moral sense as does Witherspoon’s.  To be sure, 
Witherspoon made other contributions to American ethical and political philosophy.  He 
was more responsible than anyone else for establishing Scottish Common Sense philosophy 
in America, and this philosophic approach was to dominate the American academy for a 
very long time.  As Jeffrey H. Morrison has pointed out, Scottish realism “was (if we extend 
[it] into the Pragmatism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) the dominant 
philosophical school in America for nearly a century and a half after Witherspoon 
established it at Princeton.”TPF255FPT  Witherspoon’s own unique version of common sense 
philosophy, blending conscience, reason, and experience to produce an ethical and political 
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theory balancing duty and interest, was itself a notable contribution.  But what is most 
unique about this common sense vision, in the American context, is its extended articulation 
of the role of the moral sense in the creation of ethical and political order. 
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MCCOSH’S SCIENTIFIC INTUITIONISM 
 
 If Witherspoon was the man most responsible for making Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy the leading school of thought in the United States, James McCosh was the last 
major advocate of that philosophical tradition in America, and indeed in the world.  
Witherspoon had possessed good philosophical instincts, but as a scholar and theoretician, 
he was neither especially imaginative nor terribly precise.  He was more a man of action than 
a philosopher; his extraordinarily demanding responsibilities—his pastorate and his extensive 
involvement in the controversies of the Church of Scotland before he came to America, and 
in America his pastoral obligations, his leadership of the American Presbyterian Church, his 
vigorous participation in the politics of the War and the founding, his teaching duties, and 
most of all his monumental achievement of rescuing Princeton from dissolution (twice) and 
making it into “the School of Statesmen”—all this took much of the time and energy he 
might otherwise have devoted to refining his philosophical positions.  James McCosh, on the 
other hand, was both a first-rate scholar and a very fine metaphysician.  McCosh managed 
also to be a very active, reforming president at Princeton, which he put in a position to 
achieve the status of university shortly after he relinquished the helm there.  But he had 
written his best work before becoming immersed in his presidential duties at Princeton, and 
even after assuming the burdens of managing a major collegiate institution he was able to 
give more time to scholarship and philosophical investigation than Witherspoon ever could. 
 H.G. Townsend wrote in 1934 that “Scottish realism . . . found in [McCosh] a 
culmination and a crystallization.” TPF256FPT  This is undoubtedly true:  as J. David Hoeveler has 
said, McCosh was “clearly the last major voice of the Scottish Enlightenment and the system 
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of philosophical realism for which it is best known,”TPF257FPT and his chief philosophical writings 
are collectively a monument to clarity and precision.  His greatest work, The Intuitions of the 
Mind, certainly should be ranked among the more important works of the Scottish realist 
tradition, as it provides perhaps the most thorough, lucid, and convincing case for grounding 
human knowledge and the various sciences in man’s primary or primitive experience of 
reality—that is, in common sense. 
McCosh did not himself like the moniker “common sense,” believing it vague and 
misleading.  “The word sense seems to associate the faculty [of intuition] with the bodily 
organism, with which certainly it has no connection,” he says, and the stipulation that 
“common sense” refers to a kind of internal mental sense does not come close to clearing 
matters up:  as an internal sense the phrase has been used variously to mean a “sense 
common to all mankind” providing “an original inlet of knowledge,” “good sense” or 
“practical sense” (gained through cumulative experience), “the knowledge imparted by the 
senses in common” (Aristotle’s koine aesthesis), and “the aggregate of original principles 
planted in the minds of all, and in ordinary circumstances operating in the minds of all.”TPF258F PT  
McCosh and the Scottish realists are concerned primarily with the last meaning of the term, 
but the ambiguity of the term has bred confusion for those outside the Scottish Common 
Sense tradition, and even for those within it.  Reid wanted to make use of two meanings, 
both good sense and the constellation of the mind’s original principles, but McCosh insists, 
“It is only in this last sense that [common sense] can be legitimately employed in 
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overthrowing skepticism, or for any philosophic purpose.” TPF259FPT  He explains:  common sense 
as good sense is, “according to an old saying, the most uncommon of the senses.  This 
valuable property is not common to all men, but is possessed only by a certain number; and 
there are others who can never acquire it, and it is always the result of a number of gifts and 
attainments, such as an originally sound judgment and a careful observation of mankind and 
the world.  In this signification, common sense is not to be the final appeal in philosophy, 
science, or any other department of investigation; though in all it may keep us from much 
error.”  Common sense in this meaning cannot be a final appeal because it can be wrong:  
“Practical sense, as it claimed to be, long opposed the doctrine of there being antipodes and 
of the earth moving; it spoke contemptuously in the first instance of some of the greatest 
achievements of our world, the deeds of philanthropists, and the sufferings of martyrs; it 
laughed at the early poetry of Wordsworth and Tennyson.  All that good sense can do in 
science and philosophy is to guard us against accepting any doctrine till it is settled by 
inductive proof.”TPF260FPT  The final appeal, for McCosh, must be to those original principles of 
mind. 
 Reid’s combination or conflation of these two meanings of common sense, McCosh 
suggests, proved the undoing of Scottish Common Sense philosophy in Europe:  “while 
perhaps contributing to the immediate popularity of Reid, and still more of Beattie, [it] 
turned in the end against them . . . in the estimation of philosophic thinkers, who, looking on 
the appeal as only to vulgar judgment, which may be prejudice, have denied the validity of 
the argument.” TPF261FPT  Kant had dismissed the school of Reid for just this reason.TPF262FPT  Reid had 
also failed to express “the precise nature of the principles of common sense, of their points 
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of agreement and of difference, of their precise laws and varied modes of action.”TPF263FPT  These 
deficiencies McCosh would try, with considerable success, to set right in his own 
philosophy. TPF264FPT 
 Unlike Witherspoon, McCosh never provided in one place a systematic ethical and 
political theory, but he did suggest the outlines of such a theory in various of his writings, 
most notably in Method of the Divine Government, Intuitions of the Mind, and An Examination of J. 
S. Mill’s Philosophy.  These ethical and political conclusions are grounded in his understanding 
of human nature, which in turn is derived from an inductive investigation of the human 
mind.  Let us turn first, therefore, to a consideration of McCosh’s epistemological findings. 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 The broadest outlines of McCosh’s scientific, philosophic approach are evident in his 
description of common characteristics of Scottish philosophy.  In the book bearing that 
name, he says that the Scottish philosophers generally proceed according to the method of 
observation and induction, employ self-consciousness as the instrument of observation, and, 
based on observations of consciousness, arrive at principles “which are prior to and 
independent of experience.”TPF265FPT  The combination of these characteristics set Scottish 
philosophy apart, “on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism; and, on the other 
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hand, from . . . dogmatism and a priori speculation.” TPF266FPT  (Hume, of course, as a sensationalist, 
is a major exception to this generalization.)  “To the Scottish school,” McCosh avers, 
“belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and knowingly, to follow the inductive 
method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation.”TPF267FPT  This was a self-
conscious attempt to follow the advice of Francis Bacon to apply the inductive method 
utilized in the physical sciences (most famously by Newton) to other sciences, including 
logic, ethics, and politics.TPF268FPT  Specifically, Scottish philosophers refused to follow the late 
medieval method of starting with given speculative principles and proceeding deductively to 
derive secondary principles from them, and insisted on beginning instead with the basic facts 
of consciousness, its capacities and activities—uncovered through careful, inductive 
explorations of the mind, partly through introspection and partly through observation of the 
thoughts and feelings of others as gathered from their words and deeds—from which could 
be derived fundamental laws or principles of consciousness.  These principles of the mind 
would constitute the essential elements in human nature and form the basis for ethical and 
political principles. 
 McCosh describes his own philosophic procedure in detail in Intuitions of the Mind and 
An Examination of J. S. Mill’s Philosophy.  The fundamental facts of consciousness, the facts 
that enable us to make sense of consciousness, are the intuitions, which he defines in the 
former book as “original perceptions” of the mental faculties—for example, of sense, of 
reason, of conscience—formed by apprehending “immediately” some object or fact. TPF269FPT  By 
consciousness McCosh means simple mental awareness, which “reveals only the present state of 
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mind” in its particulars, and which must be carefully distinguished from the form of 
consciousness that is “derived from the individual exercises [of the mind] by a reflex process 
of abstraction and generalization.” TPF270FPT  There is no innate awareness of principles in 
consciousness, only of individual facts actually apprehended; principles (of whatever kind) 
are derived by abstracting elements from those facts, collating abstracted elements into 
categories, and making generalizations about them. 
McCosh gives his most concise description of this process in the Examination of Mill’s 
Philosophy.  It begins and ends, he tells us, with consciousness, with simple awareness.  
Consciousness must observe (turn its attention to) its own content, taking notice not only of 
what passes before it but also of what is contained in memory, and it must also, “in order to 
correct the narrowness of . . . personal observations,” look at “the convictions of other 
men” as suggested by “their deeds, ever passing under our notice, and as recorded in 
history” and by “their conversation and their writings, as the expression of human thought 
and sentiment.”  Consciousness “has to take the first step, and the final step in the process” 
of arriving at fundamental principles or laws of the mind:  “It has to observe and gather the 
original facts which suggest the law.  It has again to collect and notice the verifying facts 
which establish the law.  In comparison with these, the intermediate step, the ratiocination, is 
a subordinate and dependent one.” TPF271FPT  This intermediate step of ratiocination involves 
analysis and theorization of the facts presented by consciousness.  “In order to the discovery 
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even of an ‘intuitive principle,’” McCosh says, “there must be what Bacon calls ‘the 
necessary rejections and exclusions,’ or what Dr. Whewell calls the ‘decomposition of facts,’ 
and then the coordination of the facts into a law by induction.”  Any “construction of 
metaphysics” will require “more . . . than a simple exercise of consciousness or 
introspection; there is need of discursive processes to work the facts into a science.”TPF272FPT  
Ratiocination is nevertheless subordinate and dependent to consciousness because, “When 
we [analyze and theorize], all we can do is to dissect the concrete [by abstraction], to 
generalize the individual, or find out the producing cause.  But the errors will only multiply 
on us in these steps if we have not commenced with accurate observations.”TPF273FPT 
The primary distinguishing mark of common sense—or as McCosh prefers, 
intuitional—philosophy is that it insists on maintaining always the concrete as the basis for 
all theorization.  It is concerned not merely or even primarily with the logical consistency of 
concepts, but with realities, with existences or substances and their attributes and operations 
and relations to other substances; its enterprise is an exploration of reality in all its 
dimensions, and it has no use for any conceptualizations that have no ascertainable 
correspondence to fact.  Intuitions themselves must not be exempted from this acid test of 
concreteness:  in Method of the Divine Government, McCosh insists that “no intuition be 
admitted in philosophic or religious speculation, till it is proved by induction to be in the 
constitution of the mind—nay, till its nature and rule be pointed out.”TPF274FPT 
Of course, insisting that the goal of philosophy is understanding reality put McCosh 
at odds with powerful intellectual movements of his own time that were gradually coming to 
dominate institutions of higher learning throughout the West.  Hume had held that the mind 
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knows only impressions received mysteriously through sensation; it does not, technically 
speaking, know external realities at all, but only infers them from its internal impressions 
(that is, there is no immediate apprehension of such realities, only of inward impressions); 
and much less does the mind have any knowledge of the nature of cause and effect or the 
relation between them, in bodies or in souls.  Kant, after him (ironically, since Kant hoped to 
save man philosophically from the moral ignorance into which Hume’s system necessarily 
threw him), held essentially that the mind cannot know substance—either of mind or 
matter—but only presentations or phenomena of substances supposed to exist but in 
themselves utterly mysterious:  we cannot know the “Ding an sich” (the “thing in itself”), but 
merely an appearance before the mind that may or may not resemble the thing.  Furthermore, 
the mind, in Kant’s rendering, imposes subjective forms (space and time) on phenomena, so 
that even the phenomenal image itself may be distorted. TPF275FPT  Kant’s reduction of space and 
time to mere forms of the mind, with no more than subjective existence, was, to McCosh, 
“one of the most fatal heresies—that is, dogmas opposed to the revelations of 
consciousness—ever introduced into philosophy, and it lies at the basis of all the aberrations 
in the school of speculation which followed [most notably, he observes, in the thought of 
Fichte and Hegel].  For those who were taught that the mind could create space and time, 
soon learned to suppose that the mind could also create the objects and events cognized as 
in space and time, till the whole external universe became ideal, and all reality was supposed 
to lie in a series of connected mental forms.”TPF276FPT  McCosh’s pragmatic bent may be seen in 
this statement:  he understands that Kant’s philosophy represents a closure to the real, he 
feels that the loss of reality is a very great loss indeed and wishes to counteract it.  But of 
course, showing this consequence of Kant’s philosophy—an eclipse of reality—does not 
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prove that Kant was wrong; it does not show that reality can, in fact, be known.  And in the 
end, if we will not accept the evidence of our perceptions, no proof is possible.  But to 
McCosh it is reasonable to “go with” the evidence—to go against it is simply absurd—and 
the evidence of the perceptions, as he tries to show, if we will take note of all our 
perceptions, and not only certain kinds of perceptions prejudicially selected, suggest that we 
do know reality in some degree, and that reality is what it appears to consciousness, not 
something else. 
Making the case for all this might seem a tall order, but McCosh manages to make it, 
and make it convincingly, in Intuitions of the Mind and Examination of Mill’s Philosophy.  Let me 
take his book on Mill first.  The title of the book mirrors that of Mill’s book on Hamilton:  
An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.  Although Hamilton was one of McCosh’s 
intellectual mentors (or at least, one of his teachers), McCosh in his response to Mill is not 
trying to make a defense of Hamilton’s philosophy, which he finds wanting in several crucial 
respects:  primarily, Hamilton had been led astray in his attempts to join together with a 
Reidian common sense philosophy certain philosophical tenets of Kant.  Rather, McCosh’s 
Examination is a searching analysis of Mill’s philosophical system, which had been presented 
in all its essential elements for the first time in Mill’s critique of Hamilton.TPF277FPT 
 McCosh agrees with Victor Cousin (a French common sense philosopher), against 
Mill, that one must first understand the nature of ideas before he can accurately trace out 
their origin; Mill follows Locke, he says, in reversing that order.TPF278FPT  The critical issue for Mill 
is the origin of ideas.  Mill expressly adopts the “Psychological” rather than the 
“Introspective” method in examining consciousness because, as Mill says, the original 
revelations of consciousness are not available to us “in their primitive purity,” having been 
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“overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.” TPF279FPT  
Hamilton tended to portray the entire process of philosophy as a product of introspection, 
and Mill insisted that because of the layers of “acquired notions and perceptions” obscuring 
our original perceptions, introspection could not produce any sound philosophy.  But Mill 
overcompensates, McCosh suggests:  “after he has shown that introspection cannot do 
everything, he leaves upon us the impression that it can do nothing,” while in fact, as we 
have seen, introspection—or rather inspection both of one’s own perceptions and those of 
others—is the first and the last step in the philosophic process. TPF280FPT  Mill says in his book on 
Hamilton that, “The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs or principles of 
Common Sense are affirmations of consciousness, supposes two things—that the beliefs 
exist, and that they cannot possibly have been acquired.”TPF281FPT  McCosh agrees with Mill that a 
rigorous discursive process of dissection, comparison, and testing of the mind’s convictions 
is essential, but he insists on taking into account all of the mind’s “perceptions, 
apprehensions, and beliefs.”TPF282FPT  Mill, unfortunately, rather egregiously ignores many of these; 
he steadfastly refuses to take seriously any ideas or convictions not derivable from sensation, 
but sensation manifestly cannot account for our convictions about “mind and body, 
extension, personal identity, causation and moral obligation.”TPF283FPT  On Mill’s second point, that 
alleged “Universal Beliefs” may be acquired rather than inherent in the constitution of the 
mind—for example, that, as McCosh puts it, “our idea of moral good” might be capable of 
decomposition into simpler elements—McCosh says that we should be open to this 
possibility, but that the question must be determined according to “the ordinary rules of 
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evidence.”TPF284FPT  McCosh offers three specific such rules for any inquiry into the mind’s 
convictions:  First, “No one is to be allowed to imagine that he has made a successful 
resolution into simpler elements, of an idea, belief, or conviction, unless he can explain all 
that is in the mental phenomenon.”  As we just noticed, Mill violates this rule by attempting 
to derive all ideas from the senses (specifically, from sensations and associations of 
sensations), when sensations cannot account for all of them.  Mill’s case appears plausible, 
McCosh says, only because he has ignored all ideas that cannot be thus accounted for.TPF285FPT  
The second rule:  “In resolving an alleged fundamental idea or conviction into certain 
elements, we must assume only known elements, and we must not ascribe to them more 
than can be shown to be in them.”  Again, Mill employs only sensations and associations of 
sensations to explain everything but does not successfully show that these elements are 
sufficient to produce ideas “of mind and body, of space and time, of personality and 
personal identity, of infinity and obligation to do good.”TPF286FPT  The third:  “Tests may be 
furnished to try intuitive truths.”  Three tests, McCosh says, have been largely agreed on by 
great thinkers since Aristotle, but not always kept in clear focus or remembered together:  
the tests of self-evidence, necessity, and universality.TPF287FPT  McCosh says he will take as 
fundamental elements of the mind those mental perceptions that Mill fails to reduce to 
simpler ones, “till some abler man (which is not likely to happen) makes the attempt and 
succeeds,” provided of course they stand the three tests.TPF288FPT 
 These tests of intuitions are fully explained in Intuitions of the Mind.  “The primary 
mark of intuitive truth,” McCosh tells us there, “is self-evidence.  It must be evident, and it 
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must have its evidence in the object.  The mind, on the bare contemplation of the object, 
must see it to be so and so, must see it to be so at once, without requiring any foreign 
evidence or mediate proof.”TPF289FPT  I sit typing at a computer, a black lap-top with smooth keys; 
there is no other evidence for the computer’s existence or its attributes than the computer 
itself; it is pointless and absurd to ask for other evidence.  Similarly, on contemplating a 
man’s ingratitude for a gift given him at great sacrifice, I immediately see this to be wrong, 
without any process of reasoning; no evidence is either necessary or possible beyond the fact 
itself; any explanation of why it is wrong must necessarily come after recognition of the fact 
of wrongness.  Of course, for any object or truth to be self-evident, it must be clearly 
apprehended—it is not self-evident to one who has not observed it.  Certainly “it is possible 
to fall into error in the application of this test, as in the application of any other; but this can 
take place only by negligence, by refusing to go round the object to which the conviction 
refers, and to look upon it as it is in itself, and in all its aspects.”TPF290FPT  The necessity of the 
second test refers to “the irresistible nature of the conviction to the self-evidence.”  It is thus 
a secondary test, dependent on the first.  As McCosh explains, “When an object or truth is 
self-evident, necessity always attaches to our convictions regarding it.”  These convictions or 
intuitions sometimes have the nature of knowledge, sometimes of belief, and sometimes of 
judgments, “in which we compare objects known or believed in.”  “In the first [case] our 
cognition is necessary, in the second our belief is necessary, in the third our judgment is 
necessary.”TPF291FPT  Universality, or “catholicity” as McCosh calls it in Intuitions, is not a primary 
but an auxiliary test of intuitive truth, for the reasons that “it is not easy to ascertain, or at 
least to settle absolutely, what truths may claim this common consent of humanity,” and that 
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some things may be universal that are not necessary.  This test is very useful, however, for 
social discourse:  it gives us “confidence in addressing our fellow-men, for we know that 
there are grounds of thought common to them and to us, and to these we can appeal in 
reasoning with them.”TPF292FPT 
 What, specifically, are the intuitions of the mind—what are the “primitive,” self-
evident, necessary, and universal cognitions, beliefs, and judgments?  Take first the primitive 
cognitions.  We know Being in the sense that we know existences presented to us.  Kant 
claimed we know not things, but appearances; McCosh insists:  “What we know is the thing 
manifesting itself to us,—is the thing exercising particular qualities.”TPF293FPT  Indeed, we rarely if 
ever know everything there is to know about the thing, but we do know the thing as 
presented to us, in the qualities it manifests.  There is no reason to believe that when I look 
at my bedroom, what I see is not the bedroom itself but only an appearance of a bedroom; 
the evidence of my sense is that I see directly a really existing bedroom, with its four walls, 
its bed, desk, etc., all external to me.  The confusion about appearance versus reality arises 
from a lack of clarity about the process by which one sees.  I claim to see something directly, 
and it is objected that vision requires an intermediary between the mind and the object 
seen—namely, the optical mechanism.  But this objection turns out to be trivial:  that the 
apparatus of the eyes is necessary for my vision does not in the least suggest that what I see 
with its aid is merely an image and not an object.  It is objected further that my eyes can 
deceive me, but this (taken literally) is misleading as well:  I am in fact deceived by 
misinterpreting what I see, not by my eyes.  The old example of the oar appearing bent in 
the water does not in the least prove that vision is faulty; the vision is correct—the oar in 
                                                 
TP
292
PT Ibid., 40-1.  It might be added that universality also serves as a negative test of self-evidence and necessity:  
if any alleged knowledge, belief, or judgment is clearly not universal for all rational beings who clearly apprehend 
a given object or truth, then it cannot be self-evident or necessary. 
TP
293
PT Ibid., 163. 
 109
fact appears bent from the refraction of the water; thinking that the oar itself is bent is a 
misinterpretation based on ignorance of the properties of water—one quickly dispelled, it 
should be added, by pulling the oar from the water.  So, again, we know not images or 
representations (which are all derivative, although, at the same time, suggestive), but real 
things as experienced.  At the level of primary experience, we have genuine knowledge, but 
only of things as presented to us; as we experience further aspects of things, our knowledge 
increases, resulting often in new interpretations of their meaning, but the original, limited 
experience gives genuine, though limited knowledge. 
 McCosh’s analysis of primitive cognitions becomes clearer with his discussion of 
substance.  What we know is substance existing, with active power, and with some 
permanence.  “The mind starts with knowledge, and with the knowledge of things as having 
being.  This is the foundation, the necessary foundation, of all other exercises.”  But the 
mind knows substances as having being because the substances possess active power:  “We 
cannot know self, or the mind that knows, except as active, that is, exerting power, or as 
being affected.  Nor can we know material objects except as exercising or suffering an 
influence—that is, a certain kind of power.  They become known to us as having a power 
either upon themselves or upon other objects, and we express this when we say we know 
matter by its properties.” TPF294FPT  To know on the intuitional level, in other words, is to be 
influenced or affected by substances, spiritual or material.  A property of a substance, as 
McCosh later suggests, is a peculiarity of the substance by which the substance “acts or 
manifests itself,” and he employs the word “faculty” to speak of a property of mental 
powers, and “force” to refer to a property of material powers. TPF295FPT  In addition to existence 
and active power, we know substances as possessing a permanence:  “A substance is not a 
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spectre which appeared when we began to see it, and which may cease to exist when we have 
ceased to view it.  This conviction is at the basis of the belief in the abiding nature of every 
existing thing, amid all the changes it may undergo.”TPF296FPT  In brief, by way of primitive 
cognitions we know concrete existences concretely, we know things directly, immediately. 
The things a man thus knows directly and immediately are, specifically, his own 
body, external bodies, and his non-material self or personality.   He could not escape the 
facts of his personality—his willing, evaluating, etc.—if he wanted to.  He may attribute the 
facts of his personality to material causes, but as McCosh suggested in his critique of Mill, no 
one has successfully shown that material factors are able to account for those facts.  At any 
rate, the facts are known, and known directly.  Immediately cognizable qualities of bodies 
include extension (occupying space), number, motion, and of course, power, their exercising 
influence on themselves and other things.TPF297FPT  On the level of the individual human being, 
McCosh holds, as Witherspoon did, that mind and body are mutually affective.  Mind and 
body, he says, “have been so constituted as that the bodily organism acts on the mind, while 
mind is also capable of operating on the organism.”  “The coexistence of the two is 
necessary,” in fact, “to any effect being produced, and the effect is the result of the two 
operating and cooperating.  Thus in all perception through the senses there is a cerebral 
power and there is mental power, and without both there will be no result, no object 
perceived.”TPF298FPT 
McCosh’s second kind of intuitions, the primitive beliefs, are necessary beliefs 
following from the primitive cognitions.  A primitive belief, precisely, is a belief in something 
not immediately before the mind but raised by something that has been.  Among the 
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primitive beliefs, according to McCosh, are the beliefs in time and space (following from 
perceptions of concrete objects as having extension and separation from other extended 
objects, and actions as happening before and after other actions) and in infinity (following 
from the conviction or “positive affirmation [of the mind] that to whatever point we go, in 
reality or imagination, there must be a space and time beyond”). TPF299FPT  Primitive judgments, the 
third class of intuitions, are necessary judgments arising on the comparison of known 
objects.  The mind notices different objects and perceives certain relations among them; it 
then intuitively judges some of these to be necessary relations.  There is the relation of 
identity (constituted by the continuing existence over time of a known object), of wholes and 
parts, of space, of time, of quantity, of resemblance, of active properties to substance, and of 
cause and effect.TPF300FPT It must be emphasized again that all these intuitions arise from 
observation, and are by no means self-evident or necessary ideas to those who have not 
made the requisite observations. 
MORAL INTUITIONS 
Of particular importance to McCosh’s ethical understanding are the moral 
convictions.  The conscience, McCosh elaborates, “is of the nature of a cognitive power,” 
not in making objects known, but in recognizing certain qualities in known objects—
specifically, the moral qualities in the voluntary states and acts of rational creatures.  Beliefs 
and judgments are also involved in the exercises of conscience:  we believe certain acts to be 
good and others to be bad everywhere, at all times, whether or not we directly observe them 
performed, and in comparing moral cognitions and beliefs we are led to certain necessary 
moral decisions or conclusions, not as a product of reasoning or ratiocination but as 
something “seen” as soon as the necessary relations are seen:  observing the relation between 
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man and God, for instance, we immediately conclude that we ought to obey God, or, 
observing a wrong act and its painful consequences, we spontaneously judge the suffering to 
be deserved.TPF301FPT 
McCosh is explicit in The Method of the Divine Government about the importance of 
distinguishing carefully between conscience and (discursive) reason and recognizing their 
independent functions:  “The understanding does not feel that it is called to justify itself to 
the conscience, nor is the conscience required to justify itself to the understanding . . . A 
thousand errors have arisen from imagining that the conscience should give account of itself 
to the understanding, and that the understanding should give account of itself to the 
conscience.”TPF302FPT  Because awareness of right and wrong is intuitive and not a product of 
reasoning, insisting on rational arguments for moral behavior can actually have the effect of 
numbing the conscience, or rather making one numb to it, and of stunting moral 
development; a man should not wait for a reason to act on what he knows intuitively should 
be done.  Hume and later Mill had both made the mistake of insisting that conscience give a 
rational account of itself because they failed to recognize the existence and nature of the 
intuitions and of self-evident truth.  Conversely, reasoning would become intolerably 
burdensome—indeed, impossible—if one demanded a moral justification for beginning any 
train of thought. 
In Method, McCosh is careful to point out that “a complete view of the conscience” 
requires a consideration of conscience under three aspects:  “as proceeding upon and 
revealing a law [above itself] with authoritative obligations,” “as pronouncing an 
authoritative judgment upon actions presented to it,” and “as possessing a class of emotions, 
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or as a sentiment.” TPF303FPT  The conscience, “though supreme within the mind . . . does not look 
upon itself as absolutely supreme . . . It points to a law prior to itself, above itself, 
independent of itself, universal, unchangeable, and eternal.  The conscience is not the law 
itself, it is merely the organ which makes it known to us—the eye that looks to it.”TPF304FPT  In its 
decisions, the conscience does not distinguish between true and false, or discover relations 
or resemblances, but simply declares the right or wrong of actions.  These decisions, though 
not a product of reasoning, are of the nature of judgments rather than feelings; while every 
act of conscience is in fact accompanied by emotion, the decisive factor in each of these 
operations is not the feeling but the factual judgment that an action contemplated has the 
quality of rightness or wrongness. TPF305FPT 
It is important to realize that conscience judges exclusively mental acts; that is, it 
judges not “outward actions” but “internal motives”—more specifically acts of will and “the 
mind or agent manifested in these acts” (one’s own and those revealed of others).  No 
outward act in itself can be judged good or evil; it can only be so judged in its connection 
with the will of the actor.  Likewise, affections and acts of mind become morally good or evil 
only in association with the will.TPF306FPT  Conscience renders essentially four kinds of judgments 
on acts of will contemplated:  “First, it authoritatively demands that certain actions be done.  
Secondly, it authoritatively insists that certain actions be not done.  Thirdly, it declares that 
the performance of the first class of actions is good, commendable, rewardable.  Fourthly, it 
announces that the omission of the first, or commission of the second class is wrong, 
condemnable, punishable.”  The fourth class of moral judgments, significantly, gives rise to 
“fear of a supernatural power, and of coming judgments.”  “It is this sentiment,” McCosh 
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says, “which, more than anything else, has retained the idea of God—in some cases very 
vaguely—among all nations.”TPF307FPT 
HUMAN NATURE 
We have now seen enough to trace out the basic elements of human nature.  Human 
nature is a matter of soul.  The human body differs from the bodies of the lower animals 
only by a matter of degrees; it is the soul that makes man qualitatively different.  The basic 
elements of human nature, then, are the basic elements of the soul, and these are, according 
to McCosh, intelligence or reason, conscience, will, and the “appetencies.”  Intelligence 
involves the powers of cognition, belief, and judgment, and also the power of ratiocination.  
The conscience is the power of cognizing right and wrong qualities.  The will is the power of 
choosing.  The appetencies are natural inclinations—appetites, desires, feelings.  Collectively, 
the appetencies, the will, and the conscience are the “motive powers.” 
We observed already the operations of intelligence and conscience in the course of 
surveying McCosh’s epistemological investigations.  A few things more, however, must be 
said of the appetencies and their relation to the other motive powers—the will and 
conscience.  The appetencies include inclinations to activity, desires and aversions (inclining 
toward pleasure and away from pain), physical and mental cravings (for food, drink, and sex, 
and for “knowledge, esteem, society, power, property,” respectively), an inclination to 
beauty, social affections, and moral inclinations.TPF308FPT  The will is that power of the mind that 
decides among the inclinations, and the conscience is the power that, addressing itself to the 
will, intuitively perceives “when a particular appetency should be allowed and when it should 
be restrained.”TPF309FPT   
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The conscience is, in a sense, capable of error, and its susceptibility to error derives 
from its relation to the will and the inclinations.  How, it might well be asked, can the 
conscience be in error, given that moral convictions have the status of fundamental 
intuitions and are therefore self-evident, necessary, and universal?  The short answer is that 
“while our decisions upon the acts presented may be intuitively certain, yet . . . the acts are 
not intuitively presented, and may be very inaccurately presented.”  Conscience correctly 
judges the act as presented, but the act may be falsely or incompletely presented to 
conscience.TPF310FPT  “If we look directly and fairly at moral excellence,” McCosh avers, “the mind 
must declare it to be good.  But then first the mind may refuse to look at it at all, and 
secondly, it may not regard it in the right light.”TPF311FPT  The mind may be deterred from looking 
straightforwardly at moral excellence by the distraction of wrongly directed desire or, as 
often happens, by efforts to escape the pain of guilt associated with the awareness of living 
in contradiction to the good.  This is in fact the condition of most men:  most men have 
dysfunctional consciences because they have dysfunctional souls; their souls are in such a 
condition as not to allow their consciences to function properly.  McCosh describes the 
psychological dynamics in Method of the Divine Government: 
The conditions of responsibility seem to be conscience, will, and intelligence—the 
conscience being the law, the will the agent, and the intelligence the means of 
announcing the state of the case to the law.  The will, as the agent, is the immediate 
seat of good or evil, and all evil may be traced primarily to it.  But the will, if 
depraved, will soon come to sway the intelligence, and the intelligence gives a false 
report to the conscience, which utters, in consequence, a false judgment.  [Thus,] the 
moral disorder, beginning in the will, lies all along essentially in the will, which 
corrupts intelligence, which, again, deceives the conscience. 
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The real problem, then, is not the conscience but the will:  “Give us but a corrected will, and 
the intelligence will give faithful reports, and the conscience will become an unerring 
guide.”TPF312FPT 
The corruption of the will and the corresponding disordering of the soul is precisely 
the problem of sin, TPF313FPT and this is a very serious problem for man.  The problem is that not 
only that man is disordered, but also that, even when conscience is functioning properly, 
man does not always live according to its dictates; worse, when he wants to live according to 
its dictates, he finds himself unable to do so consistently, and racked by guilt for past and 
present wrongs.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that for McCosh, human depravity is 
not total.  He takes the “doctrine of depravity” to be thoroughly “established” by experience, 
but recognizes certain important “limitations” to it:  first, men generally have some good 
qualities, and though their love is “commonly misdirected and perverted” with regard both 
to God and man, they show at least a capacity for loving well; second, “every particular kind 
of sin is not practiced by every man, or natural to every man;” and third, man “is not so 
corrupt that he cannot become worse.”TPF314FPT 
ETHICS 
Not surprisingly, McCosh holds that any sound ethical theory must begin with the 
moral intuitions.  “It is the special office of ethical science,” he says, “to generalize and 
express the cognitions, beliefs, and judgments of the moral power, and to derive rules from 
them by which to judge of actions.”TPF315FPT  The ethical scientist must begin at the level of the 
concrete, with particulars:  taking this wallet the fellow left on the table would be wrong, that 
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woman’s sacrifice for her child was commendable, and the like.  Such particulars may be 
generalized and put in the form of ethical principles or of general or specific precepts:  one 
should do good to others and not harm, “Thou shalt not steal,” etc.  “But a science of ethics 
fitted to serve any useful purpose,” McCosh warns, “cannot be constructed from the mere 
native convictions of the mind. . . In order to serve the ends intended by it, ethics must settle 
what are the duties of different classes of persons, according to the relation in which they 
stand to each other, such as rulers and subjects, parents and children, masters and servants; 
and what the path which individuals should follow in certain circumstances, it may be, very 
difficult and perplexing.”  The complexity of human relations and circumstances, not to 
speak of the complexity of human motives and states of mind, means that ethics cannot be 
an exact science, that “demonstration [from first principles] can be carried but a very little 
way in ethics.”TPF316FPT  Much gathering of experience and much reasoning, and not a little divine 
assistance, will be required to work out any kind of complete ethical theory. 
McCosh says explicitly that his ethical investigations are conducted “in the spirit and 
after the manner of Lord Bacon”:  in mental sciences (of which ethics is one) as well as in 
the natural sciences, “there should be an orderly observation of facts, accompanied by 
analysis, or, as Bacon expresses, the ‘necessary exclusions’ of things indifferent, and this 
followed up by a process of generalization in which we seize on the points of agreement.”  
The difference between the material and the mental sciences is that while the former relies 
on the senses for its information, the latter relies on consciousness.  “Ethics,” as McCosh 
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defines it, “is the science of the necessary laws of our nature.”  These laws or principles exist 
a priori in the mind but are not known intuitively as principles; they have to be discovered 
reflexively through a posteriori investigation of particular moral perceptions.  “The historical 
method of inquiry,” as employed by Schleiermacher, “with whom ethics is an investigation 
of human nature, with its forms and tendencies developing itself in history,” is useful for the 
ethical theorist, but not, according to McCosh, sufficient:  “as human nature is always 
presented in history as a complex web, in which good and evil are mixed together, it is 
needful to have a test to determine which is the one and which the other.”  Only an 
inductive exploration of “man’s moral constitution” will provide such a standard. TPF317FPT 
What is the purpose of ethical science?  It is not, surprisingly, for practical guidance:  
“For the purposes of practical morality, it is not needful to determine the nature of ethical 
principles; for these principles operate spontaneously, and act best when we are not thinking 
of them, but are simply desiring to do what is right.  So far as we need practical rules, these 
may best be learned from the Word of God and treatises founded upon it.” TPF318FPT  Why, then, 
should one learn the principles of man’s moral nature?  The reason for McCosh is to direct 
the soul upwards to God through an appreciative recognition of the divine marks in human 
nature.  He wants in all his investigations of nature to rise “beyond mechanism to life, and 
beyond law to love,” and find “the traces of a living God whom we may admire and trust, 
and at the same time, revere and adore, and whose image, as we cherish it, assimilates our 
character to itself.”TPF319FPT  For this, divine assistance will be necessary.  (More on this shortly.) 
In Method of the Divine Government, McCosh lays out some important preliminary 
distinctions for any inquiry into ethical science.  There are, he says, four distinct subjects 
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under the general subject of ethics that must not be confused:  1) “the mental process, the 
faculty or feeling, by which the distinction between vice and virtue is observed;” 2) “the 
common quality or qualities to be found in all virtuous action;” 3) “the rule by which we are 
to determine whether an action is virtuous;” and 4) “the consequences which follow from 
virtue and vice in the feelings of the mind and the experience of society.” TPF320FPT 
We have already looked at McCosh’s account of the mental process by which the 
distinction between virtue and vice is observed:  conscience recognizes a law above itself 
imposing authoritative obligations and itself makes authoritative moral judgments on the 
actions presented to it, and its decisions are supported by accompanying emotions, but its 
proper function depends on will and intelligence.  Proceeding to the next subdivision of 
ethical inquiry, then, what are the qualities that make virtue recognizable?  McCosh finds three 
essential to any virtuous action:  the action is voluntary, it is right or lawful, and it is done in 
respect to God as the lawgiver.TPF321FPT  Again, “there can be neither virtue nor vice where there is 
no exercise of the will.”  McCosh includes as “exercises of will” not only positive volitions 
but also wish and desire, although he carefully separates wishes and desires from emotions:  
emotions cannot be sinful; wishes and desires can. TPF322FPT  “Our moral nature,” he reiterates, 
“reveals a law which is—first, independent of it; secondly, binding upon it; and, thirdly, 
binding on all intelligent beings.”  An action is virtuous if and only if it is both right (in 
accord with this law) and done because it is right; the will has chosen or desired the right as 
right.TPF323FPT  McCosh does not agree with those like Francis Hutcheson who make benevolence 
or well-wishing the sum of virtue:  love is certainly an essential component, but to be 
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virtuous love must be rightly directed.  Love is “the impellant of virtue,” justice “the rule”:  
“Love, ever ready to flow out like waters from a fountain, has unchanging justice 
determining its measure and direction, and furnishing it with a channel in which to flow.” TPF324FPT  
Finally, the law above the conscience that regulates human acts points to God as lawgiver.  
Recognition of God as lawgiver lends weight to the law and “constrains us to acknowledge 
that we owe supreme love and obedience to him, and this opens up a new and higher class 
of duties;” it “turns morality into religion, and makes all duties, even those which we owe to 
our fellow-men, to be also duties which we owe to God.”TPF325FPT 
The next consideration for ethical theory is the practical rule for determining the virtue 
of actions.  The problem here is one of distinguishing “between the voice of conscience and 
that of interest or passion.”  Interest or passion can make things seem right that are not. TPF326FPT  
The key to distinguishing passion from dictates of conscience is to discover the law or 
principle of right action governing the particular action in question.  Unfortunately, this has 
“invariably” been imperfectly done by men throughout history, and the reigning confusion 
has pointed to the need for a revelation of divine intentions regarding human activity.  
McCosh himself is convinced that the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures provide the kind of 
clear and reliable standard needed.  All men everywhere possess the law of God in the form 
of conscience, but this law is obfuscated and rendered in varying degrees impotent by 
human passion.  “Those who possess the inward principle [of conscience] will find stability 
and consistency imparted to morality by embodying its dictates in a code of precepts. . .But 
the work of forming a moral code without revelation has ever been felt to be encompassed 
with great difficulties, and the result of such an effort has invariably been a very imperfect 
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and mutilated exhibition of the moral law itself.”  In light of the perversion of human 
conscience and the difficulty of deriving an adequate code of precepts, McCosh believes it 
“absolutely necessary” for consistency in virtue to have a revealed, written code by which to 
measure one’s actions.  This has not always been available, but fortunately, thanks to Judaic 
and Christian revelation, it has become available; before this appeared, men were without 
remedy, without a certain rule for determining uncertain cases, but when it became known, it 
became the standard.  “The practical rule of obedience to those who are in possession of 
revelation,” then, “is the written law, as addressed to conscience.”TPF327FPT 
McCosh makes the case for taking the Bible as divine revelation in The Supernatural in 
Relation to the Natural, the book that, added to Intuitions of the Mind and Method of the Divine 
Government, completes his philosophy.  In Method he had been concerned with outlining the 
traces of divine design in nature—in the physical world and in human nature—and said that 
the natural world points to the supernatural as its source.    In The Supernatural in Relation to 
the Natural, he shows how the supernatural system revealed in Scripture perfects the natural 
system.  (He addresses therein the defects of the natural world as well as of human nature, 
but our concern here is strictly the latter.)  Human nature appears to the candid, observing 
mind capable of good but falling far short of goodness; human beings are restless, uneasy, 
distressed, and long for a better life; conscience keeps calling attention to wrongs, but reason 
finds no remedy for them.TPF328FPT  The Bible—in particular the New Testament—reveals a 
remedy for wrongs, a path to goodness, and a way to eternal happiness, all supernatural.  
The supernatural lifts and restores the natural, which was designed for the supernatural and 
needed it from the beginning.  “The Bible comes to us as the Word of God,—pre-supposing 
that we believe in God, on the natural evidence supplied in his works without and 
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convictions within.  Pre-supposing that God and his eternal power and godhead may be thus 
so far known—yes known (noumena kathoratai is the language used, Rom. i. 20)—it comes to 
us to make him more fully known, as to what he is in himself, and as to what he has done 
for man.”TPF329FPT  McCosh summarizes nicely how Scripture completes ethics in his Examination 
of Mill’s Philosophy:  the Word reveals how to be relieved of the burden of past sin, gives 
motives to perform duties, provides “the regulating principle of our conduct, love to God 
and love to man,” “lays down many and varied precepts as to how we should feel and what 
we should do, in very many and varied situations, and supplies numerous warnings against 
evil, and examples of good;” beyond these, it “leaves the rest to ourselves, to the motives 
which it has called forth, and the royal law of love.”TPF330FPT  Man’s restoration is clearly not 
merely a matter of additional knowledge, but of transformation, wrought (with human 
cooperation) “by the immediate indwelling and operation of the Spirit of God.” TPF331FPT  It should 
be understood that Scripture does not provide an ethical science of its own, although in 
revealing man’s ultimate ends it draws out the arc of man’s natural moral principles to a 
logical conclusion; it rather provides intensely practical ethical rules and directs to the 
spiritual Source that enables man to follow them consistently.TPF332FPT 
There is one more area of ethical investigation after the mental process of moral 
discernment, the qualities of virtuous action, and the practical rule for deciding particular 
cases:  it is the question of the consequences of moral acts.  McCosh observes that a 
“correspondence” obtains in nature between moral activity and certain effects.  Two 
correspondences in particular are important here:  1) the internal correspondence of 
pleasurable emotions with virtuous, and painful emotions with vicious, affection; and 2) the 
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external correspondence of social advantages with virtuous, and disadvantages with vicious, 
behavior.  The virtuous affections are pleasant, and include both the pleasure of love, which 
is something “far higher and deeper than mere animal gratification,” and the pleasure of 
contemplating virtuous actions; the sinful affections, by contrast (envy, malice, or revenge, 
for instance), are painful.  Virtuous and vicious affections, moreover, in addition to being 
pleasurable or painful in themselves, each raise in the mind associated ideas and feelings, and 
these influence the whole character.  The external consequences of virtuous action include a 
“multiplication of happiness” among people as a natural response to justice and benevolence, 
an augmentation of confidence or trust among them, and, very often, prosperity—or “the 
success which generally follows the exertions of excellence.”  The results of vicious actions 
are precisely the opposite, although evil is sometimes successful in the short term.TPF333FPT 
McCosh’s foregoing critical subdivisions of ethical theory give us a general form of 
ethics; let us now look a little further into the first and last parts—into the determinations of 
conscience and the consequences of moral acts.  The conscience, we have seen, is what 
allows us to recognize good and evil.  Are there any generalizations we can make about what, 
substantively, conscience discerns in them?  McCosh believes there are.  He outlines in 
Intuitions some fundamental moral convictions involved in the exercises of conscience 
regarding the nature of moral good, sin and error, and the relation of moral good and 
happiness.  We have already witnessed most of them, but it may be helpful to see them all 
together.  Of the nature of moral good, McCosh says, conscience reveals that the moral 
quality recognized is a quality in the action itself, and not given to it by the contemplating 
mind; that moral good must be seen as such by all clear-seeing rational creatures; that when 
recognized it lays on us an obligation of attending to it; that some authority or standard of 
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right exists above conscience that we are obliged to obey; that this obligation, when we have 
been led to believe in a Supreme Being, takes the form of law; that moral good is 
commendable and deserving of reward; that moral good pertains to the will and is “a quality 
of certain actions proceeding from Free Will;” and that this quality is not capable of being 
resolved into simpler elements.TPF334FPT  But while it is “necessary for the conscience to decide in a 
certain manner” given certain facts, “it is not necessary that the will should do what the 
conscience commands.” TPF335FPT  When the will falls away from the good commanded by 
conscience, when in its essential freedom it opts for evil rather than good, this is sin.TPF336FPT  The 
conscience reveals of sin that it is a reality—“not a separate entity, like a plant or an animal,” 
but a quality of certain actions; TPF337FPT that it is a quality of voluntary acts; and that it is 
condemnable and deserves punishment.TPF338FPT  Finally, with regard to the relation of moral good 
and happiness, the conscience reveals that the moral good of an act is “altogether 
independent of the pleasure it may bring;” that we ought to promote the happiness of all 
those capable of happiness (not as a utilitarian calculation, but as a duty); that, however much 
the evils of this present life may disunite them, happiness belongs with moral good; and that 
sin deserves pain as punishment.TPF339FPT 
As I noted previously, McCosh spoke in Intuitions of the need for any adequate 
theory of ethics to establish “the duties of different classes of persons” according to the 
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relations they are in to others.  These would fall in part under the general obligation to 
promote the happiness of all who are capable of happiness.  Before we examine McCosh’s 
classifications of duties, then, let us understand what McCosh means by this broader 
obligation to promote the happiness of others.  He accepts the Benthamite-Millian principle 
of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” as an appropriate goal, but finds the 
philosophical foundation provided for the principle by those two thinkers to be grossly 
inadequate.  Discussing Hume’s utilitarianism in The Scottish Philosophy, McCosh articulates 
“the fundamental objections” to the utilitarian approach:  “Whence the obligation lying on 
us to promote the happiness of others? to give to others their due? to keep our promises?  
From their utility, it is answered.  But why are we bound to attend to what is useful?. . .why 
the reproach that follows, and which justifies itself when we have failed to keep our word?  
These questionings bring us to a justice which guards conventions, to a law which enjoins 
love.”TPF340FPT 
McCosh elaborates his position regarding utilitarian ethics fully in his Examination of 
Mill’s Philosophy.  There he identifies four essential problems with Mill’s utilitarian theory.  
First, it fails to account for “the peculiar idea and conviction” regarding moral good and evil 
as it resides in consciousness.  Mill admits that there are in consciousness feelings or 
judgments concerning right and wrong, but attributes these fully to interest and sympathy 
and their corresponding associations of ideas.  McCosh freely concedes that “persons may 
be led by mere prudence to attend to the duties of an outward morality, and by a kind of 
disposition to relieve distress, altogether irrespective of a moral sense,” but he insists on 
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taking seriously the intuition of obligation and the sense that if we neglect the obligation we 
are “blameworthy.” TPF341FPT 
Second, Mill’s utilitarianism does not provide “sufficient sanctions to induce us to 
approve virtue and condemn vice,” or in other words, does not “contain within itself a body 
of motives or motive powers, fitted to lead to virtuous conduct.”  It recommends seeking 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number but cannot say why anyone ought to do so, and 
it undermines religious sanction by jettisoning both conscience and the motive of adhering 
to divine will.  Mill says in his Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy that “the ultimate sanction. 
. .of all morality (external motives apart) [is] a subjective feeling in our minds,” which he 
thinks is as powerful a motive as can be had.  But a faithful examination of consciousness, 
McCosh suggests, shows that the feeling of pleasure or pain associated with moral questions 
arises “in consequence of a prior perception” [emphasis added] of good or evil—the feeling 
does not exist independently, but derives from the perception.  Mill describes moral feeling 
as “all encrusted over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, and 
still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of 
childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and 
occasionally even self-abasement;” this “mass of feeling,” he thinks, provides a kind of 
personal standard of right and simultaneously a powerful incentive not to violate it.  Again, 
Mill is only half right:  it is true, McCosh says, “that other and secondary motives may and 
should gather and cling around our primary conviction of duty, to aid and strengthen it,” but 
the fact remains that at the center lies the conviction.  The inherent deficiency of Mill’s 
emotive standard of morality will make itself felt, McCosh believes, when “the intelligent 
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youth [who] comes to rise beyond his educational beliefs, and to think for himself, will not 
be satisfied with the mere existence of the mass of feeling,” but will ask, “Is it justifiable, is it 
binding?”  If this intelligent youth is taught that these associations “have no obligation 
[beneath them] in the reason or nature of things, then why should he not uncoil them?”  
Besides, even if he is satisfied with his complex of moral feeling, some of the feelings created 
by association may have a bad tendency when unregulated by conscience.TPF342FPT 
The third problem with Mill’s utilitarian approach is that it does not furnish “a 
sufficient test of virtuousness of acts and virtuousness of agents.”  Mill’s test, of course, is 
whether an act or an agent tends to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number.  
An obvious practical problem with this test, as McCosh observes, is that “in the complicated 
affairs of this world, the most far-sighted cannot know for certain what may be the total 
consequences of any one act.”  More fundamentally, Mill provides no test for the 
virtuousness of motives (as distinguished from acts)TPF343FPT and does not adequately explain what 
makes an action wrong.  “Mr. Mill speaks of ‘reproach’ being one of the checks on evil; but 
when,” McCosh asks, “is reproach justifiable?  Not knowing what to make of sin, the system 
provides no place for repentence.”  In the end, “The boundary line [in Mill’s system] 
between moral good and evil is drawn so uncertainly, that persons will ever be tempted to 
cross it without allowing that they have done so,—the more so that they are not told what 
they should do when the have crossed it.”TPF344FPT 
Finally, Mill’s utilitarian ethics fails to account for all the virtues.  Again, Mill is right 
to suggest that all have a duty to promote the happiness of others, but fails to establish it as a 
duty, to give motive and obligation to it.  He is right to look to the consequences of behavior 
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as an important consideration in all moral deliberations, but lacks any adequate measure of 
the true moral status of those consequences, or any appreciation for the fact that some 
actions are good and some bad in themselves, apart from any consideration of 
consequences.  Indeed, certain actions cannot be rightly done for the sake of utility:  the duty 
to love and revere God, for example, if done for utilitarian reasons, is not truly done.  In 
short, while utility is a genuine good, it is not the only good, and it is not, in itself, a 
sufficient standard of virtue.TPF345FPT 
The obligation to promote the happiness of all who are capable of happiness, then, 
demands much more than wishing others well and acting consistently according to 
sympathy; it is an obligation to do good to them and not evil, as good and evil are revealed 
by conscience, whether we feel sympathy for them or not.  But even this is not sufficient; 
promoting happiness as emotional satisfaction, providing comfort and lawful pleasure and 
reducing suffering, does not fulfill human duty.TPF346FPT  Often doing right entails suffering in the 
short term—in the form of struggle against internal evil, or resistance to external evil, or the 
foregoing of lesser, temporary goods for the sake of higher ones—and no one should ever 
communicate to others an idea that suffering is to be avoided at all costs or try to promote 
happiness or relieve misery in any way inconsistent with the moral integrity of either the 
giving or the receiving parties. 
What, then, are the basic human duties?  McCosh gives a rough outline of these in a 
late, slim volume entitled Our Moral Nature: Being a Brief System of Ethics.  They can be classed 
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as duties to God, duties to man, and duties to self. TPF347FPT  Duties are “something due, something 
to be paid,” and they are derived from the principles of human nature as discovered through 
an inductive investigation of the intuitions, in particular the moral intuitions rendered by 
conscience, and from moral ideas connected to the principles.  The duties to God really 
encompass the duties to man and self, as all right is traceable ultimately to God, the architect 
of man’s moral constitution. TPF348FPT  Still, the duties may be separated analytically into those 
specially owed to God, to others, and to self.  The fundamental duties specifically directed to 
God are public and private worship (a cherishing of “reverent and devout feeling” and a 
willing dependence on God, expressed in praise and prayer) and carrying out missions in 
cooperation with divine causes (primarily communicating the gospel, suppressing vice and 
promoting morality).  “In general,” we have a duty to obey God “whenever He has uttered a 
command, whatever be the sacrifice we are required to make.”TPF349FPT 
Toward men, we generally owe honor, sympathy, and love.  The “standard of love” 
to others is our own “instinctive love toward ourselves”—we should love our neighbors as 
ourselves.  More specifically, we owe others integrity, which includes both personal 
trustworthiness and charitableness, respecting the integrity of others; veracity; and respect 
for others’ property, including the precious cargo of their “character and influence” as well 
as their material possessions.  The duties to others can be further subdivided into the duties 
of communities, of masters and servants, of families, and of church and state.  “The moral 
law is binding on communities,” McCosh says, “as it is upon single persons.”  He does not 
mention any special duties to the various communities—“nations, towns, commercial 
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companies, and clubs”—with which one may be associated, but seems to assume that the 
same duties of individuals are simply applied on a larger scale.  Servants owe their masters 
“such service as was understood at their engagement, [as] determined by custom or the law 
of the country,” and masters “should give respect both to the best interests and feelings of 
their dependents,” especially recognizing their right to “liberty of thought and of religious 
worship.”  Within the family, father and mother have a duty to provide lovingly for their 
children’s welfare, seeing that they are not only raised to maturity but also trained for a 
future occupation; children are obliged to give to their parents affection and obedience, 
“except where their commands are seen to be clearly contrary to the higher demands of 
God;” brothers and sisters and more distant blood relations owe to one another perpetual 
affection and kindness.  Sexual relationships are to be confined to marriage, and marriages 
should be supported by law; divorces should not be allowed except “from causes which 
virtually abrogate the relationship: by unfaithfulness. . .or by willful and proven 
abandonment.”  The church and the state owe to each other a solemn recognition of their 
respective exclusive domains:  “the church should not meddle with money or temporalities 
of any kind, except incidentally to secure buildings or stipends to its ministers,” and “the 
civil magistrate is not at liberty to interfere in spiritual matters, in the government or services 
of the church.”TPF350FPT  There are duties the state owes to the people generally, too, and of 
course, duties the people owe to the state:  the state or government owes the people 
protection of civil and religious rights, and the people owe the state “strict obedience,” so 
long as “the government keeps within its own province, having to do with men’s lives and 
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their property.”  In relation to other states, each state has a duty of considering “calmly and 
resolutely” whether its cause is just before it resorts to war.TPF351FPT 
Our duties to ourselves include attending to our bodily health and preservation, 
maintaining chastity, training and improving—“so far as God allows”—our mental faculties, 
cultivating “an independence in forming our opinions, and courage in carrying them out,” 
developing personal character through virtuous habits, “especially habits of self-command, 
habits of industry, habits of perseverance, habits of thorough integrity, habits of charity.  In 
short, we are to love ourselves “in the various positions in which we may be placed.”TPF352FPT 
The great difficulty, however, is less knowing what one should do than doing it.  Even 
the best ethical guidelines—for McCosh, those laid down in Scripture—cannot of 
themselves make a man good.  There is still the intractable problem of the corrupted will 
disordering the soul.  What is needed to produce good behavior is a righting of the will and a 
rectification of conscience.  The will must be reformed, rightly oriented to higher goods, so 
that it will not lead the mind and conscience astray.  The rectified conscience, restored to its 
rightful supremacy among the powers of the mind, will recognize consistently the good in 
sound ethical rules, and the will, now allied to conscience, will move the man consistently to 
act in conformity to them.  But how are the will and the conscience made whole?  According 
to McCosh, this can only be effected by a work of divine grace.  A man’s conscience, when it 
is heard, points to a God who demands “obedience in all things, at all times, and in all 
places,” but also sees that the man does not and cannot deliver such obedience.  But God 
has intervened; through Christ, “The majesty of the law is upheld, the justice of God is 
satisfied, and an obedience is provided by one from whom obedience is not required as for 
himself, but who has power in himself, and puts himself in circumstances to render it.”  
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Through him “the two essential moral attributes of God, his justice, and his benevolence,” 
are satisfied. TPF353FPT  By the activity of God’s Spirit in the soul, one comes to realize the efficacy 
of Christ’s life and death, is taken through his own death to life in God. 
This transforming process touches all of “the four indestructible principles in the 
human agent”—reason, conscience, affections, and will.  Reason is satisfied through 
evidence, “partly external, arising from miracles properly attested, and the fulfillment of 
prophecy,” and “partly, indeed chiefly, internal,” the latter supplied by the transformations 
wrought in the soul.  Christianity, McCosh says, is the only religion “which professes to be 
founded on evidence, and which is at pains to furnish it.”TPF354FPT  Conscience is “pacified” by its 
recognition that God himself is pacified with Christ’s sacrificeTPF355FPT and “rectified” by its 
perception of the “pure standard of right and wrong” provided by God’s law. TPF356FPT  The pain of 
guilt being removed, the affections flow out freely to God and the Savior, whose character, 
perfectly reflecting God’s, inspires the warmest love and admiration.TPF357FPT  The will, swayed by 
these emotions, freely chooses to accept the divine offer of forgiveness and submit itself to 
the dictates of conscience and the law of God that conscience has affirmed.TPF358FPT 
POLITICS 
McCosh nowhere in his writings presents a theory of politics.  But he does make a 
number of statements, particularly in Method of the Divine Government, suggesting a conception 
of politics much like Witherspoon’s—a political approach grounded in conscience but alive 
to utilitarian considerations.  Unlike Witherspoon, however, McCosh provides a penetrating 
analysis of the process by which the order of soul and society break down.  Social disorder is 
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rooted in the disordering of the soul.  We have seen that a malfunctioning conscience is 
caused by a bad will:  the will inclines to lesser goods or unworthy objects, neglecting the 
higher for the sake of the lower, and through myopic preoccupation with the lower deceives 
intelligence, which consequently gives a false or partial report of the facts to the conscience, 
so that the latter renders a false judgment.  But this is only the beginning of the soul’s 
dissolution.  The mind, recoiling from the pain of guilt associated with memories of sinful 
acts, increasingly tries to push out all such memories and “learns to present the deeds which 
it wishes to do or to avoid in a false [i.e., more attractive] light.”  Conscience, then, 
misinformed by reason and judging only an incomplete survey of facts regarding one’s 
internal and external acts, ceases to be a reliable moral guide.  It is rendered less effective in 
proportion to the will’s corruption and the corresponding darkening of intelligence; the 
conscience is in effect corrupted along with will and intelligence.  The process of this 
corruption can be divided analytically into four stages:  First there is the “unenlightened 
conscience,” in which “the mind avoids inquiry, because it does not wish to be disturbed,” 
and the individual acts “according to the prevailing views of the age and country, without 
making any nice inquiry into their accuracy.”  Next there is the “perverted conscience,” in 
which the mind is marked not only by ignorance, but “positive mistake,” “calling good evil, 
and evil good;” corrupt will has “succeeded in calling in the conscience” to its service, so 
that “men feel as if they did right to be [wrong].”  Then there is the “unfaithful conscience,” 
when the conscience has simply ceased to inform of wrongs because of “the painful nature 
of the emotions which the contemplation of sin calls up, and the effort which the mind 
makes to avoid or deaden the sensation.”  Finally, there is the “troubled conscience,” in 
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which the mind is characterized by “violent and convulsive movements of self-reproach 
which will at times break in upon the self-satisfaction of the most complacent.”TPF359FPT 
McCosh is convinced that the psychological and social effects of bad conscience can 
be as devastating as those of bad will, and thinks the social ramifications of bad conscience 
deserve much more attention than they have generally been given by ethical and political 
theorists.  He attributes much of the restlessness, anger, and anxiety in the world to “an 
unsatisfied conscience.”  He is “inclined to refer not only much of human misery, but much 
more than is commonly supposed, of human sinfulness, to the working of an evil 
conscience. . .It is possible for the conscience to become a deranging instead of a regulating 
power; and when it does so, it becomes the most corrupting of all agents.”  A continued 
resistance to conscience ends in a desperate last resort of condemning God as cruel and 
unjust, and from that point there is endless internal war, involving as it does not merely the 
passions, but conscience itself.  As the soul becomes increasingly rebellious, there is even a 
“drying up of the natural affections,” first of affections towards God, and then of affections 
towards people as well.TPF360FPT  Philosophers have generally paid far too little attention, McCosh 
thinks, to man’s existing condition of corruption in general, and to the central role of 
conscience in human psychological and social disorders in particular.  Passions alone simply 
do not explain “the particular mode and intensity of human wickedness”—this is explained 
only by “a perverted moral sense.” TPF361FPT 
 Given that corruption in one of the above forms is the prevailing condition among 
men, how is society kept from utter dissolution?  Fortunately, there are countervailing 
natural arrangements providing stability to human social life.  Two positive arrangements are 
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the institutions of family and civil government, both of which are natural to humanity.  The 
first institution counterbalances human selfishness with familial affection and the sense of 
mutual duty it engenders, and the second reinforces restraint by its commands and 
encourages obedience to law by the “palpable advantages” it affords to society.  Obedience 
is further reinforced by “the feelings of allegiance, of loyalty, and nationality, which spring 
up in the human bosom.” TPF362FPT   In addition to these positive arrangements, McCosh observes 
three negative arrangements in the human condition that promote stability:  “the physical 
dependence of man” on a properly functioning body, which puts definite limits on what he 
can do; the uncertainty and brevity of his life, which often prevents him from trying or 
successfully executing “bolder schemes of ambition and wickedness;” and his dependence 
on other human beings, which keeps him friendly to them, if not out of “true affection or 
righteous principle,” then at least out of need.TPF363FPT 
Indeed, evil is made to counteract evil at every level of society, not only in the home 
and in political society, but at the civilizational level as well.  The advance of civilization 
perhaps makes man in one sense capable of greater evil because “the power of masses is 
greatly augmented by the intercommunication of ideas and sentiments,” but it brings with it 
new restraining forces, such as augmented “independence of thinking and acting” and 
greater awareness of the activities of ambitious men that comes with the advancement of 
learning and the spread of information.  Society thus appears to be, in some measure at least, 
self-correcting:  “Society, like the steam-engine, has regulators and safety-valves, all self-
acting, ready to meet the threatened evil, from whatever quarter it may proceed.” TPF364FPT 
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In all this, McCosh perceives a beneficent providential order that is flouted only at 
great peril.  “It always happens that things advance most prosperously when there is no 
interference with them on the part of meddling wisdom, which is folly differing from folly 
only in this, that it is more conceited.”  It dangerous to try to “alter the present constitution 
of things in favour of what might seem to human wisdom to be a better.”  McCosh is not 
surprised to find that the experimental communities of the communists of his day 
“invariably, and very speedily, become scenes of wretchedness and dissension;” the 
communist theories of his era—propounded by St. Simon, Owen, and Fourier—were based, 
after all, on a radically defective understanding of human nature and the human condition.  
In particular, they all assume that men are naturally directed by enlightened or extended self-
interest, when in fact they “are far more frequently swayed by feelings, sentiments, impulses, 
and passions.”TPF365FPT  The context suggests that McCosh would also fault them for failing to 
recognize the naturalness of family and of civil government and for failing to come to terms 
with human limitations.  This position has been historically vindicated:  the failure of 
communism, of course, has been decisively and spectacularly demonstrated in the twentieth 
century, with the implosion of the Soviet Union.  When the natural aids to virtue and 
restraints on vice are removed or radically rejected, the results are devastating.  The cultural 
and economic devastation in the old Soviet Bloc is certainly a case in point.  McCosh 
provides as his own illustrative examples the aftermath of the Athenian plague as recounted 
by Thucydides, the excesses of emperors and nobles in the late Roman Empire so poignantly 
conveyed by Gibbon, and the Reign of Terror in eighteenth-century France. TPF366FPT  Even 
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horrors like these, however, are held in check by natural means:  the destruction caused by 
such activities itself proves a limit on wicked ambition, and eventually produces a 
backlash. TPF367FPT 
If most philosophers have given insufficient attention to the corruption of human 
nature and failed to understand that this corruption is at the root of social disorder, other 
philosophers and perhaps most theologians have taken too little notice of “the original and 
indestructible structure of man’s moral nature.”  McCosh categorically rejects “the miserably 
low and groveling views of those who would represent all and each of mankind as utterly 
selfish and dishonest.”TPF368FPT  Even in corruption, traces of order are discernable in human 
nature: 
(1.) [T]he conscience retains in the human mind its original claims of authority.  The law is 
broken, but it is still binding.  Then, (2.) There is room in the depraved heart of man for the 
play and exercise of all the high talents and susceptibilities with which man was originally 
furnished.  (3.) There are still in the human mind many amiable and benevolent qualities.  
(4.) There are actions of moral honesty and integrity, and even of religion so called, 
performed in obedience to conscience. 
 
The problem is that in the state of corruption the claims of conscience “are not attended 
to,” the talents and susceptibilities “are abused and perverted,” the affections are not rightly 
directed, and the actions performed in obedience to conscience are done in conformity to “a 
perverted conscience.”TPF369FPT  And yet conscience, despite the disrupting effects of human 
corruption, remains the source of the “peace and decorum of society.”  The genuine 
honesty, honor, and “disinterested philanthropy” that may be found among corrupt men are 
the result of “direct obedience, not indeed full and constant, but partial and occasional, to 
the dictates of conscience.”  Even in the context of corruption, the conscience often 
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provides direction for the mind.  Generally, conscience is able to provide this direction to 
corrupt minds when sin, once committed, is forced on the attention of conscience through 
external circumstances or through natural social affections.  Men typically “avoid those sins 
which after commission must be constantly recalled by events ever recurring.”  Above all, 
they shy away from wrongs that receive society’s strong condemnation for inflicting 
“immediate injury on the temporal interests of mankind.”  For this reason, “we find the 
general tone of morality in society exercising a powerful influence on the individual 
members of it.”  The “social and sympathetic feelings of man’s nature” will not let him 
become easily accustomed to inflicting significant injuries and pain on others.TPF370FPT 
 Other tendencies in human nature conducive to social order also remain operational 
in a state of corruption.  First, there are physical and mental appetencies inherent in human 
nature.  The physical appetites—hunger, thirst, sexual appetite—“compel man to be 
industrious and laborious, in order to obtain the food needful for their gratification” and 
“render him active on the one hand, and dependent on the other.”  They encourage, in other 
words, productivity, discipline, and humility.  Mental appetencies—the natural desires for 
knowledge, esteem, power, society, and property—also conduce to social well-being.  The 
appetence for knowledge fosters the learning and discovery necessary for social 
improvements and restrains human wickedness by bringing human character under 
inspection and thereby under the sway of public opinion.  The desire for honor, when not 
utterly perverted by evil, engenders “amiability, or that spirit that leads us to study the 
temper, the tastes, and feelings of our fellow-men,” helping thus to bind society together, 
and providing an added motive for philanthropic enterprises.  The inclination to power, 
when not excessive, unites men “who would otherwise be isolated in all their actions, and 
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wavering and unsteady in their movements” around charismatic leaders, combining their 
actions to produce powerful effects.  The yearning for society gives rise to community and 
all the social offices and benefits of people’s living in close proximity to one another.  The 
desire for property, when it does not turn into raw greed, encourages work, and the habit of 
working lends “a steadiness of aim and a spirit of caution to individual minds” and issues in 
“the accumulation of wealth,” which “tends to produce an elegance and a social order which 
cannot be found in communities stricken with poverty and constantly striving about the 
necessities of existence.”  To these “primary impulses” may be added “the secondary 
principles” of “a calculating self-love” and a “habitual benevolence,” but “it is by the 
primary impulses fully as much as by the secondary principles of self-love and benevolence, 
that mankind are induced to maintain an outward decency and deportment, and society at 
large is made to clothe itself in becoming decorum.” TPF371FPT 
 Various classes of natural emotions also tend to promote social order in some way.  
“Arrestive” emotions (apprehension, fear, dread, terror), arising from perceptions of 
potential harm, help to make men cautious and support the development of “all the hardy 
virtues which grow upon caution.”  “Instigative” emotions (hope, expectation), following the 
recognition of possible benefit, both stimulate human activity and promote human 
happiness.  (Action ceases and happiness dies with the loss of hope.)  “Adhesive and 
repulsive” emotions (desires and aversions), awakened on the contemplation of persons or 
objects possessing good or bad qualities, draw men toward good and away from evil.  
“Remunerative and punitive” emotions (enjoyment and contentment, grief and depression), 
emerging with the awareness of good or evil “as already attained,” reinforce the attraction to 
the one and the repulsion from the other.  Sympathetic emotions—responsiveness to the joy 
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and sorrow of others—encourage men to help and protect one another.  Finally, “aesthetic 
admiration and repugnance,” produced on the observation of order, beauty, and nobility and 
their opposites, help to keep the mind focused on worthy objects and cultivate a sense of 
“propriety and decorum” highly beneficial to the maintenance of social mores. TPF372FPT 
 Unfortunately, both appetites and emotions can be corrupted by a bad will, and 
when they are, their personally and socially beneficial effects are blunted and—too often—
they become destructive.  Especially damaging are vanity, ambition, avarice, prodigality, 
anger, resentment, envy, and party spirit.  Yet even these, by providential arrangement, are 
made to have good effects, despite being wrong in themselves.  Take away vanity and 
ambition, McCosh observes, “and it is impossible to calculate how much earthly excellence 
would be taken away, or rather to say how little would remain.”  Citing Adam Smith and 
Thomas Malthus, he notes that the ugly vices of avarice and prodigality sometimes work in 
the public’s favor:  the former often results in the accumulation of capital, and the latter 
burnishes the income of those who produce what the extravagant purchase.  “We see,” he 
says, “how a nation may owe its commercial and political prosperity, not so much to the 
wisdom of its statesmen and citizens, as to the skillful adjustments of the government of 
God.”  Anger and resentment, as destructive as they can be, also goad men to prevent and 
redress injustices, and violent conflicts “have been the means of checking other evils which 
would have spread inextricable disorder throughout society.”  Envy, too, though “among the 
basest and most malignant of human passions,” often serves to check ambition and turn 
people against extravagant projects.  And partisanship in politics and religion, while 
sometimes a source of great tumult, has also lead individuals to subject public measures to 
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“sifting investigation” and fostered “reading, inquiry, and reflection” through the interest 
generated by controversy. TPF373FPT 
 The arrangement of human nature and the other arrangements in the natural order 
together keep men from sinking into utter depravity and destroying themselves in their 
corruption.  However, if man personally and socially is ever to move beyond the minimal 
level of restraint and stability enforced by these natural arrangements to full, robust maturity, 
a supernatural dynamic must be added to nature, the natural man must be infused with 
divine grace.  Whatever benefits derive from the checks and balances providentially 
instituted in nature, they cannot match those following from a spiritually awakened and 
morally rebuilt community.  The psychic reordering McCosh described on the personal 
level—the redirected will and affections, the informed intelligence, the rectified 
conscience—must take place on a grand scale. 
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THE COMMON-SENSE BASIS OF JAMES’ PRAGMATIC RADICAL 
EMPIRICISM 
 
 
 The place of common sense in William James’s philosophy is not sufficiently 
appreciated.  Some scholars have recognized that common sense was a sort of touchstone 
for James, but none has given a systematic treatment of its meaning and its place in James’s 
philosophic Weltanschauung. This I will attempt to provide.  James always took the common 
sense perspective as his starting point and default position.  Sometimes he did so explicitly.  
Other times common sense lurked in the background like a ghost, reminding you of its 
presence only to trail away whispering in the air.  James often spoke of common sense as if 
confident his readers (or auditors) knew just what he meant by the term.  Probably he spoke 
of it this way because, as I have observed, Scottish Common Sense had been a major force 
in British and American universities for much of the nineteenth century, and the largely 
philosophical public to which he committed his thoughts could be assumed to be familiar 
with Common Sense thinking.  I noted in the introduction that James told his audience at 
the Gifford Lectures, where he delivered the text of what would become The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, that his first philosophical studies were of Scottish Common Sense, and 
an attentive reading of his Principles of Psychology shows that he was well acquainted with the 
works of Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton, and McCosh.TPF374FPT  He probably could have 
expected his communicants to be at least generally familiar with the basic ideas, if not the 
writings, of these Common Sense philosophers.  He did not make frequent reference to 
these thinkers outside of the Principles, but a close analysis of his writings shows unmistakably 
that the concept of common sense profoundly affected his own thinking about the world 
and man’s existence in the world. 
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Pragmatism—at least the Jamesian version—is a philosophy grounded in and 
constantly checked by common sense.    In “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth”—the 
central lecture within Pragmatism—James presents “common sense” as the most fundamental 
of three levels of truth generally accessible to human beings.  Throughout his writings, 
common sense repeatedly emerges as something that must be taken into account if error and 
injury to human well-being are to be averted.  Additionally, the pragmatic approach is 
motivated and driven by common-sense concerns, above all by a concern for the good of 
man as it is concretely available to him.  Pragmatism takes human needs and interests 
seriously as being among the more important constituents of reality, and as potentially 
finding their fulfillment in the universe of which they are parts. TPF375FPT  As James’s pragmatic 
conception of truth has been and continues to be very badly misunderstood, a few clarifying 
suggestions about what he means by “truth” are in order before we scrutinize his notion of 
common sense. 
THE PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH 
Truth is for James a matter of concrete relations between knower and known. The 
key to understanding James’s pragmatism is to grasp what he means by the “true” and the 
“real” and precisely how he sees the two to be connected.  Truth, James says, “must obtain 
between an idea and a reality that is the idea’s object; and, as a predicate, it must apply to the 
idea and not to the object, for objective realities are not true…they are taken as simply being, 
while the ideas are true of them.”TPF376FPT  One must never forget that for James truth is by 
definition a relation of one concrete reality (thought) to another outside it (another thought 
or thing); the failure to realize or remember this simple fact lies at the root of most 
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misunderstandings of James’s philosophy.  The “pragmatic” element in James’s approach to 
truth is the insistence that a hard criterion be supplied for speaking of any idea as “true” and 
the conviction that the only hard criterion available is that an idea makes some discernable 
difference in experience.  A true idea is one that can be verified some way in experience.  
James’s first public articulation of the pragmatic principle TPF377FPT remains one of his clearest.  
There James credits Charles S. Peirce with its first enunciation.  “Peirce’s principle”—based 
on the empirical observations that the aim of thought is belief and that belief is sought as a 
foundation for activity of some kind—is that the key to achieving clarity of thought is to 
consider what “possible difference of practice” a given idea makes.  An idea’s concrete 
practical effects, according to the principle, are all that we can know of any substance about 
it.  Its meaning is precisely its capacity to produce just those effects it produces if believed 
and acted on. TPF378FPT  James extends the principle by making the criterion of meaning the possible 
difference of experience an idea suggests:  “The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is 
indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires.  But it inspires that conduct because it first 
foretells some particular turn to our experience which shall call for just that conduct from 
us…[Therefore,] the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be 
brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether 
active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, 
than in the fact that it must be active.” TPF379FPT  The practical issue of truth, James suggests—and 
thus its meaning—is what manner of experience it suggests, and what is to be believed and 
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what done in light of this foreseen experience.  This leads James to the following assertion of 
what, on his accounting, a pragmatic philosophy should be:  “the whole function of 
philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at 
definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is 
true.”TPF380FPT  
The foregoing extension of Peirce’s principle was too much for Peirce, who had only 
applied it to logic (as a means of attaining maximal clarity and consistency of thought) and 
believed that making experiential consequences the criterion of truth must end in radical 
subjectivism and relativism.TPF381FPT  That a friend and colleague of Peirce’s caliber thought this 
the inevitable result of James’s formulation of the concept is striking testimony to just how 
difficult James found it to make himself understood on the matter.  For one of the primary 
aims of James’s philosophic work was precisely to refute subjectivism and relativism (as 
distinguished from relativity, which James both acknowledged and defended). 
The misunderstanding of James’s position revolves around his use of the term 
“experience.”  He was misunderstood on this point, I want to suggest, not because he failed 
to articulate his meaning clearly, but rather because his conception of experience was so 
startlingly original and because his fullest and clearest elaboration of it did not receive much 
public attention until after his death in 1910, when Ralph Barton Perry compiled James’s 
articles on the subject and published the collection as Essays in Radical Empiricism.  For James, 
both reality and truth are to be found within experience, but according to his conception of 
experience, this does not imply either radical subjectivism or idealism in the Berkeleyan 
sense.  There is, James thought, an element of subjectivity in all perceptions, but there is also 
                                                 
TP
380
PT Ibid., 1081. 
TP
381
PT See Peirce’s considered statements and restatements on pragmatism in “The Essentials of Pragmatism,” 
“Pragmatism in Retrospect: A Last Formulation,” and “Critical Common-Sensism,” chs. 17, 18, and 19, 
respectively in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Buchler. 
 146
an element of real objectivity in them.  Subjectivity and objectivity in perception are two 
poles within one overarching “pure experience.”  As Hunter Brown explains, “James 
understood subject and world to be simultaneously implicated in the constitution of 
experience.” TPF382FPT  Pure experience is essentially undifferentiated primary experience, “the 
instant field of the present,” TPF383FPT “the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to 
our later reflection with its conceptual categories,” “a that” not yet abstracted through 
reflection into any whats. TPF384FPT  James uses the term “pure experience” in two quite different 
ways, however, and this dual usage must be borne in mind to avoid misunderstanding.  
Sometimes he speaks of the pure experience of an individual:  “the instant field of the 
present” as it appears to a personal consciousness.  The germ of his notion of pure 
experience in its personal dimension is already present in the Principles—in hindsight it seems 
clear that pure experience in this sense is equivalent to the present moment of James’ 
“stream of consciousness.”  The following statement from Chapter XIII of the Principles 
would work well as a definition of pure experience on this level:  “Experience, from the very 
first, presents us with concreted objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which 
envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible into inward elements and parts.”TPF385FPT  
At other times James employs the term “pure experience” to speak of the instant field of the 
present in general, as when he talks of a “world of pure experience.”  Pure experience in this 
latter sense is essentially equivalent to what in the history of philosophy is more commonly 
called “being” or “what is”—in James’s words, “plain, unqualified actuality or existence.”TPF386FPT  
But James’s notion of being or existence differs from others in two ways.  First, being as 
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James understands it is dynamic, not static.  From one moment to the next being is never 
exactly the same.  There are continuities, to be sure—as James himself never tires of 
reminding us—and some constants in reality seem to remain amid the flux:  as James 
observes in Pragmatism, “Our experience is all shot through with regularities.”TPF387FPT  But the 
stream of things is never entirely the same as it was before.  Second, being on James’s 
analysis must include the subjective within it.  Our experiencing minds are as much a part of 
what is as the things we experience; the subject is as real as its objects.  The implication of 
this for James is that “subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized 
only when [an] experience is ‘taken,’ i.e., talked-of, twice…by a new retrospective 
experience.” TPF388FPT 
This “retrospective experience” is experience as constituted by selective attention, 
and is what is usually meant by “experience.”  When we talk of our experiences, we do not 
ordinarily mean to include events undergone of which we were unaware but rather only 
those we noticed going through, happenings that we remember, and remember as having 
some significance or at least some interest for us.  Or if the question concerns what has just 
transpired, we typically mean by “this experience” not James’ “immediate flux of life” but 
some circumscribed matter within the flux—what an excellent concerto that was, for 
example, not the rate of our breathing, the objects in our peripheral vision, the fidgeting of 
our fingers, or whatever else we might have noticed going on in and around us in the concert 
hall had we turned our thoughts to them.  Pure experience consists of all the possible objects 
of attention at any given moment, experience in the usual sense only of selected features out 
of that massive whole.  It is the latter, ordinary meaning of “experience” James employs in 
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the Principles of Psychology when he says, “My experience is what I agree to attend to.”TPF389FPT  This 
kind of experience is secondary, while pure experience is primary. TPF390FPT  It is pure experience—
together with, as we shall see, collective human experience—rather than personal experience as we ordinarily 
speak of it, which James takes as the test of truth.  James would have saved himself a lot of trouble 
trying to make himself understood if he had been able to make this point clear. 
How, then, does James understand the relationship between experience and truth?  
When James puts forth experiential consequence as the criterion of truth, he does not mean 
to suggest that truth is whatever we would like it to be or whatever will produce the desired 
feelings of the moment.  He means to suggest that truth must conform to the facts of 
experience, which (he believes) tell us all we can ever know about reality.  Conformity to 
experienced or clearly experienceable fact is what makes an idea true.  The experiential 
consequences to which James refers are the experienceable effects, whether we like them or 
not, that would obtain if we believed and acted on a given supposition.  They are what show 
us whether the supposition was accurate.  If I have an idea about something but am 
constantly rebuffed by the facts of experience when I “try it out”—whether the matter is 
“theoretical” or “practical”—I have good reason to think the idea is false.  The level of 
experience is for James the level of reality, or at least as much of reality as human beings can 
have access to, and therefore making experience the test of truth in James’s mind is nothing 
more or less than making reality the test of truth.  James prefers to speak in terms of 
“experience” rather than “reality” in part, I suspect, because the former term suggests 
concreteness in a way the latter does not, and it is in the concrete that we find the hard test 
of ideas that James is looking for. 
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In Pragmatism, James says that pragmatists hold to the usual notion of truth as 
“agreement with reality,” but insist on pressing the question of what exactly agreement with 
reality means, of “what may precisely be meant by the term ‘agreement,’ and what by the term 
‘reality,’ when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with.”TPF391FPT  Philosophers 
often present truth as a “copy” or “transcript” of reality, but James insists this concept of 
truth is inadequate.  Conceiving of truth as a copy of reality works in some cases, as when we 
want a true idea of what a particular physical object looks like—say, a building downtown or 
a person we expect to find at the airport.  But some realities are not amenable to copying in 
this way:  James gives as examples “past time,” “power,” and “spontaneity.”TPF392FPT  This 
consideration suggests that copying is only one type of agreement with reality and that, if we 
are to get an adequate conception of truth, we will have to consider a variety of types.  An 
adequate conception of truth must answer the question, What do all the various types of 
agreement with reality have in common?  James’s answer is that all of them bring us into 
closer working contact with the facts of experience.  Truth is “essentially an affair of 
leading” to and through reality, TPF393FPT or more precisely, “into or up to, or towards, other parts 
of experience,” TPF394FPT terminating (if we follow them far enough) in “sense-percepts.”TP F395FPT 
If this is what is meant pragmatically—i.e., concretely—by “agreeing” with reality, 
what is meant by “reality”?  “‘Reality’ is in general what truths have to take account of” TPF396FPT—
it is “something resisting, yet malleable, which controls our thinking as an energy that must 
be taken ‘account’ of incessantly (tho not necessarily merely copied).”TPF397FPT  It is malleable in 
the sense that we can manipulate it in some limited ways, and it responds to our 
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manipulation.  But while we make genuine contributions to reality or change it in various 
ways by our own thinking and acting, this is not to say we simply create it:  “All our truths 
are beliefs about ‘Reality’; and in any particular belief the reality acts as something 
independent, as a thing found, not manufactured.” TPF398FPT 
But we know this independent something only because we have in fact found it, and 
this is why experience must be the touchstone of reality.  “The only objective criterion of 
reality is coerciveness, in the long run, over thought.  Objective facts…are real only because 
they coerce sensation.” TPF399FPT  James means sensation in the broadest possible sense, as including 
perception and all concrete intellectual processes.  “Every living man would instantly define 
right thinking as thinking in correspondence with reality,” TPF400FPT but what reality as a whole 
actually is remains somewhat obscure, to put it mildly.TPF401FPT The only standard available for 
determining which of the various “postulates” about reality is valid is experience: “each 
[such postulate] must depend on the general consensus of experience as a whole to bear out 
its validity.”TPF402FPT 
Note James’s formulation here:  “experience as a whole.”  This rendering reminds 
again that James does not use the term “experience” in a narrow sense.  While all immediate 
experience of the world is individual and personal, collective human experience offers a view 
of what may be known beyond our own personal encounters.  James is careful in Pragmatism 
to specify that actual verification in sense-percepts is not necessary for most purposes for 
taking claims as true, that “verifiability” will suffice.TPF403FPT  Moreover, James’s brand of 
empiricism is distinctly non-traditional.  John E. Smith aptly warns that describing James as 
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an “empiricist” can mislead:  “James was the philosopher of experience par excellence, but 
what he understood by experience was something far richer than the conception of 
experience that dominated classical British empiricism, and therefore attempts to assimilate 
his thought to that tradition are erroneous and misleading.”TPF404FPT  In his pivotal essay, “A 
World of Pure Experience,” James explains that his “radical empiricism” is empirical in that 
he “starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order” (he mentions 
his likeness to “Hume and his descendants” here), and radical in that it “neither admits into 
its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor excludes from them any 
element that is directly experienced.”  And James (unlike Berkeley, Hume, J. Mill, and J.S. 
Mill) includes “conjunctive relations” as direct experienceables.TPF405FPT  The resulting conception 
of experience is, as Smith noted, extraordinarily rich. 
The difficulty in defining “reality” stems in part from the fact that we the 
experiencers are part of it; in some contexts it denotes that independently existing something 
that we encounter, but in the complete sense—reality “as a whole”—it must be understood 
as encompassing all of us and our encounters as well as the things encountered.  Once we 
realize that James is ultimately concerned with reality in this latter, larger sense and that 
“experience” as James uses the term is a more concrete substitute for “reality,” his pragmatic 
meaning of truth as “agreement with reality” begins to come clear.  Truth, James is trying to 
say, is a process within reality. 
Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one hand, and a reality 
outside of the idea, on the other.  This relation, like all relations, has its fundamentum, namely, 
the matrix of experiential circumstance, psychological as well as physical, in which the 
correlated terms are found embedded…What constitutes the relation known as truth…is 
just the existence in the empirical world of this fundamentum of circumstance surrounding 
object and idea and ready to be either short-circuited [because it is usually not necessary to 
explore thoroughly] or traversed at full length…The nature and place and affinities of the 
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object of course play as vital a part in making the particular passage possible as do the nature 
and associative tendencies of the idea; so that the notion that truth could fall altogether 
inside of the thinker’s private experience and be something purely psychological, is absurd.  
It is between the idea and the object that the truth-relation is to be sought and it involves 
both terms. TPF406FPT 
 
As far as James’s philosophy goes, the beginning of wisdom is to realize that experience 
entails more than psychology.TPF407FPT 
COMMON SENSE 
We are now in a position to consider James’s account of common sense and its place 
within his larger philosophy.  James combined the two primary meanings of common sense:  
as perceptual judgment and as common convictions or understandings.  He wrote more 
often of the former sense, as most of his writings (psychological and philosophical) are 
preoccupied with epistemological concerns.  He sometimes spoke of the latter in terms of 
“funded experience” and the “rich and active commerce” of experiences in the community 
of men. TPF408FPT  For James, common sense in both respects is a variety of truth.  In Pragmatism, he 
describes three basic levels of truth:  the levels of common sense, of logic, and of theory.TPF409FPT  
Each kind of truth is a kind of leading towards or directly up to various experiences.  The 
common sense level relates to “matters of fact,”TPF410FPT so that common sense truths terminate 
directly in experiences of the world, or of “things” in the world, including the “thing” called 
the “self” and even including moral and “religious” facts.  Logical truths concern “relations 
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among purely mental ideas” TPF411FPT and lead through our constellations of abstract ideas to 
certain abstract conclusions.TPF412FPT  Logical truths, then, do not lead directly to concrete facts, but 
they do lead towards them:  because they are derived ultimately from our mental 
classifications of “real objects,”TPF413FPT they suggest what facts must follow from certain orderings 
of other facts.TPF414FPT  Theoretical truths concern truth relations more generally, and mediate 
between new ideas and “the whole body of other truths already in our possession.”TPF415FPT  As 
new ideas are the product of new experiences and all truths derive somewhere from 
experience, theoretical truths also have a concrete basis and suggest what new experiences to 
expect from new coordinations of older and newer truths. 
Of these three levels of truth, common sense is closest to reality.  For James, as we 
have seen, the level of reality is “pure experience,” undifferentiated primary experience.  It is 
here in pure experience that we find all the materials from which to build out our truths.  If 
reality concretely considered is undifferentiated primary experience, common sense is 
essentially differentiating primary experience.  At the common sense level, you may say, reality 
is still directly in view.  However an observer might misconstrue the nature of the reality 
before him here, the common sense level of thought has at least this advantage over the 
other levels, that here objective reality of some kind is immediately present, here there is 
something definitely real to be known. TPF416FPT 
 As differentiating primary experience, common sense is also necessarily the first 
form of truth in order of time.  James says it constitutes the first great “stage of 
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philosophizing.”TPF417FPT  For James, “philosophy” is simply “man thinking, thinking about 
generalities rather than about particulars.”TPF418FPT  Philosophy is thus in James’s conception a 
specific kind of concrete experience of the broadest application.  It denotes man’s effort to 
grasp the basic elements of reality—the broad sweep of reality-as-a-whole, and the larger 
patterns and movements detectible within that greater current.  Common sense thinking on 
this view is appropriately classified as an incipient form of philosophizing.  Like the Scottish 
Common Sense philosophers, James carefully circumscribes the philosophical meaning of 
“common sense”:  “In practical talk, a man’s common sense means his good judgment, his 
freedom from excentricity [sic], his gumption, to use the vernacular word.  In philosophy it 
means something entirely different, it means his use of certain intellectual forms or 
categories of thought.”  These are intellectual forms inherited from our ancient ancestors 
that “have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent 
time;” they collectively constitute “our fundamental ways of thinking about things” and 
“form one great state of equilibrium in the human mind’s development, the stage of 
common sense.” TP F419FPT  Common sense notions may be questioned, and indeed philosophers 
have subjected them to intense scrutiny, but they have weathered the onslaught and continue 
to exercise an irresistible power over us:  “Criticise them as you may, they persist; and we fly 
back to them the moment critical pressure is relaxed”—“Our later and more critical 
philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of 
thought.” TPF420FPT  James names as “the most important” common sense concepts 
Thing; 
The same or different; 
Kinds; 
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Minds; 
Bodies; 
One Time; 
One Space; 
Subjects and attributes; 
Causal influences; 
The fancied; 
The real. TPF421FPT 
 
These common sense concepts are derived directly from perceptual experience.  On the level 
of common sense, concepts are never far removed from percepts, and this is what makes 
common sense generally so reliable.  Philosophy in the Aristotelian tradition, James suggests, 
is essentially a technical elaboration of such common sense concepts:  “The peripatetic 
philosophy, obeying rationalist propensities, has tried to eternalize the common-sense 
categories by treating them very technically and articulately.”TPF422FPT  These technically articulated 
categories are, he observes, “magnificently useful [for] steering our discourse to profitable 
issues.”TP F423FPT 
 James does not think common sense infallible, nor does he find it adequate for all 
human purposes.  While “for all utilitarian practical purposes [common sense] conceptions 
amply suffice,” TPF424FPT more precise conceptions are needed for attaining a genuine understanding 
of man and his environment and for enabling him to navigate ever more efficiently and 
advantageously across and through that environment.  Common sense must be refined and 
supplemented by critical thought and science.  Critical thought reveals the limitations of 
common sense conceptions, and science adds to them proven methods of verification and 
new means of managing experience.  It is essential to remember, however, that neither 
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critical philosophy nor science can ever simply supplant common sense—they can only 
supplement it.  Common sense conceptions serve an indispensable function.  Common sense 
“interpolates…‘things’ between our intermittent sensations,” so that we “connect all the 
remoter parts of experience with what lies before our eyes;”TPF425FPT critical philosophy demands 
to know what exactly these things are; science “extrapolates” [James’s emphasis] to what is 
“beyond the common-sense world” (to atoms, magnetic fields, and such).TPF426FPT  Each of these 
is essential and even superior in its own domain:  “Common sense is better for one sphere of 
life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third.”  But, James adds, “whether either 
be truer absolutely, Heaven only knows.” TPF427FPT  Common sense must be taken with a certain 
measure of “suspicion” because “its categories may after all be only a collection of 
extraordinarily successful hypotheses” (successful in the sense of relating us closely enough 
to nature to be extremely serviceable for “ordinary practical purposes”), but then philosophy 
and science must likewise be held in some suspicion, as none of these modes of 
understanding can “support a claim of absolute veracity.” TPF428FPT 
The need for diverse modes of understanding the world and the limits of each serve 
as primary motivators for James’s pragmatic philosophizing.  “Ought not the existence of 
the various types of thinking which we have reviewed, each so splendid for certain purposes, 
yet all conflicting still, and neither one of them able to support the claim of absolute veracity, 
to awaken a presumption favorable to the pragmatistic view that all our theories are 
instrumental, are mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic 
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answers to some divinely instituted world-enigma?” TPF429FPT  It would seem that we need all these 
modes in their fullest development and in coordination to get a complete picture of the 
world.  Pragmatism as a philosophic method is meant on the one hand to be a tool for 
refining meaning, for cutting away irrelevant considerations and bringing the essential facts 
and ideas into sharp relief, and on the other to do justice to all such facts and ideas, despite 
their emergence in such widely diverging encounters.  Pragmatism in this latter mode 
…lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel.  Innumerable chambers open 
out of it.  In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next some one on 
his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties.  
In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility 
of metaphysics is being shown.  But they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it if 
they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms.TPF430FPT 
 
The pragmatic method does its refining work and forges its paths between theories by 
constantly chipping concepts down to their concrete meaning and uncovering concrete 
connections among available facts. “The whole originality of pragmatism,” James reminds 
us, “the whole point in it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing.  It begins with 
concreteness, and returns and ends with it.”TPF431FPT  With its help, common sense, logic, and 
theory may be honed to maximal precision and their respective truths made cohesive and 
mutually serviceable. 
 The main point here, however, is that the common sense mode of understanding is, 
in James’s schema of philosophy, foundational in that it is the most intimately associated with 
the facts of experience.  It is also regulative in that philosophy must constantly take it into 
account:  there is something true in common sense, and thus it cannot be safely ignored or 
forgotten.  In finding common sense to be both foundational and regulative of thought, 
James is perfectly in line with Scottish Common Sense philosophy.  But James differs from 
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the leading philosophers of that tradition in understanding the intellectual forms or modes 
of thinking that compose common sense to be ancient habits rather than products of eternal 
structures implanted in the mind by the Creator.  James rejects the faculty psychology of 
classic and Scottish Common Sense philosophy as unsubstantiated by the facts and finds the 
idea of common sense as a slowly evolving stage of philosophizing more plausible, given 
what we now know about human psychology. TPF432FPT  We noticed above James’s description of 
common sense concepts as having preserved themselves through known human experience.  
This view of them reflects James’s Darwinian assumptions about human development.  As 
Thomas Carlson observes, “In James’s time…Darwin’s theory of evolution through 
spontaneous variation and natural selection offered…a general model of the means by which 
knowledge itself is constructed.  James’s friend and mentor, Chauncy Wright, argued, ‘our 
knowledges and rational beliefs result, truly and literally, from the survival of the fittest among 
our original and spontaneous beliefs.’”TPF433FPT  Wright’s statement captures nicely James’s 
understanding of the status of common sense notions.  These notions are not innate but 
inherited; they originated in response to the facts of human experience and developed over 
time; they survived to form a stable foundation for knowledge because experience has not 
discredited them; they are true enough to the facts of experience to be reliable for most 
purposes, even in most cases to be taken for granted.  In short, they are generally fit to 
ground our thought and discourse because they generally fit the facts of our individual and 
collective experience.  Common sense is not necessarily in its final shape, however, because 
fitter conceptions may come along with sufficient persuasive power to replace older 
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concepts and form new givens for the human community.  Still, such fundamental 
conceptual change should not be intolerably jarring and disruptive because it merely reflects 
a better understanding of what were already known to be fundamental facts of human 
experience.  The foundation of common sense in its glacial transformation is thus quite 
sufficiently firm and stable to support all ordinary human activity. 
COMMON SENSE AND RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
 How central is common sense to James’s overall philosophy?  I want to suggest that 
James’s radical empiricism is in fact a sort of refined version of common sense.  If I am right 
in this, common sense is quite central indeed to his larger philosophic project.  My reasons 
for classifying radical empiricism as common sense refined are several.  First, radical 
empiricism wishes to emulate common sense in maintaining unbroken contact with the facts 
of experience.  Common sense “interpolates…‘things’ between our intermittent sensations,” 
allowing us to “connect all the remoter parts of experience with what lies before our 
eyes.”TPF434FPT  Radical empiricism as James describes it “must neither admit into its constructions 
any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is 
directly experienced.”TPF435FPT  Like common sense, radical empiricism keeps one eye, so to speak, 
always on experience, on realities as they directly confront us.  As a way of philosophizing, 
radical empiricism insists on making hard reality the test of truth.  If certain facts cannot be 
made sense of, theory must be made to yield to these facts; facts must never be ignored for 
the sake of theoretic unity or elegance.  Common sense predisposes to such an approach.  It 
“contents itself with the unreconciled contradiction, laughs when it can, and weeps when it 
must, and makes, in short, a practical compromise, without trying a theoretic solution.  This 
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attitude is of course respectable.”TPF436FPT  James is not, like some latter-day pragmatists, “against 
theory” TPF437FPT—at least half the point of radical empiricism is to provide a more adequate 
theoretical understanding of the worldTPF438FPT—but he does insist that theory be held accountable 
to fact.  Common sense thinking is not strictly speaking theoretical, and in this it differs 
from radical empiricism; common sense simply takes reality as it finds it, while radical 
empiricism tries to uncover the deeper sources and tendencies of things.  But common sense 
constitutes the starting point of radically empirical theorizing.  If common sense is 
differentiating primary experience, radical empiricism merely takes this more compact level 
of thinking to a higher degree of differentiation.  Radical empiricism is just common sense 
made perspicuous. 
 In his Essays on Radical Empiricism James points to several fundamental judgments 
shared by common sense and radical empiricism.  Most significantly:  both view the world 
pluralistically; both espouse a robust variety of realism, taking the objects in the world to 
have an existence independent of our thoughts about them, but taking our thoughts also to 
have genuine ontic status; and both assert the objective reality of relations.  Take first their 
pluralistic outlook.  James throughout his writings contrasts pluralism with monism, or 
Absolutism—the idea, given its classic philosophical expression by Hegel and championed in 
James’s day by F.H. Bradley and Josiah Royce, that the universe is absolutely one in 
substance and finds its unity in that all its parts are manifestations of one absolute mind.  
The pluralist rejects the monistic thesis as wildly speculative; the thesis could be true, but 
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nothing in common experience supports it. TPF439FPT  Ordinary experience gives us “the common-
sense world, in which we find things partly joined and partly disjoined.” TPF440FPT  Radical 
empiricism takes the world as common sense does, as “a collection, some parts of which are 
conjunctively and others disjunctively related,” with disjoined parts hanging together “by 
intermediaries,” so that “the whole world eventually may hang together similarly, inasmuch 
as some path of conjunctive transition by which to pass from one of its parts to another may 
always be discernable.”  The world on this view is thus a “concatenated union” rather than “the 
‘through-and-through’ type of union…which monistic systems hold to obtain when things 
are taken in their absolute reality.” TPF441FPT 
 Common sense and radical empiricism likewise both conform to the basic thrust of 
traditional realism.  Much confusion has surrounded the question of whether James was in 
fact a realist or was really something else.  Ralph Barton Perry took James to be a 
straightforward realist, while others have read him as a subjectivist of some kind.  Of these 
two interpretations, Perry’s is more correct, but his analysis needs refining.  James clearly was 
a realist in the traditional sense of understanding things in the world to exist independently 
of what we may think about them and assuming that many things may exist of which we have 
no knowledge at all.  This basic supposition of classic realism is the common-sense view, and 
it is James’s view.  “Practically,” James says in the Essays in Radical Empiricism, “our minds 
meet in a world of objects which they share in common, which would still be there, if one or 
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several of the minds were destroyed.  I can see no formal objection to this supposition’s 
being literally true.”TPF442FPT  Even more emphatically, James says of himself, Dewey, and F.C.S. 
Schiller in the Preface to The Meaning of Truth, “As I myself understand these authors, we all 
three absolutely agree in admitting the transcendency of the object (provided it be an 
experienceable object) to the subject, in the truth-relation.”TPF443FPT  He says “provided it be an 
experienceable object” because pragmatists do insist that any object, to be taken as real, must 
be experienceable, whether it has been already experienced or not.TPF444FPT  Indeed, James in Essays 
in Radical Empiricism gives the following as the basic postulate of radical empiricism:  
“Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced 
must somewhere be real.”TPF445FPT  Some critics, he asserts, have made an unwarrantable leap from 
the pragmatists’ typical refusal to discuss “altogether trans-experiential” objects to the 
assumption that pragmatists deny the independent existence of any things beyond our minds.  
This assumption is so far wrong that James is clearly annoyed at having to respond to it:  “It 
seems incredible,” he says, “that educated and apparently sincere critics should so fail to 
catch their adversary’s point of view.”TPF446FPT 
 The reason I say that Perry’s interpretation of James as a straightforward realist 
needs refining is that it fails to recognize how much more subtle and precise and ultimately 
how much truer to reality as we know it is James’s brand of realism than the older sort.  
Charlene Haddock Seigfried has aptly described James’s version as a “reconstructed 
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realism.”TPF447FPT  It is reconstructed in that it includes subjective elements in its accounting of the 
real.  As we noticed before, all knowledge according to James’s analysis is necessarily both 
objective and subjective.  “Knowing” implies a real knower as well as a real something 
known.  It also implies that the knower makes contact in some way with the known, either 
directly or through intermediaries.  The knower, the known, the concrete tracks of mental 
and physical material connecting them, and the act of knowing itself (the traversing of those 
tracks) all are fully real, and each must receive its due weight in any adequate account of the 
real.  This Jamesian “thick” realism seems in the final analysis more thoroughly realistic than 
the usual kind, not less.TPF448FPT 
 So far, again, radical empiricism turns out to be only a more differentiated form of 
common sense.  This holds true once more in the matter of relations.  While “both 
rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that [relations] are exclusively the ‘work of the 
mind’—the finite mind or the absolute mind, as the case may be,” “common sense 
and…radical empiricism stand for their being objective.”TPF449FPT  What James means by 
“objective” relations is just what I mentioned in the preceding paragraph:  concrete paths of 
some kind connecting knower and known.  Common sense takes relations among things to 
be real and not tricks of the mind.  The man of ordinary common sense would be surprised 
indeed to hear Kant insisting that space and time are only “pure forms of intuition” and not 
real-world relations.  Radical empiricism, with its appreciation for the objective dimension of 
all experience, similarly rejects such brainy speculating in favor of the hard evidence of 
experience.  For a radically empirical philosophy, “the relations that connect experiences 
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must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relations experienced must be 
accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.”TP F450FPT  As it happens, experience is loaded 
with hard evidence of objective relations.  We experience both our thoughts and the larger 
reality enveloping us as a continuous stream, and within this flow we feel our thoughts in 
relation to other thoughts and ourselves in relation to things around us.  Relations are 
directly felt; we know them immediately, by acquaintance.  “We ought to,” but from 
inattention usually do not, “say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling 
of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold.”TPF451FPT  Radical empiricism 
takes these subtle feelings at face value, as manifestations of real conjunctive and disjunctive 
relations within experience.  James describes the basic categories of felt relations in “A 
World of Pure Experience”: 
Relations are of different degrees of intimacy.  Merely to be ‘with’ one another in a universe 
of discourse is the most external relation that terms can have, and seems to involve nothing 
whatever as to farther consequences.  Simultaneity and time-interval come next, and then 
space-adjacency and distance.  After them, similarity and difference, carrying the possibility 
of many inferences.  Then relations of activity, tying terms into series involving change, 
tendency, resistance, and the causal order generally.  Finally, the relation experienced 
between terms that form states of mind, and are immediately conscious of continuing each 
other.  The organization of the Self as a system of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfilments 
or disappointments, is incidental to this most intimate of all relations, the terms of which 
seem in many cases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other’s being.TPF452FPT 
 
James derived these categories of relations from his own painstaking examinations of 
consciousness and of the experience of being-in-the-world, the results of which are 
presented most prominently in The Principles of Psychology.  The common-sense view that 
relations are real, then, is fully confirmed by careful empirical investigation. 
 Radical empiricism does part ways with common sense on one important point.  
Common sense is inveterately dualistic, positing an entity called the “soul” or “mind” as the 
                                                 
TP
450
PT ERE, 23. 
TP
451
PT PP, 238. 
TP
452
PT ERE, 23. 
 165
domain of mental phenomena, an entity altogether different in basic substance from material 
reality.  Radical empiricism rejects a hard-and-fast dualism as unwarranted by the facts of 
experience and superfluous on an explanatory level.  James concedes that believing in soul or 
consciousness as an entity is consistent with the facts, and suggests that one can believe in 
such with a good scientific or philosophical conscience. TPF453FPT  The point for him, however, is 
that mental facts do not require a substantial soul back of them to be explained, that they 
can be explained perfectly well in terms of relations within experience.  “The central point of 
the pure-experience theory,” James says, “is that ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ are names for two groups 
into which we sort experiences according to the way in which they act upon their 
neighbors.”TPF454FPT  Before a retrospective sorting into categories, there is no ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ of 
experience but simply a that.  At the level of pure experience—the level of reality—thoughts 
and things are substantively “absolutely homogenous,”TPF455FPT or at least, a homogeneity of 
substance is what experience itself, independently of our retrospective thinking about it, 
suggests.  A truly radical empiricism, therefore, cannot take either spiritual or material 
substance as a fundamentum; it must be content with substantively ambiguous, mysterious 
pure experience for its concrete basis.  From a philosophical viewpoint, taking as true the 
idea of consciousness as an entity would violate the pragmatic principle because 
consciousness is not concretely known as an entity—there are no effects manifesting a 
conscious entity per se—but only as a “function in experience,” the particular function of 
knowing.  Looking to pure experience as the concrete phenomenon to be understood, 
“knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into 
which portions of pure experience may enter.  The relation itself is a part of pure experience; 
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one of its ‘terms’ becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other 
becomes the object known.”TPF456FPT 
 The difference between common sense and radical empiricism on the question of 
substance should not, however, be overstated.  Again, commonsense dualism, while not a 
necessary conclusion, is fully compatible with the facts of experience, and common sense 
and radical empiricism are in full agreement about what these facts are.  Common-sense 
dualizing, if indeed invalid, may be attributed to the human tendency to conceptualize 
prematurely, before the facts are adequately weighed, and to adopt as true any hypothesis 
close enough to the facts to work for ordinary practical purposes.  Indeed, James 
pragmatically accepts such hypotheses as the two-substance theory as true insofar (but not 
farther than) they do so work; within the borders of previous experienceTPF457FPT—before more 
meticulous examinations of the facts of consciousness were made—that particular 
interpretation of the facts of experience was true in the sense of being a closer fit to the facts 
than any other available.  Should James’s hypothesis that consciousness does not exist as an 
entity be borne out fully by future experience, that understanding itself would become part 
of common-sense thinking. 
 Moreover, James, in rejecting dualism, is hardly rejecting spiritual reality.  He says at 
the end of “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” “I greatly grieve that to many [his conclusion that 
consciousness does not exist as an entity] will sound materialistic,”TPF458FPT and, as anyone who 
has read James’s Varieties of Religious Experience and his other essays and letters on the subject 
of spirituality will attest, this profession of grief is no mere rhetorical flourish, a polite way of 
respecting the religious sensibilities of his American readers, but expresses a genuine concern 
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of being misunderstood.  No one at the turn of the twentieth century was doing more than 
James to make religious belief scientifically respectable, and James clearly thought that a 
great many events are appropriately characterized as spiritual, in the sense of not being 
reducible to mere physical processes.  Whether Socrates’ assertion in Plato’s Apology that 
belief in “spiritual things” logically necessitates a belief in spiritsTPF459FPT is valid, and whether this 
verdict is enough to render James’s position untenable, I leave aside for the moment.  Suffice 
it to say for now that James’s rejection of dualism is fully consistent with his pragmatic, 
radically empirical approach in that it leaves what “spiritual” may mean, beyond a certain 
peculiar quality of activity, as empirically—according to the current state of human 
experience, at least—an impossible question to answer.TPF460FPT 
I think I have established now that radical empiricism is fully compatible with 
common sense and is itself in key respects a variety of common-sense thinking. 
COMMON SENSE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE 
James took the common-sense perspective as his default position in his analysis of 
human psychology.  When in The Principles of Psychology he discussed the possibility that no 
spiritual core of consciousness exists, he presented his thoughts on the matter as “a 
parenthetical digression” and said that “from now to the end of the volume [he would] 
revert to the path of common-sense again,” the path which he had traveled from the book’s 
beginning.TPF461FPT  But this should come as no surprise:  as James clearly indicated in Pragmatism, 
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common sense is the level of truth in general most directly in contact with concrete 
experience, and common-sense perceptions are our first perceptions of reality.  Our first 
perceptions can be wrong TPF462FPT and thus may need correcting—as he admitted they might in 
the case just mentioned—but they are by definition and by necessity our point of departure 
in any initial examination of reality. 
What is the common-sense perspective of psychology?  It is, as we might say, the 
natural perspective—natural in the sense of being unreflective, or more precisely, pre-
reflective—unforced, spontaneously adopted—in short, taking appearances at face-value.  
Its advantage over traditional philosophical or scientific perspectives on psychology is that it 
deals primarily in percepts, and treats concepts as secondary and derivative.  It doesn’t seek a 
conceptual framework but merely asks, who goes there?  It starts from what is immediately 
given rather than trying to read the given through one or another theoretical lens.  Common 
sense does not object to conceptualization and conceptual framing per se—as witness the 
previous discussion of common-sense “concepts”—but it resists any conceptual 
constructions that fail to acknowledge what is directly sensed. 
As James saw it, modern philosophers of psychology had not answered this demand 
satisfactorily.  Rationalist psychology, as represented most notably by Hegel, was hopelessly 
abstract, far removed from the actual workings of the mind.  Empiricists such as Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume, and J.S. Mill were more concrete, but still tended to approach psychological 
phenomena and human experience generally in an unnatural way.  Peter H. Hare explains: 
As James saw it, the basic problem with traditional empiricism was that, in its own way, it 
departed from common sense almost as much as did rationalism…  Such common-sense 
realities as the self, material objects, causation, and freedom of the will turned out, in the 
empiricist analysis, to be fictions.  Although he never felt any inclination to abandon 
empiricism, whose reliance on fact he applauded, he sought some way to revise empiricism 
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to bring it into accord with common-sense beliefs…  The key idea in his new or ‘radical’ 
empiricism was that empiricists had been using an artificial and impoverished notion of 
experience.  If we recognize, James argued, that experience is much richer than empiricists 
have supposed hitherto and includes such common-sense realities as relatedness, tendency, 
and continuous transition, we will be able, as empiricists, to vindicate common-sense beliefs 
and will not in desperation seek the realities needed for practical activity in worlds 
transcending experience.  The notion of experience as a continuous flux is, in short, the key 
to James’ empiricist defense of a common-sense realism. TPF463FPT 
 
I am not as sure as Hare seems to be that James directly intended “to vindicate common-
sense beliefs,” but it is clear that James found the going alternatives to the common-sense 
view inadequate. 
James’s key psychological insight was that “we really gain a more living 
understanding of the mind by keeping our attention as long as possible upon our entire 
conscious states as they are concretely given to us, than by the post-mortem study of their 
comminuted ‘elements.’  This last is the study of artificial abstractions, not of natural 
things.”TPF464FPT  Ironically, traditional empiricism, while staying closer to the facts, trafficked in 
abstractions almost as much as rationalism in its psychological accounts.  “Most [psychology] 
books”—including books of a supposedly empirical variety—“start with sensations, as the 
simplest mental facts, and proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage from those 
below it.  But this is abandoning the empirical method of investigation.”TPF465FPT  Taking, as James 
suggests, “our entire conscious states as they are concretely given to us,” we discover five 
essential characteristics of consciousness:  “1) Every thought [mental state] tends to be part 
of a personal consciousness.  2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always 
changing.  3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.  4) It 
always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.  5) It is interested in some parts of 
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these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, 
in a word—all the while.” TPF466FPT 
Each of these findings, as Hare suggested in the passage just quoted, confirms 
common-sense assumptions.  Common sense accepts the personal dimension of 
consciousness as a matter of course.  It does not try to escape the personal to attain some 
Archimedian viewpoint, but rather accepts the personal, perspectival element of knowledge 
as an inherent limitation of being human.TPF467FPT  Common sense also takes constant change, 
continuity of experience, objectivity, and interestedness for granted.  Common sense is a 
mode of feeling, and our lives feel like they are constantly changing, despite the 
corresponding feeling that we who undergo the changes are somehow, in some sense, the 
same.  The passing objects which we engage and events in which we participate (mentally if 
not physically) constitute a palpable flow of experience, a flow in which we seem fully 
immersed:  we know it from within.  The sense of continuity derives from the continuity of 
thought, of consciousness.  Consciousness in general, in James’ famous metaphor, is a 
“stream.”  If we take our conscious experience as we have it, we do not find discrete 
thoughts of this or that object, but always of objects embedded in a seamless web of 
connecting relations.  “The Object of your thought,” James says, “is really its entire content or 
deliverance, neither more nor less…  The object of every thought…is neither more nor less 
than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the 
matter and however symbolic the manner of thinking may be.”TPF468FPT  The object of thought 
should not be confused with the thought of an object.  The objective deliverance of a 
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thought contains a multitude within “one undivided state of consciousness.”TPF469FPT  But within 
that wider state, we are almost always interested in and attentive to some particular features 
to the exclusion of others:  “The mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous 
possibilities.  Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the 
selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of 
attention.” TPF470FPT  Attention is drawn by interest, the excitement created by those possibilities of 
experience within the field of consciousness appealing most directly to the dominant active 
tendencies of the self.  Attention leads to perception, to the apprehension of “things” within 
the sensual stream, and, as James indicated in Pragmatism, the perception of “things” is the 
primary function of common sense on the level of personal judgment. 
It is significant that common sense does not see any incompatibility between 
perspectivity and objectivity.  And why should it?  Why indeed have philosophers so often 
opposed perspective to objective truth?  If one is looking at reality, perspective terminates in 
the real and so is true to that extent.  What really should be contrasted by those concerned 
about narrowness of perspective is not perspectivity and objectivity, but reliance on few 
perspectives and reliance on the wider view achieved through the imaginative synthesis of 
many perspectives.  The common-sense outlook has the virtue of being both narrow and 
broad, of allowing simultaneously acuity and breadth of vision.  Common sense is by 
definition that which enables us to connect the matter immediately before us with matters 
remote.  It is objective in two respects:  in knowing real objects as they present themselves to 
consciousness—and here we see that perspective in the narrow sense is objective—and in 
recognizing a larger reality not presently experienced that is the context of such knowing 
acts—thus assuming “perspective” in the popular sense of “putting things in perspective.”  
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These two sorts of objectivity are what make common sense a form of “realism.”  Common-
sense realism is precisely the position that perspectivity and objectivity are fused and 
inseparable. 
It begins to dawn that common sense on the level of personal judgment is a kind of 
knowing.TPF471FPT  James has in fact treated consciousness in general as a phenomenon of 
knowing, and common sense as a particular kind of knowing within the knowing stream.  
The stream of consciousness is, to speak more precisely, a sciousness, and consciousness a 
secondary event within that primal, knowing stream.TPF472FPT  The whole stream of thought is 
knowing, but not yet knowing with until some manner of reflection takes place.  Common 
sense’s interpolation of “things” within the stream is just such a mode of knowing-with, a 
proto-reflective act in that it apprehends each organized group of sensations as an entity of a 
particular class. TPF473FPT  The function of common sense judgment is to classify particular, 
experienced objects. 
The larger stream of thought is, as James presents it in the Principles, a stream of 
sensation.  “Sensation,” in James’ classificatory scheme, is a mental rather than a physical 
phenomenon. Sensation is conscious feeling, including not only pleasures and pains but 
every subtlest “sense of things” we have.  It is that “sciousness” of which James spoke, a 
kind of pure knowing.  It is, in a word, “knowledge by acquaintance,” our direct awareness 
of what passes in the flow of experience.  Of course, when we ordinarily talk of “sensation,” 
we do not mean our entire sensual experience but some particular feeling of some particular 
thing.  In this sense sensation is “a function in our thought whereby we first become aware 
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of the bare immediate natures by which our several objects are distributed.”TPF474FPT  Perception, 
by contrast, is a kind of “knowledge about,” which involves sensation but also 
interpretation. TPF475FPT  As James explains, “Perception…differs from sensation by the 
consciousness of farther facts associated with the object of the sensation [—this associating 
of farther facts is what James in Pragmatism called “interpolation”]…   Sensational and 
reproductive brain-processes combined…are what give us the content of our perceptions…  
Perception may then be defined, in [psychologist] Mr. Sully’s words, as that process by which 
the mind ‘supplements a sense-perception by an accompaniment or escort of revived 
sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived sensations being solidified or 
‘integrated’ into the form of a percept, that is, an apparently immediate apprehension or 
cognition of an object now present in a particular locality or region of space.” TPF476FPT  If you were 
shown an object which you had not only never seen, but had “never seen anything like it” 
and did not know where to place it categorically, you would be experiencing an essentially 
pure sensation, you would see but not perceive.  For the most part, however, after infancy, 
“a pure sensation is [for us] an abstraction.” TPF477FPT  After a few years of life, certainly by 
adulthood, we experience virtually everything perceptually.  “Why, there’s a dog, a car, a 
house,” we say, taking in everything we see as things of a kind rather than as raw sensibles. 
The “thing” perceived James calls a “percept.”  A percept is something other than a 
“concept.”  The class into which a perceived object is put is signified by a concept, but the 
immediate, particular perceived object itself is a percept.  There is the concept of “cat,” and 
then there is the perceived cat sitting here in front of me.  The distinction between concept 
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and percept is important to James because it highlights, by reminding us of the role of 
percepts in our thinking, a too neglected part of philosophy.  Most philosophers are 
conceptualists extraordinaire, and run wild among concepts, leaving percepts far behind, and 
sometimes treating them with sneering contempt.  James’ critique of those he calls 
“rationalist” philosophers is that they fail to stay in working contact with percepts—and 
more broadly, with concrete experience—and therefore run the risk of losing touch with 
reality.  Philosophers need to be grounded in common sense to “keep them honest,” to 
prevent their engaging in wishful thinking and ultimately presenting as “philosophy” nothing 
more than personal flights of fancy. 
“Conception,” James tells us, is “the function by which we…identify a numerically 
distinct and permanent subject of discourse,” and “concepts” are “the thoughts which are its 
vehicles.”  This function of conception derives from our “sense of sameness,” the sense that 
some experienced objects are of the same kind as others known before.  The distinction 
James made before between the two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge by acquaintance 
and the knowledge-about, is possible because of “a fundamental psychical peculiarity which 
may be entitled ‘the principle of constancy in the mind’s meaning,’ and which may be 
expressed:…‘the mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think of the Same.’”  
“This sense of sameness,” James avers, “is the very keel and backbone of our thinking.”TPF478FPT  As 
such, it is also the basis for common sense.  Common sense recognizes that this object before 
me now is of the same kind as objects previously experienced.  Common sense interpolation 
and conception come from the same root—this sense of sameness—and remain close to 
that root; together they provide the foundation for all advanced thinking. 
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But unfortunately philosophers have tended to privilege concepts and degrade 
percepts, and have thereby violated and undermined common sense.  They have tended to 
treat meaning as a purely conceptual matter rather than a matter of living experience.  James 
refuses to make that mistake.  “The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of 
[our] thought.  It is one of those evanescent and ‘transitive’ facts of mind which 
introspection cannot turn round upon, and isolate and hold up for examination, as an 
entomologist passes round an insect on a pin…  It pertains to the ‘fringe’ of the subjective 
state, and is a ‘feeling of tendency’…  This [consciousness of meaning] is an absolutely 
positive sort of feeling, transforming what would otherwise be mere noise or vision into 
something understood, and determining the sequel of my thinking, the later words and 
images, in a perfectly definite way.”TPF479FPT   One guesses that this view of meaning is not 
“perfectly definite” enough for the inveterate rationalizer, who will take this “feeling of 
tendency” as too insubstantial to count as something that really matters.  But James stands 
with common sense and against the rationalists in refusing to discount the vague and dimly 
felt, refusing to treat “mystery” as a synonym for “unreal.”  In the famous chapter on the 
stream of consciousness, James says he wants to see “the reinstatement of the vague and 
inarticulate to its proper place in our mental life.”TPF480FPT  He wants this because the “vague and 
inarticulate” in our experience is empirically fully as real as what is sharply made out and 
easily defined, and because that hazy domain is where the meaning of life is found.  It may 
be the case, and James in fact believes it is the case, that the most important realities are the 
hardest to grasp and put in words. 
But the rationalist will say, “What about truth?  If we have a concern for truth, we 
will resist the Jamesian urge to engage in wishful thinking, to hope against hope—and more 
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to the point, against hard evidence—that somewhere in that mysterious fog of tendencies 
and possibilities is something exceptionally valuable, but too deep for us to grasp.”  But this 
objection rests on both a misconstruing of the evidence and, James would say, a thin and 
hollow notion of truth.  James’ argument on behalf of the vaguely felt is predicated on 
empirically verifiable fact:  this radiating field of tendency is as real as anything else we sense, 
or we cannot trust our sensations at all.  The sense of meaning this tendency gives is a sense 
of being intimately connected to a larger whole which is the ground of our experiences—the 
ground of their possibility, the necessary condition of their actualization—a larger whole to 
which, moreover, we make a contribution by our activity, and which seems to have a 
direction of its own.  This sense of participating in a larger whole that grounds our 
possibilities is empirically indisputable, and it would seem equally certain that only in 
understanding the whole can we find the larger meaning of our lives, and thereby the real 
significance of the regularities and tensions we discover in living them.  But the human 
situation is not to be grasped by means of concepts.  Concepts, as James says, are only 
instruments for navigating our way across the surface of the vast existential continuum, 
giving us fixed points by which to steer our course.  The greater meaning can only be 
understood by a vision of the continuum itself, a vision not merely of its surface, but of its 
full voluminous depth and breadth.TPF481FPT  Despite the benefits of conceptual mapping, “the 
map remains superficial through abstractness, and false through the discreteness of its 
terms…  Conceptual knowledge is forever inadequate to the fulness of the reality to be 
known.”TPF482FPT  It is inadequate because “the relations of concepts are of static comparison only, 
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it is impossible to substitute them for the dynamic relations with which the perceptual flux is 
filled.”TPF483FPT  Concepts may “bring new values into our perceptual life, [may] reanimate our 
wills, and make our action turn upon new points of emphasis,”TPF484FPT but their worth is 
derivative and instrumental.  The felt continuity of the stream of thought, and between that 
stream and the wider world, is the base of meaning, and infinitely more truth is made out 
through immersion in the perceptual flux than by the most refined conceptual system. 
Implicit in this account is that we know outer realities, objects in the world, directly, 
as directly as we know our own thoughts.  We know them so by sensation and perception.  
We do not know the world (nor indeed our minds) directly by conception.  Conception, like 
perception, is a kind of knowledge-about, but unlike perception, does not always have direct 
contact with the facts of experience.TPF485FPT  But concepts need to have such contact at some 
point to show their truth-value. 
Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations would be like bridges 
without piers.  Systems about fact must plunge themselves into sensation as bridges plunge 
their piers into the rock.  Sensations are the stable rock, the terminus a quo and the terminus ad 
quem of thought.  To find such termini is our aim with all our theories—to conceive first 
when and where a certain sensation may be had, and then to have it.  Finding it stops 
discussion.  Failure to find it kills the false conceit of knowledge.  Only when you deduce a 
possible sensation for me from your theory, and give it to me when and where the theory 
requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has anything to do with truth. TPF486FPT 
 
A primary intent of James’ Pragmatism is to bring conceptual schemes and theories down to 
common sensibles, down to relevant percepts and ultimately to the applicable bits of sensual 
experience underlying them.  “Sensible realities,” says James, “are…either our realities or the 
tests of our realities.  Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved…  
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A conception, to prevail, must terminate in the world of orderly sensible experience.” TPF487FPT  I 
say “common sensibles” both because common sense interpolation is involved in tracing out 
the perceptual basis for any theory, and because philosophy and science must proceed on the 
basis of publicly accessible observations (accessible at least to philosophers and scientists)—
on what may be commonly sensed. 
 It is critically important to remember that James’ “sensation” includes the knowledge 
by acquaintance of anything whatever, including what may be classed as spiritual phenomena 
and religious experiences.  The reader should bear in mind that sensation itself, as James 
understands it, is a kind of spiritual phenomenon.  James in one place calls the sensual 
stream a “spiritual stream,”TPF488FPT as I note again below reviewing James’ account of the self.  
For James, sensual knowledge is neither a purely physical process (though it does require 
certain physical preconditions) nor is it ipso facto knowledge of physical objects.  This is 
significant with regard to what I just said about common sensibles:  what is commonly 
sensed may be something intangible, like a moral fact or an attitude, and such intangibles 
may themselves be interpolated.  Common sensibles of this latter kind are especially 
important for the development of ethical and political order.  But more on this anon. 
Common sensibles, persistently felt, breed conviction, belief.  Belief itself is a kind of 
“sense of reality,” which “in its inner nature…is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions 
than to anything else.”TPF489FPT  Actually, we human beings are so constructed as to believe all 
perceptions uncontradicted by others.  “The true opposites of belief, psychologically 
considered, are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief.”TPF490FPT  We sometimes receive mixed messages, 
and we start to wonder what’s really going on.  But when we get the sense of the same again 
                                                 
TP
487
PT PP, 930, 929. 
TP
488
PT PP, 322. 
TP
489
PT PP, 913-14. 
TP
490
PT PP, 914. 
 179
and again, conviction deepens that we are dealing with reality.  Conceptual systems that 
account for all our common sensibles are the ones that lay greatest claim to the truth.  “The 
conceived system, to pass for true, must at least include the reality of the sensible objects in 
it, by explaining them as effects on us, if nothing more.  The system which includes the most 
of them, and definitely explains or pretends to explain the most of them, will, ceteris paribus, 
prevail.”TPF491FPT 
Among the most interesting common sensibles, humanly speaking, are those 
pertaining to human inclinations, and James stresses how absolutely essential it is that we 
take them seriously:  “That theory [of reality] will be most generally believed which, besides 
offering us objects able to account satisfactorily for our sensible experience, also offers those 
which are most interesting, those which appeal most urgently to our aesthetic, emotional, 
and active needs.”  Our tendency to believe that the universe and human powers correspond 
seems natural, innate.  “Certain postulates [of this kind] are given in our nature; and 
whatever satisfies those postulates is treated as if real.”TPF492FPT  That we tend to treat these 
postulates as if real is a fact, and although this tendency to believe the universe congenial to 
our powers is not proof of the possibility, it may count as evidence. 
Related to our sense of human inclinations and capacities, and supremely important 
for human flourishing, is our sense of right and wrong.  In the preface to his Psychology: Briefer 
Course, James expressed his “regret” that he had not been able in the Principles or in this 
shorter “scissors and paste” textbook version of his psychology to provide a chapter on “the 
moral sense.”TPF493FPT  Apparently he had thought that, while desirable, such a chapter did not have 
to be included because he understood moral awareness to be just a specific sort of 
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sensation—a sense of “directly felt fitnesses between things,”TPF494FPT or the contrary feeling of 
unfitness—and so the same principles that applied in general to sensation could be safely 
assumed to apply in particular to moral sense:  one could know moral phenomena by 
acquaintance (sensation), classifiable moral facts by organized sensation (perception), moral 
categories by abstraction and generalization (which combined result in conception), and so 
on.  It may also be that he thought the workings of the moral sense to have been adequately 
described by the Scottish Common Sense philosophers.  Although he faulted them for a 
tendency to dogmatism, James agreed with “the intuitionist school” (against the 
“sensationalists”) that human ideals are “not all explicable as signifying corporeal pleasures 
to be gained, and pains to be escaped,”TPF495FPT and said that “the intuitional moralists deserve 
credit for keeping most clearly to the psychological facts.”TPF496FPT  Whatever the reason for the 
lacuna, it is beyond doubt that James assumed “the moral sense” to be of the highest 
importance for human life.  In the Principles he placed “moral sensibility and conscience” at 
the core of human identity, locating them in man’s “innermost self.”TPF497FPT  In addition to 
allowing us to sense the fitness or unfitness of relations among men or among priorities 
within a man, the moral sense as James conceived it supplied a “sense of an ideal spectator” 
who judges our values and intentions.  This is a feature of natural human sociability.  We 
seem naturally to seek the good opinion of others, especially of those we perceive to be the 
best of persons.  We find ourselves driven “in pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is 
at least worthy of approving recognition by the highest possible judging companion, if such a 
companion there be…  This judge is God.”  “It is probable,” James admits, “that individuals 
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differ a good deal in the degree in which they are haunted by [this sense of an ideal 
spectator], but I am sure that even those who say they are altogether without it deceive 
themselves, and really have it in some degree.”TPF498FPT 
The philosophical reader will be asking, What of reason?  Does not James think that 
reason is the highest power in man?  The answer depends on what is meant by “reason.”  
Much of what James describes as sensation and perception were understood to be functions 
of “reason” by ancients such as Aristotle, in particular the intuitive grasp of intangibles.TPF499FPT  
What is clear is that “reasoning,” as James uses the term, is a secondary, higher-order process 
that depends on the prior activity of sensation and perception for its successful exercise.  
The simplest kind of thinking, James notes, is “spontaneous revery,” consisting of “trains of 
images suggested one by another.”  Closer to “what would commonly be classed as acts of 
reasoning,” he says, are “those where a present sign suggests an unseen, distant, or future 
reality.” TPF500FPT  James understands reasoning to be a process of analysis and abstraction.  He 
finds the process to consist of two stages:  “First, sagacity, or the ability to discover what part, 
M, lies embedded in the whole S which is before him; Second, learning, or the ability to recall 
promptly M’s consequences, concomitants, or implications.”TPF501FPT  The process proceeds by 
analyzing the matter at hand, that is, breaking the whole mentally into parts; abstracting 
some element of interest from the matter—noticing it as an element that may be considered 
by itself, and giving it exclusive attention—and then considering it in varying relations; other 
instances of the same element in different contexts are thought of, and the awareness of 
numerous instances of the same kind gives rise to conception; a name for the kind is recalled 
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or created, and this concept provides an easy, short-hand way of handling the category just 
recognized; as a sharply delineated signification, meaning one thing and nothing else, the 
concept may now be treated logically:  if item X is a member of class Y, then it must have 
these qualities, relations, etc.; logical relations among concepts may be mapped out; and so 
on.  The logical relations discovered in the course of reasoning are eternally valid, says 
James—cannot be other than they are.  Yet, these relations may not hold in the empirical 
world.  Logic is no final test of truth.  A proposition may be perfectly true logically, but 
utterly false as a description of reality.  Fortunately, the concrete world of experience has 
enough regularity and order in it to make reasoning about it worthwhile:  “This is, in fact, a 
world in which general laws obtain, in which universal propositions are true, and in which 
reasoning is therefore possible.”TPF502FPT 
James’ description of reasoning and its place in human understanding, and more 
broadly in human activity, suggests that reason as he defines it is instrumental in function.  
Reason as analytical and logical power has as its meaningful function navigating us across the 
sea of experience and getting us in touch with its farther reaches, to take us from one 
experience to another.  We know reason has achieved its purpose when we have sensation 
where we expected to have it, that is, when we find through sensation reality where we 
expected to find it.  The test of rationality is concrete effect.  Rationality itself, James 
believes, is a concrete state of being.  When reasoning we are seeking rationality as an end-
state, and this state is a certain mode of experience, a certain kind of sensation.  It is a 
“feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness…[of an] absence of all 
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need to explain it, account for it, or justify it,” so that the flow of thought is unobstructed.  
James calls this the “sentiment of rationality.” TPF503FPT  We arrive at this sentiment when we have 
found the right way of conceiving the matter at hand, the right conception for the occasion. 
It is as if the pathway between the knower and what he seeks to know has become smooth, 
and a clear track of connecting points from one to the other has opened up, until finally the 
two come face to face, and the restlessness of the search drains away.  In fact, James thinks 
something like this literally occurs in a successful course of reasoning, as we saw in his 
account of truth as a concrete track of experience between knower and known.  Reasoning is 
one of the principal means of attaining truth. 
But it is not the only way.  Sometimes the truth just comes to us, the path to the real 
just suddenly discloses itself, in the absence of any reasoning process.  Indeed, this may be 
the more usual way of finding truth.  In this case, reasoning begins, if it begins at all, as a 
response—as an effect rather than a cause of the truth disclosed—and its work is to “make 
sense” of the newly seen truth by analyzing it, finding a way to adequately conceive it and 
whatever elements it may consist of, tracing out relations to other concepts, etc.  By further 
reasoning, we quite literally make more truth.  Remember, for James “truth” is a relation 
between knower and known, so that when we relate ourselves in new ways to old objects, we 
“create” truths.  The idea of making or creating truth is not so startling when you recall that 
James understood “truth” always to apply to ideas rather than to objects.  What we are really 
after in the “search for truth” is reality, and a truth is a way to it.  Thus, strictly speaking we 
make truth by our creation or recognition of a path, and what we discover is reality.  What 
happens when truth “just comes to us”?  The causes may be mysterious and varied, but 
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according to James’ understanding of the mind’s workings, the means of disclosure are 
sensation and perception, what reasoning must in any case come back to in its quest. 
By far the larger share of our truths are common-sense truths.  All the time we are 
perceiving and interpolating, and every case of perception and interpolation involves truth, 
in that in it our thoughts find a direct correspondence or commerce with some reality.  
Comparatively speaking, a much smaller percentage of our truths are attained rationally—
that is, through a process of reasoning.  But that common-sense truth is not attained through 
reasoning does not make it somehow irrational.  The same “sentiment of rationality” that 
comes with the right conception also comes with each interpolation, with each this-is-a-kind.  
The reasoning way is the abstract way, the common-sense way is the concrete way, and 
reasoning needs common sense as a foundation—as an anchor to reality as well as a starting 
point.  Moreover, if I read James correctly, his position is that reasoning must frequently 
touch down at strategic points to common-sense (interpolated) percepts to keep it on the path 
of truth (where truth is a matter of more than merely logical relations).  Once a concept has 
been anchored to reality by a common-sense percept, the common-sense percept itself may 
be evaluated for its accuracy in interpreting the underlying sensation by comparing the 
common-sense percept to other, possibly conflicting percepts.  James’ analysis of truth, 
taken altogether, clearly implies that common sense is the stable basis of rationality.TPF504FPT 
THE SELF 
All these mental functions we have noticed—who or what activates and directs 
them?  This question takes us to the heart of what man is, and the answer hinges on the 
nature and status of the self.  James gives a richly textured account of the self in The Principles 
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of Psychology.  There he describes it as consisting of at least three, possibly four parts:  a 
“material Self,” a “social Self,” a “spiritual Self,” and, perhaps—something difficult or 
impossible to determine on the level of psychological analysis—what has been called the 
“soul” or the “pure Ego.”  The material Self includes the body as its “innermost part,” but 
also clothes, immediate family, home and outer possessions—all the tangibles one takes to 
be his own. TPF505FPT  A man’s social Self is composed of the images of him others carry in their 
minds.  “To wound any of these images,” James says, “is to wound him.”  James is not 
speaking here of man’s sociability, his desire for human company (which he recognizes to be 
natural), but of his “innate propensity” to seek the favorable attention of others, to be well 
regarded for who he is and what he does. TPF506FPT  The spiritual Self, empirically considered, is “a 
man’s inner and subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely,” 
including reasoning ability, “moral sensibility and conscience,” strength of will, and the like.  
“These psychic dispositions are the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which 
we most verily seem to be.”  If we take “a concrete view,” James says, “ the spiritual self in 
us will be either the entire stream of our personal consciousness, or the present ‘segment’ or 
‘section’ of that stream, according as we take a broader or narrower view.” TPF507FPT  The “spiritual 
stream” TPF508FPT of consciousness, broadly speaking, is the spiritual Self, and the core of this self, 
our “innermost self,” is the present thinking thought.  This last is 
the active element in all consciousness…a spiritual something in [a man] which seems to go out 
to meet…qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in to be received by it.  It is what 
welcomes or rejects.  It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or 
withholding assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse.  It is the home of 
interest,—not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within 
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us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak.  It is the source of effort 
and attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will.TPF509FPT 
 
 This innermost self, James says, is definitely felt:  “It is something with which 
we…have direct sensible acquaintance.”  What exactly is it that is felt?  James is cautious 
here and says he can only describe his own experience.  When he is most self-aware, he 
experiences this innermost self as something that spontaneously reacts to the “play” of his 
stream of thought, “welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or 
against, saying yes or no.”  When he tries to be as concrete as possible and “grapple with 
particulars,” he finds that “it is difficult for me to detect in the activity any purely spiritual 
element at all.  Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough 
to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is 
some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head.” TPF510FPT  James is not sure 
what to make of this.  All he can discover through introspection of the innermost self from 
which these central acts break forth are these “cephalic motions.”TPF511FPT  But what of this 
“introspective glance” itself that manages to notice these motions?  Is it not at that moment 
something deeper, more inner than, or at least something other than the motions?  Is this 
“glance” a physical or a spiritual activity, and what manner of thing is it that causes the 
glance?  Can we really, after all, learn anything about the innermost self through 
introspection, or has James only demonstrated the limits of introspective analysis?  Perhaps 
trying to observe the innermost self is like the eye turning in its socket to examine its own 
features—a natural impossibility, doomed from the beginning.  Is there then some other, 
non-introspective approach by which we may understand this “self of selves”?  These 
questions and more come crowding in. 
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 James seriously considers in the Principles the possibility, and the implications of the 
possibility, that the innermost self is after all only a particularly subtle “feeling of bodily 
activities,”TPF512FPT the feeling of the bodily motions accompanying those mental acts that seem 
most inward.  But ultimately he rejects the theory as too much at odds with common sense 
and common philosophic assumptions in general to be adopted without further 
substantiation:  such “speculations…traverse common-sense [and] contradict the 
fundamental assumption of every philosophic school [that] our thoughts [are] the one sort of 
existent which skepticism cannot touch…  I will therefore treat the last few pages [discussing 
these speculations] as a parenthetical digression, and from now to the end of the volume 
revert to the path of common-sense again.  I mean by this that I will continue to assume (as 
I have assumed all along…) a direct awareness of the process of our thinking as such, simply 
insisting on the fact that it is an even more inward and subtle phenomenon than most of us 
suppose.” TPF513FPT  The common sense understanding, that is, and that of most of the Western 
philosophic tradition, is that we know directly the activities of the innermost spiritual self—
our reasoning, our willing, and so forth—and know them as spiritual, and not physical, 
phenomena.  The only conclusion to which James can come on the sole basis of 
introspection is that “(in some persons at least) the part of the innermost Self which is most 
vividly felt turns out to consist for the most part of a collection of cephalic movements of 
‘adjustments’ [in reaction to objects in the stream of consciousness] which, for want of 
attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are; that over 
and above these there is an obscurer feeling of something more; but whether it be of fainter 
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physiological processes, or of nothing objective at all, but rather of subjectivity as such, of 
thought become ‘its own object,’ must at present remain an open question.”TPF514FPT 
 James himself thought that the innermost self is “something more” than physical.  
One of his earliest observations in the Principles is that psychology must presuppose a 
dualism at least of mental states and brain-states, as the former can by no means—on our 
present level of knowledge, or any we are likely to have in future—be reduced to the latter; 
at most, certain mental states and certain brain-states may be shown to correlate.  It must 
further presuppose a dualism of subject and object, of “mind knowing and thing known,” so 
that “Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes 
the other.” TPF515FPT  The whole stream of consciousness is spiritual, the reader will recall, and what 
James calls the “innermost self,” taken at face-value, is just the present section of the 
spiritual stream.  To understand what James means by the “present section of the stream,” it 
helps to realize that James (in agreement with other psychologists) found the span of 
consciousness to last at least a few seconds, shading out into vagueness and then darkness at 
each end, dropping away into past thought on one side and trending into futurity on the 
other.  The sense that the present thought is continuous with past and future is what gives 
consciousness its streaming quality.  James seems to understand the innermost self as 
identical with that whole section of consciousness between the dark outer edges.  The 
innermost self, on this reading, is constantly changing.  If there is anything behind this 
present, dynamic section of thought, James thinks, we can only be aware of it “in an abstract, 
hypothetic or conceptual way.”TPF516FPT  We cannot, apparently, perceive it directly.  We can at 
most sense it on the periphery of thought. 
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 The common sense belief is that there definitely is something behind the present 
thought, and indeed behind all the various phenomenal selves, that there is a Thinker of the 
thought and an Owner of the selves:  “common-sense insists that the unity of all the selves is 
not a mere appearance of similarity or continuity, ascertained after the fact.  She is sure that 
it involves a real belonging to a real Owner, to a pure spiritual entity of some kind.  Relation 
to this entity is what makes the self’s constituents stick together as they do for thought.”  
James believes he can account for the unity of the selves without postulating such a 
substantial Owner.  It may be that the selves are unified by “something [other than a soul or 
“pure Ego”] not among the things collected, but superior to them all, namely, the real, 
present onlooking, remembering, ‘judging thought’ or identifying ‘section’ of the stream.”  
This is in fact James’ position:  the innermost self, the spiritual center of man is his present 
thought, which is felt to be continuous with the wider stream of consciousness, including 
those parts within it recognized in varying ways as “my Self,” and which appropriates to 
itself the thoughts and selves gone before.  “Who owns the last self,” says James, “owns the 
self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed.”  James thinks 
it “impossible to discover any verifiable features in personal identity which this sketch does 
not contain.” 
But this assumption, though it yields much, still does not yield all that common-sense 
demands…  The essence of the matter to common-sense is that the past thoughts…were 
always owned.  The [aforementioned present] Thought does not capture them, but as soon 
as it comes into existence it finds them already its own.  How is this possible unless the 
Thought have a substantial identity with a former owner,—not a mere continuity or 
resemblance, as in [James’] account, but a real unity?  The ‘Soul’ of Metaphysics and the 
‘Transcendental Ego’ of the Kantian Philosophy, are…but attempts to satisfy this urgent 
demand of common-sense.” TPF517FPT 
 
 The commonsensical embrace of the substantial soul did not, of course, derive from 
common-sense perception.  The soul never was a percept—or at least it was certainly never 
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perceived as an entity.  No, the common-sense adoption of the soul-concept emerged over 
time as 1) a hypothesis that worked for all practical purposes (and one, furthermore, that 
could not be disproved), and 2) a tradition in philosophy, theology, and civilization.  That is, 
the notion of the soul was commonsensical in the secondary sense of being a common 
conviction tested over time and never successfully contradicted.  The idea was empirically 
based in that it was a hypothesis based on hard evidence:  we witness these acts emanating 
from our inmost selves, and we reason that something causes these acts, and that they come 
from somewhere.  “Soul” became a name for this cause and/or site.  But, as James points out, 
the mere naming of this unknown cause or site does not count either as a description or an 
explanation.  No doubt part of what made the soul-hypothesis into a conviction is that the 
soul’s existence was thought to guarantee goods of the most precious kind—in particular, 
immortality, responsibility, and individuality.  It was thought that only a permanent inner 
substance could guarantee them.  But James thinks he shows that the theory of the soul does 
not, in fact, guarantee any of these.  He concludes:  the soul “explains nothing and 
guarantees nothing.”TPF518FPT 
 Still, neither here in the Principles nor in his later essay, “Does Consciousness 
Exist?”—where he publicly declares his judgment that, as an entity, it does not—is James 
dogmatic in his rejection of the soul-hypothesis.  In the Principles he is careful to say, “The 
reader who finds any comfort in the idea of the Soul, is, however, perfectly free to continue 
to believe in it; for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they 
have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.” TPF519FPT  Moreover, James seems to have 
developed his own hypothesis about the central self only after carefully considering the 
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common sense view.  He seems to have taken very seriously the commonsense “demand” 
that the ownership of thoughts and of the various selves be accounted for, and it seems 
likely that had he not found a way to understand the present thought as exercising such 
ownership, he would have taken the common-sense view over the available alternatives.  
Associationist theories and transcendentalist theories alike failed to recognize the concrete 
continuities between thoughts in conscious experience:  Hume and his followers made thought 
consist of “bundles” or series of discrete sensations, “associated” but not continuous; the 
school of Kant essentially accepted that sensations come to us in a bundle or “manifold,” 
and brought in a transcendental Ego to make them into a unified thought. TPF520FPT  As he did on 
other occasions, James appears to have taken the common sense understanding as his 
starting point for thinking about the innermost self.  Whatever the shortcomings of the 
common sense perspective here, it at least adhered to the concrete facts as presented. 
 One thing more needs to be said about the inmost self.  James mentioned (as we 
have noticed) reason, conscience, and will as being associated with this most intimate self.  
But in the Principles James gave special attention to, and found a special significance in, will. 
He seemed to see will as the deepest, most central or inner of human powers.  After all, will 
seems to be necessary to engage reason and act on conscience, indeed to make all the other 
central human powers fully active.  But will was important to James not only as being 
fundamental, the prerequisite of man’s engagement of his own capacities and with the world 
around him.  James found the question of free will to be especially urgent, both personally and 
philosophically.  The question preoccupied and haunted him in an unusual way, in a way 
rather uncharacteristic of modern writers.  His scientific learning had made him feel the full 
force of determinism, and this contributed in his early career to a profound personal crisis.  
                                                 
TP
520
PT PP, 349. 
 192
His own account of this crisis has become well known among readers of James, but it is well 
worth reexamining, for it sheds much light not only on the centrality of the question of will 
for him, but also on his own philosophic motivations and on the general cast of his 
philosophy.  I submit here passages from two sources.  The first was published in the 
Varieties of Religious Experience under a false personage—James attributed the account to “a 
Frenchman,” but later admitted it to be autobiographical. 
Whilst in [a] state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits about my 
prospects, I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight to procure some article 
that was there; when suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out 
of the darkness, a horrible fear of my own existence.  Simultaneously there arose in my mind 
the image of an epileptic patient whom I had seen in the asylum, a black-haired youth with 
greenish skin, entirely idiotic, who used to sit all day on one of the benches, or rather shelves 
against the wall, with his knees drawn up against his chin, and the coarse gray undershirt, 
which was his only garment, drawn over them inclosing his entire figure.  He sat there like a 
sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving nothing but his black eyes and 
looking absolutely non-human.  This image and my fear entered into a species of 
combination with each other.  That shape am I, I felt, potentially.  Nothing that I possess can 
defend me against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it struck for him.  There 
was such a horror of him, that it was as if something hitherto solid within my breast gave 
way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering fear.  After this the universe was changed for 
me altogether.  I awoke morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my 
stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before, and that I have 
never felt since.  It was like a revelation; and although the immediate feelings passed away, 
the experience has made me sympathetic with the morbid feelings of others ever since.  It 
gradually faded, but for months I was unable to go out into the dark alone. 
In general I dreaded to be left alone.  I remember wondering how other people could live, 
how I myself had ever lived, so unconscious of that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of 
life. 
 
James went on to say that he had “always thought that this experience of melancholia of 
mine had a religious bearing.”TPF521FPT  I will consider its religious aspects and implications later; 
for now I want to point out the palpable feeling of helplessness against catastrophe 
suggested in the experience, and the crushing of personal willpower implied.  The incident 
must have powerfully reinforced James’ growing appreciation, thanks to his medical and 
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scientific work, of the limits of the will, and more generally of the limits of human nature.  
The other passage comes from James’ personal diary, dated April 30, 1870: 
I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life.  I finished the first part of Renouvier’s second 
‘Essais’ and see no reason why his definition of Free Will—‘the sustaining of a thought 
because I choose to when I might have other thoughts’—need be the definition of an illusion.  
At any rate, I will assume for the present…that it is no illusion.  My first act of free will shall 
be to believe in free will…  Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring 
to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to 
determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now, I will 
go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my 
individual reality and creative power.  My belief, to be sure, can’t be optimistic—but I will 
posit life (the real, the good) in the self-governing resistance of the ego to the world.  Life shall 
[be built in] doing and suffering and creating. TPF522FPT 
 
If the previous selection showed the hard limits of the will, this one points to its potential 
and possibility within those limits.  The dynamic tension between man’s creative possibilities 
and his need of something beyond himself—his need to harmonize his powers with a larger 
reality not of his making—is a theme that runs throughout James’ writings.  In maintaining 
this tension, James demonstrates again the balance of common sense, the equipoise of “on 
the one hand, and on the other hand.” 
Of course, common sense takes free will for granted, as it also takes for granted that 
we can’t do just whatever we might wish to do.  We certainly seem to choose freely in many 
cases.  It certainly feels as if sometimes we made things happen by fiat, as if we did one thing 
when we could just as well have done another.  On the other hand, we cannot simply choose 
to be rich, or to be happy, or to be wise.  We may choose to do things that will contribute to 
making us rich, happy, or wise, but there are definite limits to the power of sheer will.  To 
common sense, this is all quite obvious, and the man of common sense will tend to laugh at 
persons who trouble themselves about such matters.  “You think too much,” he will say.  
And perhaps in some measure he is right.  But if his common sense is well-rounded, he can 
                                                 
TP
522
PT Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1977), 7-8. 
 194
probably be brought around to appreciate that there is a time to think more on these things, 
just as there is a time to leave them alone. 
The problem of will that confronted James, and challenged his common sense, was 
(as the selected passages above suggest) twofold:  first, the latitude of will that the Western 
world had long taken for granted seemed to be more and more in question in light of 
modern science—deterministic forces seemed to account for more and more of what 
happens in the world, and the free space within which the will might maneuver seemed on 
the verge of disappearing altogether, or rather, seemed about to be exposed as having always 
been an illusion; second, even if free will was veridical, and the will had its domain, it might 
be rendered powerless by greater forces.  The first part of the problem provoked James’ 
affirmations of will; the second turned him to religion.  What modern psychology was 
beginning to show by James’ day was the very significant extent to which the body acts on 
stimuli of its own accord.  “The first point to understand in the psychology of Volition,” 
James says, is that “voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary functions of our 
organism…  Reflex, instinctive, and emotional movements are all primary performances.” TPF523FPT  
The will does not act ex nihilo; it can only choose to perform movements already experienced 
in some way.  “We learn all our possibilities by the way of experience.  When a particular 
movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image 
of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and 
deliberately willed…  A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible, left in 
the memory by experiences of their involuntary performance, is thus the first prerequisite of 
the voluntary life.”TPF524FPT  Our bodies, moreover, would be set in motion even without this 
reduplicative action of the will:  “Consciousness is in its very nature impulsive.  We do not have 
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a sensation or a thought, and then have to add something dynamic to it to get a movement.  
Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already 
on its way to instigate a movement.”TPF525FPT  Where, then, does something dynamic get added by 
our own fiat, apart from any automatic movement?  Or is it perhaps the case that nothing ever 
does get added in this way—that we are, in fact, highly complicated automatons?  The clearest 
evidence that we are not, James observes, is the peculiar “feeling of effort”TPF526FPT we experience 
when performing some act against resistance.  Effort comes in “whenever a rarer and more 
ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive and habitual 
kind…whenever strongly explosive tendencies are checked, or strongly obstructive 
conditions overcome.”  Effort is a kind of prevailing in “the line of greater resistance.”  
James’ account of this effort on behalf of such “ideal impulses” takes us, I believe, to the 
very core of his philosophy, to the very center of his philosophic vision, and therefore I ask 
the reader to mark carefully the following lines:  “The ideal impulse appears [as] a still small 
voice which must be artificially reinforced to prevail.  Effort is what reinforces it, making 
things seem as if, while the force of propensity were essentially a fixed quantity, the ideal 
force might be of various amount.” TPF527FPT  The “still small voice” may in some cases be religious 
in nature, TPF528FPT or it may be merely the voice of our better judgment.  In any case, it certainly 
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looks as if we have the ability—from somewhere deep down, from some spiritual reserve all 
our own—to make a response, even where this response goes against powerful contrary 
tendencies within us.  This is the common sense view of the matter, and James himself holds 
fast to it. 
 The spiritual makeup of man is not quite exhausted by the stream of consciousness 
and its vital center.  Beyond the “margin” of consciousness lies the subconscious, and this, 
too, is—at least in part—spiritual territory.  “The most important step forward that has 
occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science,” says James, “is the 
discovery…that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the consciousness of the 
ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of 
memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary 
consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to 
reveal their presence by unmistakable signs.”TPF529FPT  The empirical evidence shows, James thinks, 
that the mind’s subconscious region is (among other things) a kind of gateway to deeper 
spiritual experience.  He even speaks of the conscious region of the psyche as the “lower” 
region in comparison with the subconscious.TPF530FPT  From the higher district, in some 
individuals, come transformative “invasions” of mysterious forces.TPF531FPT  The evidence that this 
is so, James believes, is overwhelming.  The origin of these invasions is open to question—
whether spiritual or neurological, divine or sometimes perhaps diabolic—but their effects 
cannot reasonably be denied.  The discovery of the subconscious, and of the fact that this 
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region is the locus of “religious” experiences, helps explain the commonsense understanding 
of religion, as we shall see. 
The subtitle of James’ Varieties of Religious Experience was “A Study in Human 
Nature,” and James thought religious experiences revealed the full range of human 
possibilities in a way nothing else could.  Hundreds of cases—both classic and little 
known—show these experiences to produce striking effects:  expanded “vision” or 
“synoptic insight into the significance of life as a whole,” TPF532FPT or more frequently, vastly 
augmented supplies of energy—especially increased moral power.  The religious life like no 
other “lets loose the strenuous mood” that drives men to serious moral action; “in a merely 
human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal 
stimulating power.”TPF533FPT  Both intellectually and morally, then, man’s capacities are enhanced 
by “saving experiences” that “flow in” from the subconscious region.TPF534FPT  The common sense 
conviction that prayer and religious devotion have significant, real-world effects seems 
empirically well founded. 
PHYSIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 I have laid special stress on James’ understanding of the spiritual dimension of 
human psychology.  It is important, however, in order to appreciate how much James’ 
psychology owes to common sense, to observe some of what he has to say about the 
physical preconditions of thought.  One of the striking features of James’ Principles of 
Psychology is how much attention he gives therein to physiological phenomena.  Common sense, 
so immersed as it is in sensation, so attuned to every feeling, so “down to earth,” has a keen 
sensitivity to bodily experience.  It cannot very well forget the body’s needs, demands, and 
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limitations.  Our own bodies are, after all, our most frequent percept; from the standpoint of 
common sense our bodies are, literally, the anchors of our existence.  James expresses the 
common sense view when he says, “By an inscrutable necessity, each human mind’s 
appearance on this earth is conditioned upon the integrity of the body with which it belongs, 
upon the treatment that body gets from others, and upon the spiritual dispositions which use 
it as their tool, and lead it either towards longevity or to destruction.”TPF535FPT  Obviously, the 
body is the home of the sense organs, the receptors of the outer stimulations that give rise to 
sensations.  Indeed, as James tries to show, the body is a more sensitive instrument than we 
give it credit for:  it is a sensorium of the most subtle and delicate motions—even, James 
seems to think, purely spiritual movements.  Modern psychology has shown just how 
dependent the mind’s activity is on the well functioning of the brain.  Mental states are not 
reducible to brain-states, but they certainly need them; it is as if our thoughts need that soft 
gray matter to take form.  All our habits and associations of thought are neurologically 
based:  “An acquired habit, from the physiological point of view, is nothing but a new 
pathway of discharge formed in the brain, by which certain incoming currents ever after tend 
to escape.”TPF536FPT  Thanks to the plasticity of human brain matter, after every thought of two 
things together there is at least a slight tendency to think them together in future.  Our 
capacity for memory owes much, perhaps everything, to the forging of neural pathways in 
the brain.  Another class of acquired habit, motor habits, are essential for making decisions 
“stick,” and this is especially important with respect to moral decisions, and more generally, 
to character-formation.  “No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no 
matter how good one’s sentiments may be, if one have not taken advantage of every 
opportunity to act [and thus made the moral principle or feeling a motor habit], one’s 
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character may remain entirely unaffected for the better.  With mere good intentions, hell is 
proverbially paved.” TPF537FPT 
 It so happens that those sentiments James just mentioned, or more generally our 
emotions, are also physiologically based.  In fact, James believes our emotions are entirely 
physical events.  “Our natural way of thinking about [especially our] coarser emotions 
[“grief, fear, rage, love”] is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental 
affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily 
expression.  My theory, to the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the 
perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the 
emotion.” TPF538FPT  The body, again, is an exquisitely sensitive register of excitements.  
“Objects…excite bodily changes by a preorganized mechanism [and] the changes are so 
indefinitely numerous and subtle that the entire organism may be called a sounding-board, 
which every change of consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate.”TPF539FPT  The body 
is a “sounding-board” not just for the aforementioned “coarser” emotions, but even for our 
“subtler” ones, for our “moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings.”TPF540FPT  Our bodies, then, are 
the sine qua non of our emotional lives. 
Of special interest for the purposes of the present work, observe that, between habit 
and sentiment, our bodies play a crucial role in our moral development, personally and 
socially.  Our moral character just is the sum of our habits—intellectual, emotional, and 
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active—and even our intellectual habits must be physiologically established:  at the very least, 
pathways must be forged in the brain, and very often (always?) intellectual habits are formed 
with the aid of physical signs and movements (imagistic, ritualistic, linguistic).  The fact that 
our intellectual lives require the body’s service to take root and take form points to another 
way common sense is foundational for human well-being.  We need common sense 
interpolation to bind our world together, make it coherent, make it a place where we can act 
intelligently, a place fit “for all practical purposes.”  But in addition to simple common sense 
perception of this sort we need common sense perception in the larger sense, in the sense of 
the community’s perception of relevant moral facts as a community.  To perceive and know 
that we perceive the relevant moral facts as a community, we must be able to communicate our 
thoughts with each other, and to do this, we must make our thoughts incarnate:  we must 
make physical signs (notably, with our mouths and by our hands) by which to publish our 
moral perceptions—our perceptions of, practically, what is needed and what is required.  
Rational speech is the lifeblood of the community, of its common sense, and speech requires 
the joining of body and mind. 
This matter of language raises yet another advantage of common sense over much of 
modern philosophy and science:  its predilection for simplicity of expression.  James had 
little patience for the elaborate school-jargon employed by so many leading philosophers and 
scientists of his day and of the preceding decades.  The Germans, of course, were the worst 
offenders.  Lovers of concision and clarity cannot help but be secretly delighted when James 
says, “The whole lesson of Kantian and post-Kantian speculation is, it seems to me, the 
lesson of simplicity.  With Kant, complication both of thought and statement was an inborn 
infirmity, enhanced by the musty academicism of his Königsberg existence.  With Hegel it 
was a raging fever.  Terribly, therefore, do the sour grapes which these fathers of philosophy 
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have eaten set our teeth on edge.”TPF541FPT  No one can read James’ own elegant prose and fail to 
be impressed by the simplicity and clarity of his words.  His linguistic style is much in 
keeping with his affection and respect for the common sense way.  But, as James surely 
understood, “complication of thought and statement” is not merely annoying; it can be 
debilitating and even destructive of human purposes—in particular, of moral and political 
judgment and action.  Even where real complexities require complex terminological 
constructions for technical precision, these linguistic complications must be translated to 
common language to be made socially comprehensible and useful, and amenable to practical 
application by ordinary men.  That is, they must be put into common sense terms.  No social 
consensus, and therefore no community, can arise without frequent appeals to common 
sense perceptions in the common language of the people.  I do not mean by the “appeal to 
common sense” what Kant mistakenly took Thomas Reid to mean by it—“an appeal to the 
opinion of the multitude”TPF542FPT—but (what Reid did mean by it) an appeal to the people’s 
common moral perceptions, to their effective grasp of certain self-evident moral truths.  In this 
sense, even the philosopher must make regular appeal to common sense, for his truth-claims 
stand or fall according to how well they uncover the nature and meaning of things perceived.  
Such appeals, as James continually endeavors to show in his own way, are not only justifiable 
but absolutely essential, for common understanding as much as for consolidated action. 
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THE COMMON SENSE BASIS OF JAMES’ ETHICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 
 
COMMON SENSE AND ETHICS 
James grounded his moral theory, as he did all truth, in percepts—specifically, in 
moral percepts.  Our most stable moral percepts, as our most stable percepts generally, are 
of the common sense variety.  Concepts that terminate in common sense moral percepts and 
theories that make the most sense out of moral common sensibles, taken collectively, 
together constitute our stock of common sense moral truths.  (The percepts themselves are 
true at least in some measure, and the concepts and theories based on them are true in the 
same degree.)  Our overall stock of moral truths will contain some that, while potentially 
realized by all, are in fact not commonly sensed.  But if and when these uncommon truths 
become widely recognized, they become common sense truths in their own right.  Although 
James does not say so explicitly, it is clear on close examination that his reflections on 
morality and ethics are founded on common sense experience—that of the individual and of 
the larger community. 
James never worked out a full-blown ethical theory, but he did leave a detailed 
outline for how he would approach ethics systematically in his penetrating and highly 
suggestive essay, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.”  I propose to examine this 
essay very closely, almost to the point of making a gloss of it,TPF543FPT and then to round out the 
picture of James’ moral vision by looking to his moral observations in other sources.  I 
should say that in doing so, I am reversing the order in which James himself proceeded in 
his investigation of moral foundations.  His sketch in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life” of how to do ethical theory was an end-product of a long period of immersion in the 
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stream of moral experience, acquainting himself directly with the fundamental moral facts 
and tracing out their relations and implications.  He says pointedly in the first sentence of 
“Moral Life” that “there is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically 
made up in advance.” TPF544FPT  Any viable ethical theory must be built up on observable moral 
“facts”TPF545FPT—that is, on moral percepts. 
The proper “aim” of ethical philosophy, says James, is “an account of the moral 
relations that obtain among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable system, 
and make of the world what one may call a genuine universe from the ethical point of view.”  
The “subject-matter” for the ethical philosopher is “the ideals he finds existing in the 
world.”TPF546FPT    The most prevalent ideals actually “existing in the world,” of course, are 
common ideals, common opinions about what is best.  In any case, actually existing ideals 
are the matter on which the ethical philosopher should work.  A careful examination of 
these, James thinks, will give him a handle on man’s moral situation and reveal the network 
of “moral relations that obtain among things.”  The basic procedure, initially at least, is the 
same as that of Plato and Aristotle, who began with common opinions about what is right 
and good, thinking that in them they would find indications of a deeper basis of rightness 
and goodness in nature.  This assumption stems from a sense that people’s opinions on the 
subject are opinions about something real, that, however they might differ, they refer to things 
experienced by all—to common sensibles.  If we can penetrate to these underlying realities 
about which people opine, we should be able to test the varying opinions against them and 
determine their relative adequacy.TPF547FPT 
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“There are three questions in ethics that must be kept apart,” James says; he names 
them “the psychological question, the metaphysical question, and the casuistic question.”  “The 
psychological question asks after the historical origin of our moral ideas and judgments; the 
metaphysical question asks what the very meaning of the words ‘good,’ ‘ill,’ and ‘obligation’ 
are; the casuistic question asks what is the measure of the various goods and ills which men 
recognize, so that the philosopher may settle the true order of human obligations.”  James 
thinks that too often ethical thinkers confuse these questions, or fail to give full 
consideration to all of them, and in consequence end up with deeply flawed ethical theories.  
Most, indeed, never get beyond “the psychological question.”TPF548FPT 
The psychological question concerns the raw materials of moral experience—“our 
moral ideas and judgments.”  As such, it is foundational.  How are we to understand these 
moral ideas and judgments?  There are two basic theories.  One is that they derive from an 
innate human faculty called “conscience;” the other is that they come from “the association 
with acts of simple bodily pleasures and reliefs from pain”—that is, that whatever is 
associated with pleasure or the diminishing of pain will seem good to us, and what with pain, 
evil.  James finds that many of our ideals have arisen the second way, but not all—that some 
simply cannot be explained that way.  Among those that cannot be so explained are “a vast 
number of our moral perceptions.”  For example:  “The feeling of the inward dignity of 
certain spiritual attitudes, as peace, serenity, simplicity, veracity; and of the essential vulgarity 
of others, as querulousness, anxiety, egoistic fussiness, etc.—are quite inexplicable except by 
an innate preference of a more ideal attitude for its own sake.  The nobler thing tastes better, 
and that is all that we can say.  ‘Experience’ of consequences may truly teach us what things 
are wicked, but what have consequences to do with what is mean and vulgar?”  Our moral 
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perceptions “deal with directly felt fitnesses between things, and often fly in the teeth of all 
the prepossessions of habit and presumptions of utility.”  So, while the associationists (like 
Bentham, the Mills, and Bain) deserve credit for showing that many of our ideals originate in 
response to pleasures and pains, “the intuitionist school”—prominent among them, the 
Scottish Common Sense philosophers—have been more accurate on this point of moral 
perception. TPF549FPT 
 Let me linger a moment over this matter of conscience and moral perception.  As I 
suggested earlier, given that James understands “sensation” broadly as “knowledge by 
acquaintance,” and in the absence of any suggestion in his writings to the contrary, it is 
reasonable to assume that the “moral sense” for James involves simply a specific kind of 
sensation, a sense of fitness or unfitness.  Moral perception, then, assuming James is using 
the term “perception” in the same way he used it in the Principles, would be a grasp of 
particular given moral sensations as composing a coherent moral fact—as, for example, a 
perception that a certain business mogul’s motives and actions bespeak an attitude that may 
be classified as “greed.”  In this example, the instanced attitude is the perceived moral fact, 
and the nature of the perception is that the mogul’s motives and actions together constitute 
an existential orientation out of joint with human warmth and comity, and therefore an unfit 
disposition.  Now, the perception might be wrong—the perceiver may misinterpret either 
the tycoon’s motives or actions or both—but such a mistaken perception is correctible by a 
closer look at the facts of the case, provided they are available for scrutiny.  The point is that 
if the motives and actions are correctly perceived, the judgment that this individual is guilty 
of greed is valid and true. 
                                                 
TP
549
PT WB, 142-4, 158. 
 206
 The metaphysical ethical question concerns the existential meaning of “good,” “ill,” 
and “obligation.”  It concerns, in other words, the significance of the realities to which such 
words apply.  The first thing to notice here, James says, is that the “status” or site “for good 
and evil [and obligation] to exist in” is sentience or “conscious sensibility.”  “Goodness, 
badness, and obligation must be realized somewhere in order really to exist; and the first step 
in ethical philosophy is to see that no merely inorganic ‘nature of things’ can realize them.  
Neither moral relations nor the moral law can swing in vacuo.  Their only habitat can be a 
mind which feels them; and no world composed merely of physical facts can possibly be a 
world to which ethical propositions apply.”TPF550FPT  The basis of good, evil, and obligation, then, 
must be the concrete moral relations that obtain in and among sentient beings.  The prerequisite 
of moral truth, James holds, is a concrete standard outside the thinker.  “Truth [in general] 
supposes a standard outside of the thinker to which he must conform.”  If only one sentient 
being exists, there can be no moral truth, only the moral fact of feeling things to be good or 
ill.  In such a situation, there could be “no outward obligation.”  The only moral problem in 
this case would be finding an internal consistency of personal ideals.  With the existence of 
two or more sentient beings, the moral situation remains the same as long as each ignores or 
is “indifferent to what the other may feel or do.”TPF551FPT  Where does obligation come in?  It must 
arise in a context in which someone, at least, is not indifferent about what the others feel or 
do; it must arise with the concrete demand of a concrete person. 
Like the positive attributes good and bad, the comparative ones of better and worse must be 
realized in order to be real.  If one ideal judgment be objectively better than another, that 
betterness must be made flesh by being lodged concretely in someone’s actual perception.  It 
cannot float in the atmosphere, for it is not a sort of meteorological phenomenon, like the 
aurora borealis or the zodiacal light.  Its esse is percipi, like the esse of the ideals themselves 
between which it obtains.  The philosopher, therefore, who seeks to know which ideal ought 
to have supreme weight and which one ought to be subordinated, must trace the ought itself 
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to the de facto constitution of some existing consciousness, behind which, as one of the data 
of the universe, he as a purely ethical philosopher is unable to go.  This consciousness must 
make the one ideal right by feeling it to be right, the other wrong by feeling it to be wrong.TPF552FPT 
 
Notice that James attributes being to ideals:  ideals have ontological status and weight, they 
have substance; they are bits of reality to be taken into account. 
If no one else makes the demand for taking some ideals to be better than others, and 
therefore obligatory, the ethical philosopher, at least, will make it.  In that situation where 
multiple sentient beings exist but are indifferent to the feelings and actions of others, where 
they live in moral isolation, there appears at first glanceTPF553FPT to be no obligation to favor any of 
the existing ideals against others.  But the ethical philosopher finds this state of affairs 
intolerable.  In the imagined scene, “we find realized for us in the ethical sphere something 
like that world which the antique sceptics conceived of—in which individual minds are the 
measures of all things, and in which no one ‘objective’ truth, but only a multitude of 
‘subjective’ opinions can be found.  But this is the kind of world with which the philosopher, 
so long as he holds to the hope of philosophy, will not put up.  Among the various ideals 
represented, there must be, he thinks, some which have the more truth and authority; and to 
these the others ought to yield, so that system and subordination may reign.”TPF554FPT  He wants 
that “genuine universe” of moral relations, and beholding this multiverse of ideals offends 
his sense of order and possibility, for the dissonance is jarring and the lack of coordination 
strikes him as a terrible waste:  how much more good could there be, he wonders, if all these 
solitary beings joined their energies and pursued certain of the ideals together?  He also is 
inclined to believe that some ideals are inherently better than others, even for an individual in 
moral isolation.  James noted at the beginning of the essay that the ethical philosopher cannot 
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be a skeptic.  “He will not be a sceptic…so far from ethical scepticism being one possible 
fruit of ethical philosophizing, it can only be regarded as that residual alternative to all 
philosophy which from the outset menaces every would-be philosopher who may give up 
the quest discouraged, and renounce his original aim,” his aim in this case being again that 
“stable system,” that “genuine universe” of moral relations.TPF555FPT  This is the ethical 
philosopher’s ideal, TPF556FPT and he is not content to leave the constellation of sentients to their 
lonely pursuits. 
But why should anyone care about the philosopher’s ideal?  Like other ideals, it has 
ontological status, but does his ideal really matter any more than the others?  Is anyone 
obliged to take it seriously, or to even take notice of it?  It’s not clear on the face of it that 
anyone should.  If the ought must be traced, as James suggested, to “some existing 
consciousness,” it does not seem that the consciousness to which it must be traced is the 
philosopher’s.  “But now what particular consciousness in the universe can enjoy this 
prerogative of obliging others to conform to a rule which it lays down?” TPF557FPT  The answer can 
only be:  God’s.  If obligation is to come in anywhere, it must come in with the demand, the 
claim, of a thinker whose demands are more authoritative, more weighty than those of 
others, and the only thinker who obviously and necessarily matches that description would 
be God.  By the sheer size of his claim, he would have the advantage.  But this observation 
raises a host of difficult questions.  The first and most obvious in this day (and already, for a 
growing number, in James’) is, why should we believe that God exists?   A secondary, but 
still fundamental, and very challenging, question is, supposing God exists, is our obligation 
to him based on anything more than his advantage of power?  This second is a version of 
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the old question over which the Christian theologians wrangled for so many years:  Is it right 
because God wills it so, or does he will it because it’s right?  There was not space in this 
short essay for James to take up these thorny problems directly, but he addressed the first in 
other places (most famously, in “The Will to Believe,” but in other places as well), and he 
does address directly in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” the ground of our 
obligation to God. 
I will take up the first question in the next section, on religion, but it is relevant here 
to recall that James finds among the sensations associated with our innermost selves a “sense 
of an ideal spectator.”  James might not have gone as far as Coleridge in saying that the 
notion of God is “essential to the human mind” and is “called forth into distinct 
consciousness principally by the conscience,” that “the one great and binding ground of the 
belief of God and a hereafter is the law of conscience,” TPF558FPT but his comments in the Principles 
suggest that he found this sense of an ideal spectator to be an important bit of evidence for 
God’s existence and presence among men.  To the extent we experience this sensation as 
not merely a general feeling of obligation but as an awareness of a judging “spectator,” God 
may be spoken of in the event as a percept.  James’ handling of the second question, of the 
ground of our obligation to God, is startling in its freshness and simplicity.  If, on the basis 
of what James has already said, we fixate on God’s greater claim on us, we are tempted to 
think that the basis of the claim is power, that his wishes are more powerful than ours and 
that he has the power to enforce them, so that our acceding to his demands is a matter of 
facing the futility of opposing him.  But any such conclusion comes from looking in the 
wrong place.  If, as James has suggested, every ideal has existential weight, then every one 
constitutes a legitimate claim.  “The moment we take a steady look at the question” of 
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obligation, says James, “we see not only that without a claim actually made by some concrete 
person there can be no obligation, but that there is some obligation wherever there is a 
claim.”  James’ suggestion is that every claim of every thinker, divine or otherwise, should be 
taken seriously as having genuine ontic status.  Every claim is part of what is, has existential 
validity de facto, as existing; every claim stakes a claim on reality.  Every claim thus entails an 
obligation.  “Claim and obligation are, in fact, coextensive terms; they cover each other 
exactly.”  To understand obligation, we have to understand the nature of an ideal.  An ideal, 
existentially, is a desire, a desire that reality go a certain way.  But it is more than that.  It is a 
contribution to reality.  The desire is itself a part of reality, and pushes reality a certain way 
through the actions it induces.  Such desire is the basis of any obligation.  “The only possible 
reason there can be why any phenomenon ought to exist is that such a phenomenon actually 
is desired.  Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes itself valid by the 
fact that it exists at all.”  The only plausible reason that anything exists is that God wanted it to 
exist; the only reason that anything should exist that he or we or some conscious being first 
desires it, holds it out as an ideal.  Every such desire, every ideal, is a claim, and every claim 
creates an obligation against others.  The ground of our obligation to anyone, then, is his 
desire, and the ground of our greater obligation to God is the greater amount of his desire.  
“If there be [“a universal or divine consciousness”], then its demands carry the most 
obligation simply because they are greatest in amount.  But it is even then not abstractly right 
that we should respect them.  It is only concretely right—or right after the fact, and by virtue 
of the fact, that they are actually made.” TP F559FPT  So then, our obligation to God is not predicated 
on his greater power, but on his greater desire (its extensity as well as its intensity).  
Understanding our obligation to him is therefore not a matter of coming to terms with his 
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greater power, but of recognizing that he has desires as we do, and that his more extensive 
and intensive desires constitute a greater claim on reality than ours do.  When we realize that 
he is desiring as we are, we see that we have no better right to things desired than he does; 
when we realize how much vaster (not to mention nobler) his desires are, we see how 
unreasonable it is for us to treat ours as of equal importance.  Acknowledging our obligation 
to God is really a matter of fairness, and respect for life.  “It is life answering to life,” and “a 
claim thus livingly acknowledged is acknowledged with a solidity and fulness which no 
thought of an ‘ideal’ backing [James here refers to the support of “an abstract ideal order”] 
can render more complete.” TPF560FPT  “Wrongness” in this context is “disappointment” of a 
concrete divine person, and we must be judged by the extent to which we are concretely 
“responsive” or “not responsive” to his wishes. TPF561FPT 
Two features of the foregoing account of obligation demand comment.  Several 
times James explicitly or implicitly contrasts concrete and abstract obligation, and suggests 
that the concrete variety is fundamental.  Whatever legitimate obligation we have to abstract 
claims, he implies, may be traced back to some concrete obligation to some concrete person 
or persons.  Remember James’ initial observation that the status for good, evil, and obligation 
is conscious sensibility.  There can be no obligation in a world in which there are no sentient 
beings making demands.  There would be an obligation, on the basis of life itself, to 
acknowledge and respect the desires of other thinkers, even if no God existed.TPF562FPT  But the 
sense of God’s existence gives greater weight to some claims—his claims—as against others.  
James drives home the point that our higher obligations are concretely grounded with a pair 
of poignant, probing rhetorical questions:  “In what way is [the] fact of wrongness made 
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more acceptable or intelligible when we imagine it to consist rather in the laceration of an a 
priori ideal order than in the disappointment of a living personal God?  Do we, perhaps, 
think that we cover God and protect him and make his impotence over us less ultimate, 
when we back him up with this a priori blanket from which he may draw some warmth of 
further appeal?” TPF563FPT  Secondly, and crucially, though desire is on James’ account the basis of 
obligation, one can yet desire wrongly, and indeed wrong desiring is the root of all evil.  How 
can both be true?  How can desire be the basis of obligation and also be the source of evil 
and wrong?  The answer, again, is strangely simple.  It is never desire in itself that is wrong.  
Desire becomes wrong when it takes the lesser over the greater good—the satisfaction of the 
lower at the expense of the higher self, the good of self generally over the good of many, or 
merely human goods over divine goods.  To be more precise:  if the intelligent agent allows 
the normal desire for lesser goods to eclipse the desire for greater goods, the form of desire 
is warped, and the agent is defiled.  At the deepest level, moral perceptions are perceptions 
of the fitness or unfitness of particular desires to particular objects in the larger scheme of 
things.  Actions are right or wrong in a moral sense according to the particular aims of the 
desires that produce them.  This is essentially the Augustinian account, and James’ handling 
of “the casuistic question” suggests that it is, in general form, his own.  But how do we 
distinguish the lesser from the greater good, so as to give priority to our desires for the 
greater?  Two considerations emerge:  quantity and quality of goodness.  All else being equal, 
we should aim at the greatest quantity of good.  But some goods are qualitatively superior to 
others—as James said, some just “taste better.”  And no right thinking person would take a 
great quantity of mediocrity over a small share of excellence. 
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James’ is a moral metaphysics of desire.  The moral order, correspondingly—if there 
is one—is existential, formed by desires and their concomitants.  The philosopher looks at 
the vast thicket of desires the world presents and adds to it his own desire, “his own peculiar 
ideal…that over all these individual opinions there is a system of truth which he can discover if 
he only takes sufficient pains.”  Moral truth—as all truth by James’ lights—is itself 
existential:  “Truth cannot be a self-proclaiming set of laws, or an abstract ‘moral reason,’ 
but can only exist in act, or in the shape of an opinion held by some thinker really to be 
found.”TPF564FPT  Concrete moral relations among existing persons constitute the moral order, and moral truths 
are thoughts or ideas that help the thinker come to terms with those real relations.  The philosopher tries 
to think about human moral experience in such a way that the relations become transparent 
to him, and to express those thoughts and describe or symbolize those relations in a way that 
allows others to see the relations for themselves and test the adequacy of his formulations 
concerning them.  What he initially finds on examining moral experience is a tangled, 
mutating chaos of competing desires, the very antithesis of order.  At this point he can only 
hope that underneath all the confusion lies a deeper order that can serve as a standard 
according to which the madding crowd of desires may be brought into harmonious, ordered 
relations.  How does the philosopher proceed from here?  The problem that confronts him 
as he surveys the chaos is that “there is…no visible thinker invested with authority.”  And 
the philosopher, if he is to maintain objectivity, cannot at the outset take himself as an 
authority, but “must throw [his] own spontaneous ideals, even the dearest, impartially in with 
that total mass of ideals which are fairly to be judged.”  What he needs is an “impartial test” 
by which to judge.  But in accordance with what James has already said, any such test “must 
be incarnated in the demand of some actually existent person.”  Once the philosopher 
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realizes this, he is faced with a new difficulty:  “how can he pick out the person save by an 
act in which his own sympathies and prepossessions are implied?”TPF565FPT  God may seem an 
obvious choice, and God’s desires the standard by which to judge, but how can God and his 
desires be found out, and how does the philosopher avoid making God in his own image? 
“The more serious ethical schools,” James says, have found a promising “method” 
of acquiring the needed impartial test.  It is to look for “a common essence” shared by all 
goods.  James briefly surveys the “various essences of good [that] have…been found and 
proposed as bases of the ethical system” and concludes that “the best, on the whole, of these 
marks and measures of goodness seems to be the capacity to bring happiness.”  “But,” he 
continues, “in order not to break down fatally, this test must be taken to cover innumerable 
acts and impulses that never aim at happiness; so that, after all, in seeking for a universal 
principle we inevitably are carried onward to the most universal principle—that the essence of 
good is simply to satisfy demand.” TPF566FPT  The basic moral problem is that not all demands can be 
satisfied.  Necessity constrains, and as a practical matter some demands must yield to others.  
“The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; and there is 
always a pinch between the ideal and the actual which can only be got through by leaving part 
of the ideal behind.  There is hardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for 
the possession of the same bit of space and time with some other imagined good.  Every end 
of desire that presents itself appears exclusive of some other end of desire…  So…the 
ethical philosopher’s demand for the right scale of subordination in ideals is the fruit of an 
altogether practical need.  Some part of the ideal must be butchered, and he needs to know 
which part.  It is a tragic situation, and no mere speculative conundrum, with which he has 
to deal.”  But if he is self-aware and appropriately humble, the philosopher realizes that he 
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cannot rightly look to “his own intuitive preferences” for guidance on which ideals to 
sacrifice; he sees that “the very best of men must not only be insensible, but be ludicrously 
and peculiarly insensible, to many goods,” so that, were he rely on his own personal 
inclinations, the result would be “a mutilation of the fulness of the truth.” TP F567FPT  What, then, to 
do? 
Before grappling with this question, let’s step back for a moment and look at the 
whole picture.  All the features of man’s moral situation are beginning to come clear.  
Psychologically, our moral perceptions reveal the fitness or unfitness of certain relations in 
and among thinkers—the appropriateness of certain attitudes, the internal consistency of 
personal ideals and the harmony between our own ideals and those of others.  
Metaphysically, “good,” “bad,” and “obligation” emerge as “objects of feeling and desire” in 
an “ethical world” of “actually living minds” making “judgments of good and ill, and 
demands upon one another.”TPF568FPT  Casuistic considerations emerge from a series of practical 
problems.  The first practical problem is that of negotiating competing claims—because 
there is a conflict of claims.  Because not all demands can be satisfied, it becomes necessary 
to choose some goods over others.  The philosopher, confronting this situation, faces a 
second practical problem:  he finds goods already ranked in society, some ideals already 
sacrificed, but he cannot assume that the goods actually on top are really the greater goods 
or that the ideals honored are better than the ones forfeited.  Conventional rankings may 
blind us to certain goods.  “If we follow the ideal which is conventionally highest, the others 
which we butcher either die and do not return to haunt us; or if they come back and accuse 
us of murder, everyone applauds us for turning to them a deaf ear.  In other words, our 
environment encourages us not to be philosophers but partisans.  The philosopher, 
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however, cannot, so long as he clings to his own ideal of objectivity, rule out any ideal from 
being heard.”TPF569FPT  The basic dimensions of man’s moral position, then, are psychological, 
metaphysical, and practical (casuistry turns out to be a practical, rather than a “theoretical,” 
concern), and the dominant practical reality with which every man has to come to terms is 
the moral constitution of the society in which he lives.  There is one more feature of the 
human moral situation, symbiotically bound up with personal experience and social mores:  
our “metaphysical and theological beliefs.”TPF570FPT  Man is not a passive element in the universe 
but an active participant; he cannot merely exist in the world, but must interpret it, make 
sense of it, to live comfortably therein.  And his understanding of the universe of which he is 
part decisively conditions his perceptions of moral qualities and of the obligations he bears 
to others.  Perceptions, the reader will recall, are organized sensations, including both 
sensations immediately given and remembered sensations called up by expectations about 
what a given object might be.  Metaphysical and theological beliefs involve expectations 
about what the universe will show and do, and thus inform perception.  To know the world 
as it is requires at the least some circumspection about our expectations and caution about 
making empirical judgments.  To understand our obligations we must give due consideration 
both to our moral perceptions and to the beliefs that inform them, scrutinizing our beliefs, 
testing them against sensible experience, and correcting our beliefs and perceptions as 
necessary. 
Returning to our question:  how to know which ideals to uphold and which to 
sacrifice?  Well, the first thing is to sacrifice as few as possible, to try to do justice to as many 
as possible.  “The guiding principle for ethical philosophy,” James says, “(since all demands 
conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world) [must] be simply to satisfy at all times as 
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many demands as we can.”  “That act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the 
best whole, in the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions.  In the casuistic scale, 
therefore, those ideals must be written highest which prevail at the least cost, or by whose 
realization the least possible number of other ideals are destroyed.  Since victory and defeat 
there must be, the victory to be philosophically prayed for is that of the more inclusive 
side—of the side which even in the hour of triumph will to some degree do justice to the 
ideals in which the vanquished party’s interests lay.”  Adopting this principle, James suggests, 
is the only viable alternative—in light of the complexity of the moral situation—to giving up 
and resigning oneself to moral skepticism.TPF571FPT 
It is also the common sense alternative.  The other side of the common sense 
attitude of taking life as it is is a resistance to leaving out of account anything that manifestly 
contributes to life, no matter how relatively small or how hard to reconcile with other goods.  
James said in an early essay that, “‘Mind,’ as we actually find it, contains all sorts of laws—
those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, decorum, beauty, morals, and so forth, as well as of 
perception of fact.  Common sense estimates mental excellence by a combination of all these 
standards.” TPF572FPT  Common sense estimates moral excellence and human excellence generally in 
the same way—not fixating on one kind of good to the exclusion of others but recognizing 
them all.  It is not enough for common sense to preserve only the highest ideals; all claims 
should be heard, and all goods should be saved that can be saved. 
The question remains, however, of which goods should be on top—which must be 
preserved at all costs, which should be fought for but not made all-important, and which can 
be let go without unacceptable loss.  The answer hinges on metaphysical and theological 
considerations, and these in turn on psychology—or more precisely, on experience, in which 
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the psyche apprehends realities beyond itself.  James says at the beginning of the final section 
of “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” that, “The chief of all the reasons why 
concrete ethics cannot be final is that they have to wait on metaphysical and theological 
beliefs.”TPF573FPT  I observed earlier that beliefs inform perceptions.  The most fundamental beliefs, 
and the most morally significant ones, are beliefs about the larger scheme of things.  How 
one “reads” the moral facts will be most decisively influenced by just this kind of belief.  Of 
all metaphysical questions, the most momentous for ethics is the question of God, his 
existence and his nature.  Take the world first without reference to God.  James repeats that 
“real ethical relations” would exist “in a purely human world,” and even in a “moral 
solitude,” where a person had no relations with others.  In the latter case, the individual 
would still find that he cannot satisfy all his desires/ideals/demands at once and would have 
to choose among them.  The case of moral solitude is especially useful to consider, because 
the moral relations here are relatively simple.  What should the individual in moral isolation 
do when he finds himself conflicted about which desires to favor?  In light of our guiding 
principle that we should always try to satisfy as many demands as possible, “awakening the 
least sum of dissatisfactions,” the answer seems clear:  in cases of conflict, he should cater to 
those demands which, if not satisfied, will come back to “plague [him] with interminable 
crops of consequential damages, compunctions, and regrets.”  James calls such demands 
“imperatives.”TPF574FPT  Such imperatives are clearly recognizable in experience, if not always 
before the moment of moral decision, then certainly after choosing to ignore them.  At some 
point, we perceive the quality of imperativeness in these demands and realize the damage to 
us or to others that will come of ignoring them.  This perception of imperativeness is the 
experiential criterion by which to rank our goods.  By this perception we see that some 
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goods are more essential, more important than others.  Now we who live in society 
manifestly do not live in moral solitude, and we must factor into our moral calculations a 
vast range of ideals besides our own.  But the same rule applies.  The socially most 
imperative goods must be on top.  Who should determine which goods are socially most 
imperative?  James suggests that they ought in general to be determined by the long run of 
collective experience—by the common sense of the community—rather than by any one 
man or group of men.  The philosopher, remembering his limitations, his “insensibility” to 
many goods, will not be quick to dismiss the order of goods in place in his own society.  He 
will recognize that more ideals have been preserved and more good deposited in the funded 
experience of civilized tradition than he knows or can ever fully appreciate.  James’ 
explanation of this attitude is worth quoting at length: 
The course of history is nothing but the story of men’s struggles from generation to 
generation to find the more and more inclusive order.  Invent some manner of realizing your 
own ideals which will also satisfy the alien demands—that and that only is the path of peace!  
Following this path, society has shaken itself into one sort of relative equilibrium after 
another by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those of science.  Polyandry and 
polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial torture and arbitrary royal 
power have slowly succumbed to actually aroused complaints; and though someone’s ideals 
are unquestionably the worse off for each improvement, yet a vastly greater total number of 
them find shelter in our civilized society than in the older savage ways.  So far then, and up 
to date, the casuistic scale is made for the philosopher already far better than he can ever 
make it for himself.  An experiment of the most searching kind has proved that the laws and 
usages of the land are what yield the maximum of satisfaction to the thinkers taken all 
together.  The presumption in cases of conflict must always be in favor of the conventionally 
recognized good.  The philosopher must be a conservative, and in the construction of his 
casuistic scale must put the things most in accordance with the customs of the community 
on top. TPF575FPT 
 
The affinity of James’ notion of social progress to Burke’s is evident. 
 But this is not the whole story.  James goes on:  “And yet if he be a true philosopher 
he must see that there is nothing final in any actually given equilibrium of human ideals, but 
that, as our present laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones, so they 
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will in their turn be overthrown by any newly discovered order which will hush up the 
complaints that they still give rise to, without producing others louder still.”TPF576FPT  So, while the 
presumption in disputed cases should favor the conventional order, this presumption must 
not be allowed to harden into rigid inflexibility.  “The presumption [in “ethical science” as in 
“physical science”] always is that the vulgarly accepted opinions are true, and the right 
casuistic order that which public opinion believes in; and surely it would be folly quite as 
great, in most of us, to strike out independently and to aim at originality in ethics as in 
physics.  Every now and then, however, someone is born with the right to be original, and his 
revolutionary thought or action may bear prosperous fruit.  [My emphasis.]  He may replace 
old ‘laws of nature’ by better ones; he may, by breaking old moral rules in a certain place, 
bring in a total condition of things more ideal than would have followed had the rules been 
kept.”TPF577FPT  So, “although a man always risks much when he breaks away from established 
rules and strives to realize a larger ideal whole than they permit, yet the philosopher must 
allow that it is at all times open to anyone to make the experiment, provided he fear not to 
stake his life and character upon the throw.” TPF578FPT  Such men, it might be added, were 
Confucius, Socrates, and Jesus. 
 Civilization, James suggests, is the maximal realization of ideals through a balancing 
of heroic new beginnings (on the basis of new insight) and conservation (preserving and 
consolidating the good of successful experiments).  It is the product of “relative equilibrium” 
between “conservative” and “revolutionary” forces.TP PT  “The anarchists, nihilists, and free-
lovers; the free-silverites, socialists, and single-tax men; the free-traders and civil-service 
reformers; the prohibitionists and anti-vivisectionists; the radical darwinians with their idea 
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of the suppression of the weak—these and all the conservative sentiments of society arrayed 
against them, are simply deciding through actual experiment by what sort of conduct the 
maximum amount of good can be gained and kept in this world.”TPF579FPT  It is clear enough that 
James in his view of social development adopts the perspective of common sense.  In 
general he identifies with “the conservative sentiments of society” as against the 
revolutionary passions.  But while common sense resists radical change, it is capable of 
embracing revolutionary ideas and approaches when they prove their worth experimentally.  
It is safe to say that James is an adversary of total revolution, but it is equally apparent that 
he welcomed partial revolutions that, by improving life dramatically in some respects without 
sacrificing larger civilizational acquisitions, create a more ideal situation on the whole.  He 
could even be open to a total transformation of the culture, provided the change was 
sufficiently continuous with the old order and sufficiently gradual and above all manifestly 
better all around than what came before.  This attitude is the essence of common sense.  
Unless deeply offended by them, common sense does not respond to new ideas with “no!” 
but “wait and see.”  Its posture is like that of Gamaliel, that wise Pharisee who advised, 
“Leave these men alone!  Let them go!  For if their purpose or activity is of human origin, it 
will fail.  But if it is from God, you will not be able to stop these men; you will only find 
yourselves fighting against God.” TPF580FPT 
Earlier I noted James’ suggestion that the most momentous ethically-relevant beliefs 
are precisely those about God.  In point of fact, it looks as if every civilization had its origins 
in religion, as if the various civilizational mores emerged out of religious belief and practice.  
Arguably, the moral power of Confucius and Socrates as well as of Jesus, to return to my 
three examples of successful revolutionaries, stemmed from their attitudes toward what must 
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be taken as divine.  Their respective views of right order hinged on a sense of a higher order 
laid out in or by heaven.  Their imperatives were more piercing than the usual imperatives 
because they were seen as having a source beyond self and beyond the societies in which 
they lived, even beyond mankind in general and beyond nature itself, and this sense of higher 
obligation generated in them extraordinary moral energy.  “The deepest difference, 
practically,” says James, “in the moral life of man is the difference between the easy-going 
and the strenuous mood.  When in the easy-going mood the shrinking from present ill is our 
ruling consideration.  The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to 
present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained.”TPF581FPT  Nothing awakens the strenuous mood, 
James observes, like the sense of divine appeal, a challenge from on high. 
In a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its 
maximal stimulating power.  Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuinely ethical 
symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale 
of values fails to open up.  Many of us, indeed—like Sir James Stephen in those eloquent 
Essays by a Barrister—would openly laugh at the very idea of the strenuous mood being 
awakened in us by those claims of remote posterity which constitute the last appeal of the 
religion of humanity.  We do not love these men of the future keenly enough; and we love 
them perhaps the less the more we hear of their evolutionized perfection, their high average 
longevity and education, their freedom from war and crime, their relative immunity from 
pain and zymotic disease, and all their other negative superiorities.  This is all too finite, we 
say; we see too well the vacuum beyond.  It lacks the note of infinitude and mystery, and 
may all be dealt with in the don’t-care mood.  No need of agonizing ourselves or making 
others agonize for these good creatures just at present. 
 When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, 
the infinite perspective opens out.  The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged.  
The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and 
significance, and to utter the penetrating, shattering, tragically challenging note of appeal.  
They ring out like the call of Victor Hugo’s alpine eagle, ‘qui parle au précipice et que le 
gouffre entend,’ and the strenuous mood awakens at the sound…  Its blood is up; and 
cruelty to the lesser claims, so far from being a deterrent element, does but add to the stern 
joy with which it leaps to answer the greater.  All through history, in the periodical conflicts 
of Puritanism with the don’t-care temper, we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial 
moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on 
high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite need…  The strenuous type 
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of character will on the battlefield of human history always outwear the easy-going type, and 
religion will drive irreligion to the wall. TPF582FPT 
 
Of course, the practical superiority morally of the religious attitude does not prove 
that God exists or that his nature is such as believed.  But his existence and his good will 
toward man is the only possible basis for the kind of stable system of moral relations the 
philosopher seeks. 
It would seem…and this is my final conclusion—that the stable and systematic moral 
universe for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where there 
is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands.  If such a thinker existed, his way of 
subordinating the demands to one another would be the finally valid casuistic scale; his 
claims would be the most appealing; his ideal universe would be the most inclusive realizable 
whole.  If he now exist, then actualized in his thought already must be that ethical 
philosophy which we seek as the pattern which our own must evermore approach.  In the 
interests of our own ideal of systematically unified moral truth, therefore, we, as would-be 
philosophers, must postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious 
cause.TPF583FPT 
 
But supposing such a “divine thinker with all-enveloping demands” exists, how do we know 
what his demands are?  How can this divine “pattern” of values be discovered?TPF584FPT  James’ 
answer, in light of his larger corpus, is that the ethical philosopher must look to religious 
experience to discover what can be discovered of any “finally valid casuistic scale.”  Thus, 
James’ ethical and religious investigations are, and must be, inseparably connected, at least 
with respect to the quest for an “eternal moral order,” a scale of ideals permanently 
guaranteed. TPF585FPT  Indeed, James’ primary interest in religious experience is to find such an 
order.  His pragmatic conception of God is of the Agent that guarantees “an eternal moral 
order,” reinforces conscience, and gives inner strength to live well.  This is what, 
pragmatically speaking—and short of some kind of deeper mystical revelation—can be 
known of God, what he is known-as. 
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 James considers the moral upshot of religious experience in the chapters in Varieties 
on “Saintliness.”  The meaning of religious experience (as for the pragmatist the meaning of 
any experience) is in its “fruits,” and the fruits of religious experience must be sought in the 
concrete differences of character and action such experience makes in the lives of 
believers.TPF586FPT  “The collective name for the ripe fruits of religion in a character,” James says, 
“is Saintliness.  The saintly character is the character for which spiritual emotions are the 
habitual centre of the personal energy; and there is a certain composite photograph of 
universal saintliness, the same in all religions.”  James discerns four basic features of this 
universal saintliness:  1) “a feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world’s selfish 
little interests; and a conviction, not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the 
existence of an Ideal Power;” 2) “a sense of friendly continuity of the ideal power with our 
own life, and a willing self-surrender to its control;” 3) “an immense elation and freedom, as 
the outlines of the confining selfhood melt down;” and 4) “a shifting of the emotional centre 
towards loving and harmonious affections, towards ‘yes, yes,’ and away from ‘no, no,’ where 
the claims of the non-ego are concerned.”  James lists as “characteristic practical 
consequences” of these “fundamental inner conditions”:  1) “asceticism”—a deliberate 
foregoing of lower-level desires for the sake of higher goods; 2) “strength of soul,” making 
old, powerful “motives and inhibitions” insignificant; 3) “purity”—keeping “unspotted from 
the world” for the sake of deepening “spiritual consistency;” and 4) “charity”—an active 
love of one’s fellow man. TPF587FPT  It is easy to see how these characteristics would augment 
tremendously the strenuous mood.  The sense of higher purpose and divine empowerment 
and the corresponding ascetic discipline, single-mindedness, and energetic surge of love for 
others make the saintly personality a center of moral power that—all other things equal—
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cannot be matched.  The phenomenon of saintly moral power is perhaps nowhere more 
poignantly described than in Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion: 
[The mystic is taken beyond contemplation to] identification of the human will with the 
divine will…  The soul is…passing from the static to the dynamic, from the closed to the 
open, from everyday life to mystic life…  The mystic soul yearns to become [God’s] 
instrument.  It throws off anything in its substance that is not pure enough, not flexible and 
strong enough, to be turned to some use by God.  Already it had sensed the presence of 
God, it had thought it beheld God in a symbolic vision, it had even been united to Him in its 
ecstasy; but none of this rapture was lasting, because it was mere contemplation…  Now it is 
God who is acting through the soul, in the soul; the union is total, therefore final…  
Henceforth for the soul there is a superabundance of life.  There is a boundless impetus.  
There is an irresistible impulse which hurls it into vast enterprises…  The great mystic…has 
felt truth flowing into his soul from its fountainhead like an active force.  He can no more 
help spreading it abroad than the sun can help diffusing its light.  Only, it is not by mere 
words that he will spread it.  For the love which consumes him is no longer simply the love 
of man for God, it is the love of God for all men.TPF588FPT 
 
This is a variety of the strenuous life of which ordinary persons are simply incapable.  And 
yet, James observes, their magnetic examples inspire imitation by more regular folk, so that 
saints become a “creative social force” like no other.TPF589FPT 
 Now Bergson’s description above applies historically, as Bergson says, in particular 
to Christian mystics,TPF590FPT and this fact points again to the importance of metaphysical and 
theological beliefs for the moral life.  In the Varieties, James calls these “over-beliefs,” and 
despite his concentration through most of that study on the sensible inner experience of 
religion, he suggests near the end that over-beliefs (provided they are existentially 
grounded—are “live,” as James put it in “The Will to Believe”) have enormous power to 
work good or ill because of their regulation of perceptions and actions.  Over-beliefs turn 
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out to be “absolutely indispensable” practically, so that “the most interesting and valuable 
things about a man are usually his over-beliefs.”TPF591FPT 
 Significantly, James presents as the basic “test” of religious experience and belief 
common sense.  In a chapter called “The Value of Saintliness,” he endeavors “to judge the 
absolute value of what religion adds to human life.”  “What I propose to do,” he says, 
“is…to test saintliness by common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far 
the religious life commends itself as an ideal kind of human activity,” and adds, “no religion 
has ever in the long run established or proved itself in any other way.” TPF592FPT  Actually, the 
common sense test just is the test of the “long run” of experience:  how does the religious 
life look in light of the common perceptions and standards that have withstood the ravages 
of time?    John E. Smith summarizes James’ view nicely:  he thought that “religions prove 
themselves by ministering to the human needs dominant at the time.  James saw these needs 
as providing us with working principles for judging religion, principles that serve to eliminate 
the ‘humanly unfit’ and promote the survival of the ‘humanly fittest’ of religious beliefs.  
Testing religion, however, cannot be a matter of absolute precision and certainty…  In 
insisting on the fallibility of human judgment, James was hoping to steer a middle course 
between certainty and ‘wanton doubt.’”  This is the posture, as Smith notes, of common 
sense. TPF593FPT  The “working principles” by which to judge religion are common sense principles, 
and they are to be applied in a commonsensical, all-things-considered way.  As James put it 
in the Varieties, each religion must be evaluated—as for James every matter must be 
evaluated—“on the whole” rather than by reference to some pre-selected, a priori standard. TPF594FPT  
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The common sense test of the value of saintliness—saintly experience, belief, character, and 
action—is what effects it brings on the whole. 
 James is convinced that its overall effects are very good for mankind.  Gauging as 
comprehensively as he can the practical consequences of saintliness (as described above), he 
concludes:  “In a general way…and ‘on the whole,’ our abandonment of theological criteria, 
and our testing of religion by practical common sense and the empirical method, leave it in 
possession of its towering place in history.” TPF595FPT  He admits that great wrongs have been done 
in the name of religion, but finds that, “The basenesses so commonly charged to religion’s 
account are…almost all of them, not chargeable at all to religion proper, but rather to 
religion’s wicked practical partner, the spirit of corporate dominion.  And the bigotries are 
most of them chargeable to religion’s wicked intellectual partner, the spirit of dogmatic 
dominion, the passion for laying down the law in the form of a closed-in theoretic 
system.”TPF596FPT  The real life of religion, he insists, is to be found in those dynamic individuals 
who yield to and are energized by that Ideal Power they perceive in and above them.  To 
those who might tend to attribute the corrupting forms mentioned just before to religion 
itself, he says that 
The fruits of religion…are, like all human products, liable to corruption by excess.  Common 
sense must judge them…  We find that error by excess is exemplified by every saintly virtue.  
Excess, in human faculties, means usually one-sidedness or want of balance…  In the life of 
saints, technically so called, the spiritual faculties are strong, but what gives the impression of 
extravagance proves usually on examination to be a relative deficiency of intellect.  Spiritual 
excitement takes pathological forms whenever other interests are too few and the intellect 
too narrow. TPF597FPT 
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James considers corruptions of saintly virtues in some detail, but finds that, on balance, “the 
saintly group of qualities is indispensable to the world’s welfare.”TPF598FPT  He summarizes their 
source and salutary influence as follows: 
[The] group of [saintly attributes] forms a combination which…seems to flow from the 
sense of the divine as from its psychological centre.  Whoever possesses strongly this sense 
comes naturally to think that the smallest details of this world derive infinite significance 
from their relation to an unseen divine order.  The thought of this order yields him a 
superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfastness of soul with which no other can 
compare.  In social relations his serviceability is exemplary; he abounds in impulses to help.  
His help is inward as well as outward, for his sympathy reaches souls as well as bodies, and 
kindles unsuspected faculties therein.  Instead of placing happiness where common men 
place it, in comfort, he places it in a higher kind of inner excitement, which converts 
discomforts into sources of cheer and annuls unhappiness.  So he turns his back upon no 
duty, however thankless; and when we are in need of assistance, we can count upon the saint 
lending his hand with more certainty than we can count upon any other person.  Finally, his 
humble-mindedness and his ascetic tendencies save him from the petty personal pretensions 
which so obstruct our ordinary social intercourse, and his purity gives us in him a clean man 
for a companion.  Felicity, purity, charity, patience, self-severity,—these are splendid 
excellencies, and the saint of all men shows them in the completest possible measure. TPF599FPT 
 
All in all, the moral tone of the saint’s life is richer and profounder than any other.  But mark 
well:  the saint’s moral importance extends far beyond the immediate impact of his actions.  
He becomes a model and a source of inspiration for those of us who have not been 
vouchsafed comparably deep religious encounters.  “Genuine saints,” James notices, “find in 
the elevated excitement with which their faith endows them an authority and impressiveness 
which makes them irresistible.”TPF600FPT  This is the secret of their social significance:  they lead by 
attraction rather than coercion, and others follow from aspiration rather than mere duty. TPF601FPT  
The power of their appeal—or perhaps, the appeal of the divine through them—makes 
ordinary moralists of the utilitarian stripe no match for them.  The desire they awaken in 
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others gives rise to the strenuous mood and unleashes a moral force against which the easy-
going temper cannot muster a viable defense. 
 In the end, however, the religious life does not result in any clear-cut, final ethical 
system.  The reason for this is that the mix of ideals present in the world at any given 
moment is never what it was, or will be moments hence.  The general moral relations may 
hold permanently, but the particular moral relations are continually shifting, changing with 
each new desire and each new interaction of persons.  Religious experience may sharpen our 
sense of the deeper order of nature, may clarify a good bit our view and understanding of 
the permanently higher goods, but we cannot derive from it any ethical rules that will show 
us exactly what to do in any genuine moral dilemma.  Morally speaking, faith “after all serves 
only to let loose in us the strenuous mood,”TPF602FPT making us willing to pursue moral insight and 
discernment more doggedly. TPF603FPT  In the concrete moment of moral conflict, “it is simply our 
total character and personal genius that are on trial; and if we invoke any so-called 
philosophy, our choice and use of that also are but revelations of our personal aptitude or 
incapacity for moral life.  From this unsparing practical ordeal no professor’s lectures and no 
array of books can save us.  The solving word, for the learned and the unlearned man alike, 
lies in the last resort in the dumb willingnesses and unwillingnesses of their interior 
characters, and nowhere else.”TPF604FPT 
We see, then, that James understands right order to be an achievement, the concrete 
fulfillment of a process in experience aiming at maximization of satisfactions.  It is an 
achievement, moreover, that requires constant maintenance:  continual adjustments must be 
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made if the concrete order is to remain adequate to the rich and dynamic range of existing 
ideals.  In a letter, James described his philosophy as one “which represents order as being 
gradually won and always in the making.”TPF605FPT   While it may be possible to sketch out a 
permanently valid right ordering of goods, James believes any such sketch must be too 
abstract to be of much practical value.  That it may be useful for ordinary moral situations he 
readily concedes.  But for any genuine moral dilemma it will prove inadequate.  “Abstract 
rules indeed can help,” says James, “but they help the less in proportion as our intuitions are 
more piercing, and our vocation is stronger for the moral life.  For every real dilemma is in 
literal strictness a unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals 
disappointed which each decision creates is always a universe without a precedent, and for 
which no adequate previous rule exists.”  “There is,” James says, “but one unconditional 
commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote 
and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see.”TP F606FPT 
 So much, then, for James’ basic ethical schema.  Let me now fill it out a bit with 
some of the more important moral insights in his larger corpus.  Ethics has, as implied in 
“The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” both a personal and a social dimension:  the 
moral individual must look after both his own desires and those of others, including, 
significantly, whatever he can make out of God’s.  Ethics, then, is concerned most basically 
with the well-being of self and of other selves.  Practically, however, a man is no good to 
others until he has first put himself in order.  The first concern of ethics, therefore, is the 
formation of personal character, which amounts to construction of a certain kind of self. 
Initially, this construction of the self is not managed by the individual himself, but by 
parents or guardians, by schools and churches, and by society at large, with all its social 
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pressures and incentives.  The self indeed is in some measure constituted by its relations to 
others.  Ethics must accordingly consider the social dimension even when concentrating on 
personal character formation.  At some point, however, the individual comes to a maturity 
of powers sufficient to make him primarily responsible for his own moral development.  In 
either case—dependency or independency—the goal is the same:  construction of a certain 
kind of self.  Now this self is not constructed ex nihilo:  the materials are given by nature.  But 
the moral individual is confronted with a variety of potential selves, and must choose among 
them which to make actual.  The context for personal character formation is a “rivalry and 
conflict of the different selves.”  You will remember that James found the empirical self to 
be divisible into a material self, a social self, and a spiritual self.  Bear in mind that these 
“selves” are conceptual cuts of a continuous field-self.  Nonetheless, the divisions 
correspond roughly to real tensions within the field, and some potentialities in the field must 
inevitably give way to others.  “With most objects of desire, physical nature restricts our 
choice to but one of many represented goods, and even so it is here.  I am often confronted 
by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest.”  As a 
practical matter, “to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed.  
So the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out 
the one on which to stake his salvation.”TPF607FPT  On the deepest level, the practical need to rank 
goods becomes a question of how to rank potential selves. 
The broad outline of how we should rank them is clear enough on the level of 
common sense.  “A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves…in an 
hierarchical scale, with the bodily Self at bottom, the spiritual Self at top, and the 
extracorporeal material selves and the various social selves between.”  We are motivated or 
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directed to rank this way partly by necessity, partly by the judgments of our moral sense, and 
partly by social expectations.  “Our merely natural [morally neutral] self-seeking would lead 
us to aggrandize all these selves; we give up deliberately only those among them which we 
cannot keep.  Our unselfishness is thus apt to be a ‘virtue of necessity’…  Of course this is 
not the only way in which we learn to subordinate our lower selves to our higher.  A direct 
ethical judgment unquestionably also plays a part, and last, not least, we apply to our own 
persons judgments originally called forth by the acts of others.”  Regarding this last, James 
adds that, “By having constantly to pass judgment on my associates, I come ere long to see, 
as Herr Horwicz says, my own lusts in the mirror of the lusts of others, and to think about 
them in a very different way from that in which I simply feel.  Of course, the moral 
generalities which from childhood have been instilled into me accelerate enormously the 
advent of this reflective judgment of myself.”TPF608FPT 
As James tends—erroneously, I think—to be thought of as having a quintessentially 
individualistic philosophy and view of man, what he says next in this passage is worth special 
notice: 
In each kind of self, material, social, and spiritual, men distinguish between the immediate 
and the actual, and the remote and the potential, between the narrower and the wider view, 
to the detriment of the former and advantage of the latter…  Of all these wider, more 
potential selves, the potential social self is the most interesting, by reason of certain apparent 
paradoxes to which it leads in conduct, and by reason of its connection with our moral and 
religious life…  When for motives of honor and conscience I brave the condemnation of my 
own family, club, and ‘set’…I am always inwardly strengthened in my course and steeled 
against the loss of my actual social self by the thought of other and better possible social 
judges than those whose verdict goes against me now.  [Even if no human companion’s 
approval is expected,] the emotion that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal 
social self, of a self that is at least worthy of approving recognition by the highest possible 
judging companion, if such companion there be.  This self is the true, the intimate, the 
ultimate, the permanent Me which I seek.  This judge is God…  The impulse to pray is a 
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necessary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost of the empirical selves of a man 
is a Self of the social sort, it yet can find its only adequate Socius in an ideal world.TPF609FPT 
 
If James has it that “the innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a Self of the social 
sort,” the view of him as the ultimate individualist is at best a gross caricature, and in all 
likelihood simply a false impression. TPF610FPT  Be that as it may, the “sense” of this “ideal 
spectator,” TPF611FPT as James goes on to call him, is of the highest significance for the moral life, as 
we have already seen. 
 Now that little matter of “natural self-seeking” that James mentioned above in 
passing turns out to be the central moral problem for human beings, because we cannot in 
fact do as we would and “aggrandize all the selves.”  Consideration of this leads James into a 
discussion of “self love.”  What kind of love of self is appropriate?  James approaches the 
issue with a more narrowly focused question:  “What self is loved in ‘self love’?”  There are 
three key facts to consider here about normal human nature.  The first is that “each of us is 
animated by a direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence, whatever that 
may be, taken merely as such.”  The second is that all the internal movements of the Self 
broadly conceived “are but results of the fact that certain things appeal to primitive and 
instinctive impulses of our nature, and that we follow their destinies with an excitement that 
owes nothing to a reflective source.” TPF612FPT  The third fact is that our different selves excite or 
interest us in differing ways.  “The most palpable selfishness of a man is his bodily 
selfishness, and his most palpable self is the body to which that selfishness relates.”  What 
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happens to our bodies “excites in us emotions and tendencies to action more energetic and 
habitual than any which are excited by other portions of the ‘field’ [of consciousness].”  Our 
social self-love and spiritual self-love also are excited by objective factors, objects in the field 
of consciousness—social self-love relates to “the images other men have framed of me” and 
spiritual self-love to “my more phenomenal and perishable powers, my loves and hates, 
willingnesses and sensibilities, and the like.”TPF613FPT  All the foregoing are normal and involuntary 
tendencies, and as such are morally neutral.  And because all the self-loves are objective, 
James finds that “the dictum of the old-fashioned sensationalist psychology, that altruistic 
passions and interests are contradictory to the nature of things, and that if they appear 
anywhere to exist, it must be as secondary products, resolvable at bottom into cases of 
selfishness,” is empirically false.  “There is no reason why any object whatever might not 
arouse and interest as primitively and instinctively as any other, whether connected or not 
with the interests of the me” (the objective self).TPF614FPT  We may, then, have normal altruistic 
tendencies as well as self-interested ones.  The moral difficulty, again, enters the picture 
when there is a conflict—immediately, a conflict of excitements and desires, and more 
remotely, a conflict of potential selves.  Of course, one of the most important factors to 
consider in deciding which desire to favor and which self to become is how indulging or 
pursuing a given desire will affect others, and this consideration raises the question of justice.  
What is my obligation to others—what is right for me to do in light of their desires, what 
claim do they have on my attention and action?  “The just man,” James says, “is the one who 
can weigh himself impartially.  Impartial weighing presupposes a rare faculty of abstraction 
from the vividness with which, as Herr Horwicz has pointed out, things known as intimately 
as our own possessions and performances appeal to our imagination; and an equally rare 
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power of vividly representing the affairs of others.  But, granting these rare powers, there is 
no reason why a man should not pass judgment on himself quite as objectively and well as 
anyone else.  No matter how he feels about himself, unduly elated or unduly depressed, he 
may still truly know his own worth by measuring it by the outward standard he applies to 
other men, and counteract the injustice of the feeling he cannot wholly escape.”TPF615FPT 
 Note that, according to James’ analysis, principles of justice emerge from experience, 
and that justice itself is an existential matter, an inner disposition of impartiality in weighing 
interests and claims that leads to appropriate action.  As Bernard P. Brennan has observed, 
James shows “the possibility of having objective standards which grow up in our 
experience.” TPF616FPT  Part of the way James does this is by showing the relation between moral 
concepts and moral percepts.  Brennan explains: 
Without concepts we could not have a single rule of conduct or a single moral ideal.  As 
James notes, ‘life’s values deepen when we translate percepts into ideas!  The translation 
appears as far more than the original’s equivalent.’  For example, when we ‘translate’ our 
perception of a heroic act into its conceptual equivalent, we transform and enrich our 
perception.  The concept of heroism complements the thickness of the perception with a 
luminousness and depth peculiar to conception. 
 On the other hand, once we are equipped with concepts, we find that we have guides 
to steer us through the labyrinth of life with its confusing mazes of sensations.  As useful 
teleological instruments, concepts help us to survive and prosper in this world.  Moreover, 
by means of concepts, we are able to make a re-evaluation of life, a task certainly of great 
importance for our moral development. TPF617FPT 
 
 Our moral development depends above all, as James sees it, on our attention to the 
right kinds of thoughts.  James understands our intellectual and active capacities to be 
intimately linked.  We are naturally impulsive creatures, and our thoughts are so bound up 
with our active tendencies that every thought we have produces an impulse to act.  Only the 
presence of conflicting thoughts prevents us from acting on any given one.  Listening 
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intently to “the still small voice” of wisdom, of “reasonable ideas,” will banish our unwise 
and ignoble thoughts, so that the latter can gain no purchase on us.  The good man hears 
that still small voice “unflinchingly…and holds it fast, in spite of the host of exciting mental 
images which rise in revolt against it and would expel it from the mind.  Sustained in this 
way by a resolute effort of attention, the difficult object erelong begins to call up its own 
congeners and associates and ends by changing the disposition of the man’s consciousness 
altogether.  And with his consciousness, his action changes, for the new object, once stably 
in possession of the field of his thoughts, infallibly produces its own effects.”TPF618FPT  If we can 
just keep the right kinds of thoughts steadily before our minds, and not let the wrong kinds 
seize the field, we will act rightly in due course. 
We begin to see the proper relation between what we call “reason” and “will.”  The 
quality of our moral lives depends on our strength of will.  But will is essentially “effort of 
attention,” TPF619FPT and what we attend to matters.  Thus, prior to having a good will we must have 
good thoughts, and this means directing our minds to good objects.  The mental work to be 
done here is partly perceptual—observing what is good—and partly conceptual—naming and 
classifying the various goods and the appropriate ways to achieve them.  The goods for man 
are desirable or worthy ends, or what James called in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life” ideals.  “The wise man,” says James, “is he who succeeds in finding the name which 
suits the needs of the particular occasion best.  The ‘reasonable’ character is one who has a 
store of stable and worthy ends, and who does not decide about an action till he has calmly 
ascertained whether it be ministerial or detrimental to any one of these.” TPF620FPT  But this seeing 
and conceiving of good ends has no good effect unless by firmness of will one keeps them 
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steadily in mind:  no sustained attention to good ends, no right action.  Of course, none of 
the higher human ends are attainable in a single act, and it is not obvious from the outset just 
what series of actions will achieve them.  We must discover appropriate means for attaining 
our ends, and this requires deliberation.  The dynamic between reason and will is the same 
here, however.  Deliberation as James describes it involves holding alternative possibilities 
before the mind until, for present purposes, one is selected.  Selection may be based on 
immediate or remote considerations. TPF621FPT  It is characteristic of the wise man that he takes the 
long view into account in his decisions, that he makes his present purpose fall in line with his 
longer term purposes, and so he selects means that will most conduce to his highest ends. 
The essential moral act, then, is to hold the right thought before the mind until our 
natural impulses make us act on it, and the basic pattern of the moral life is repeatedly to 
attend to the right kinds of thoughts until doing so becomes habitual.  All of this 
presupposes finding right thoughts, and knowing right thoughts when you see them.  How is 
the mind led to such thoughts?  This is the question of education.  In a 1907 speech at 
Radcliffe College, James described what he thought to be the appropriate aim of a college 
education, and I think we can take what he said there to hold for his view of humane 
education generally.  He says in that address that, “The best claim that a college education 
can possibly make on your respect, the best thing it can aspire to accomplish for you, is this:  
that it should help you to know a good man when you see him.” TPF622FPT  Plato’s Socrates emphasized, 
when he and his companions were imaginatively establishing their ideal city in the Republic, 
the importance in early education of telling stories of heroes who were truly heroic, who 
really were the best of men and deserved to be emulated, and Socrates went on in the course 
of the dialogue to suggest the value to society at large of noble myth-making, creating 
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literature that, in capturing the popular imagination, inspires people to noble lives.  James 
has similar ideas.  “What our colleges should teach,” he says, “is…biographical history, that 
not of politics merely, but of anything and everything so far as human efforts and conquests 
are factors that have played their part.  Studying in this way, we learn what types of activity 
have stood the test of time; we acquire standards of the excellent and durable. All our arts 
and sciences and institutions are but so may quests of perfection on the part of men; and 
when we see how diverse the types of excellence may be, how various the tests, how flexible 
the adaptations, we gain a richer sense of what the terms ‘better’ and ‘worse’ may signify in 
general.”TPF623FPT  James is recommending study of the “humanities,” and by this he means the 
study of human “masterpieces” of all kinds.  “You can give humanistic value to almost 
anything by teaching it historically.  Geology, economics, mechanics, are humanities when 
taught with reference to the successive achievements of the geniuses to which these sciences 
owe their being.”  The purpose of teaching this broad-based “biographical history” is to 
provide examples for instruction and emulation:  “Mankind does nothing save through 
initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and imitation by the rest of us—these are 
the sole factors active in human progress.  Individuals of genius show the way, and set the 
patterns, which common people then adopt and follow.  The rivalry of the patterns is the history of 
the world.”  What is to be cultivated by this examination of great human creations is, first, a 
“critical sense” for “ideal values,” and second, “a lasting relish for the better kind of man.”TPF624FPT  
The point of helping people to know a good man when they see him, after all, is to make 
them want to be like such men, as much as possible. 
Readers unfamiliar with James might conclude from that description of education 
that he holds the “common people” to be of little account.  Nothing could be further from 
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the truth.  In fact, James recommended educating ourselves about “the little guy” as well as 
the “geniuses.”  But we study the former and the latter for different purposes:  we study the 
great ones to inspire us, to set a standard for us; we study the least to understand the 
tremendous intrinsic value of every life.  In either case, however, the role of imagination is 
crucial.  James’ most developed direct statement on appreciating ordinary folks was a little 
lecture in Talks for Teachers entitled “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings.”  We are 
peculiarly blind, he observes there, “in regard to the feelings of creatures and people 
different from ourselves,”TPF625FPT and so we have to work at cultivating an imaginative sympathy 
with them.  Whenever we get a “gleam of insight” into the inner lives of others, there is 
potential for a great moral breakthrough.  We realize in such moments that the deep 
significance we feel our peculiar lives to have, others feel in a similar way about their own, 
often quite different lives.  If we let this insight germinate, it “makes an epoch in our 
history.”  There is a depth “in those moments that constrains us to ascribe more reality to 
them than to all other experiences;” “the whole scheme of our customary values gets 
confounded [and] a new centre and a new perspective must be found.”TPF626FPT  “The stupidity 
and injustice of our opinions” concerning “the significance of alien lives,” “the falsity of our 
judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other 
persons’ conditions or ideals,”TPF627FPT then become clear to us.  The moral significance of our 
own lives, we begin to see, depends in large measure on attending carefully to the insight and 
seeking further glimpses into those inner lives, and a deeper understanding of them.  But this 
will require effort and perseverance.  We will need to put aside some of our ordinary 
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practical concernsTPF628FPT to make imaginative explorations of these foreign matters, both 
through literatureTPF629FPT and through immersion in “pure sensorial perception” in which we 
match what we can discover of these foreign experiences with what we have seen and felt in 
our own. TPF630FPT 
The study of human excellence helps us develop our own inner capacities; the study 
of the inner significance of ordinary lives helps make us just.  But of course, for our powers 
ever to mature fully and for us ever really to be just, we must give ourselves over to visions 
of excellence and of inner meaning until they drive us to action, and we must persist in 
exploring such visions and acting on them until personal virtue and justice toward others 
becomes engrained habit.  Habit, as James points out in one of the best known chapters of 
his Principles, is a physical concern.  “The moment one tries to define what habit is,” he says 
there, “one is lead to the fundamental properties of matter.”  Habit specifically involves the 
forming of neural pathways in the brain.  The human brain is marked by an unusual degree 
of plasticity, so that nervous “currents pouring in from the sense-organs make with extreme 
facility paths which do not easily disappear…  A simple habit, like every other nervous 
event…is, mechanically, nothing but a reflex discharge; and its anatomical substratum must 
be a path in the [nervous] system.  The complex habits…are, from the same point of view, 
nothing but concatenated discharges in the nerve-centres, due to the presence there of systems 
of reflex paths, so organized as to wake each other up successively—the impression 
produced by one muscular contraction serving as a stimulus to provoke the next, until a final 
impression inhibits the process and closes the chain.”TPF631FPT  James’ language here about the 
mechanical “point of view” is meant to remind his readers that the mechanical process 
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described is probably only one dimension of habit—an essential dimension, to be sure, but 
one that does not necessarily exhaust the meaning of habituation.  James, in fact, is certain 
that consciousness, and probably will, play part in the process.  Speaking strictly as a 
scientist, James says that, in habitual movements, “the will, if any will be present, limits itself 
to a permission that they exert their motor effects…  But if not distinct acts of will, [the] 
immediate antecedents of each movement of the chain are at any rate accompanied by 
consciousness of some kind.  They are sensations to which we are usually inattentive, but which 
immediately call our attention if they go wrong.”TPF632FPT  If we put this statement together with 
what James said above about our thoughts producing impulses that will lead to action of 
some kind if they keep our attention long enough and are not obstructed by contrary 
thoughts and impulses, it is easy to see that moral habituation will involve willfully training 
the mind on appropriate moral objects, deliberating about the best actions to attain those 
objects, and then willing that our active impulses be turned to the specific actions indicated 
by the verdicts of our deliberations. 
I confidently assert the role of will here despite James’ tentativeness about will in the 
Principles because James famously willed to believe in free will.  Freedom of will is one of 
those matters that to James justified unsubstantiated belief.  He was convinced that the 
question of free will was irresolvable, that the facts relevant to resolving it could never be 
conclusively established, but also that the question of free will was too live, forced, and 
momentous to wait for an answer even if an answer might be discoverable.TPF633FPT  He says in the 
Principles that, “My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly 
psychologic grounds…  The grounds of [my] opinion are ethical rather than 
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psychological.”TPF634FPT  The reader will recall the personal “crisis” of James’ young life in 1870 
when he resolved that, “My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.” TPF635FPT  The 
context of the crisis was that his study of science had called free will into question for him; 
he had begun to wonder whether everything is in fact determined for us by physical 
processes set in motion long ago.  You can begin to understand James’ anxiety over this if 
you call to mind the scientific studies occasionally put forth in our own day claiming that the 
gene for some variety of criminal behavior or for believing in God has been “discovered.”TPF636FPT  
The question of free will, of course, is not whether we may be merely predisposed toward 
certain behaviors by genetics or environment or some other condition beyond our choice, 
but whether we are determined by them.  The scientific trend in James’ day toward materialistic 
and therefore deterministic interpretations of human life is what drove James to revisit and 
reaffirm the common sense belief in free will. 
The reason the question mattered was that belief or disbelief in free will has 
momentous, objective consequences in our actions and experience.  James examines these 
most searchingly in an essay titled “The Dilemma of Determinism.”  Belief that all our 
actions are determined for us by processes beyond our control naturally results in a “don’t 
care” attitude toward events.  The feeling of regret—that a brutal murder occurred, for 
example—becomes meaningless, as does any notion of “right” or “wrong” acts.  The 
“dilemma” to which James refers in the title is this:  if all our acts are determined in this way, 
either (1) “Both [acts like “murder and treachery,” on the one hand, and regret, on the other] 
are supposed to have been foredoomed; so something must be fatally unreasonable, absurd, 
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and wrong in the world” TPF637FPT (i.e., acts are not wrong—it’s the world itself that’s wrong, in being a 
place where such acts are “normal”), or (2) “The world must not be regarded as a machine 
whose final purpose is the making real of any outward good, but rather as a contrivance for 
deepening the theoretic consciousness of what goodness and evil in their intrinsic natures 
are.  Not the doing either of good or of evil is what nature cares for, but the knowing of 
them.  Life is one long eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge.”TPF638FPT  James calls the former 
view “pessimism” (an outlook epitomized by Schopenhauer) and the latter “subjectivism,” 
or (the term James personally prefers) “gnosticism.”TPF639FPT  As pessimism has few takers, James 
concentrates his analysis on the subjective or gnostic stance.  “If we practically take up 
subjectivism in a sincere and radical manner and follow its consequences, we meet with 
some that make us pause.”  For example: 
In theology, subjectivism develops as its ‘left wing’ antinomianism.  In literature, its left wing 
is romanticism.  And in practical life it is either a nerveless sentimentality or a sensualism 
without bounds.  Everywhere it fosters the fatalistic mood of mind.  It makes those who are 
already too inert more passive still; it renders wholly reckless those whose energy is already 
in excess.  All through history we find how subjectivism, as soon as it has a free career, 
exhausts itself in every sort of spiritual, moral, and practical license.  Its optimism turns to an 
ethical indifference, which infallibly brings dissolution in its train…  After the pure and 
classic truths, the exciting and rancid ones must be explored. TPF640FPT 
 
Fortunately, there is another option besides pessimism and subjectivism.  It is “the objective 
philosophy of things” to which James holds, with its “recognition of limits, foreign and 
opaque to our understanding” and its “willingness, after bringing about some external good, 
to feel at peace,” leaving “the burden of the rest [to] higher powers.”  This objective way 
James calls “pluralism”—the way he elsewhere calls the way of common sense. TPF641FPT  It views the 
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universe as “a plurality of semi-independent forces, each one of which may help or hinder, 
and be helped or hindered by, the operations of the rest.”  It makes sense of the apparently 
bad things in the universe and the sense of regret we feel about them, and it provides a 
motive for acting.  “For my own part,” James says, “whatever difficulties may beset the 
philosophy of objective right and wrong, and the indeterminism it seems to imply, 
determinism, with its alternative of pessimism or romanticism, contains difficulties that are 
greater still.” TPF642FPT  And so James embraces “affection” for his fellow inhabitants of the 
universe and “an unsophisticated moral sense,” taking the risk of being duped in doing so as 
a risk well worth it. TPF643FPT 
This question of will is, I think, the key to James’ moral and religious theory, and by 
implication, his social theory.  The possibility of human spirituality and of real human 
significance, to James, hung on the existence of genuinely free will.  In the Principles, he says 
that, 
‘Will you or won’t you have it so?’ is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are 
asked it every hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the smallest, the most 
theoretical as well as the most practical, things.  We answer by consents or non-consents and not 
by words.  What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of 
communication with the nature of things!  What wonder if the effort demanded by them be 
the measure of our worth as men!  What wonder if the amount which we accord of it be the 
one strictly underived and original contribution we make to the world!TPF644FPT 
 
We begin to see how James could say that “the solving word” in moral dilemmas, “for the 
learned and the unlearned man alike, lies in the last resort in the dumb willingnesses and 
unwillingnesses of their interior characters, and nowhere else.  It is not in heaven, neither is 
it beyond the sea; but the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that 
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thou mayest do it.”TPF645FPT  In the end, if we are to live nobly we must risk extending ourselves on 
behalf of a larger good that we may in the end fail to bring about.  Notice, too, the religious 
language of this last statement of James’, which in fact is literally the last word in his “Moral 
Philosopher and the Moral Life.”  The will was not only for James the center of moral 
action, but the locus of faith as well.  Indeed, morality and faith ultimately merge for James:  
religious experience, in his thinking, completes morality, and morality cannot be complete 
without it. 
COMMON SENSE AND RELIGION 
 I have already said most of what needs to be said here about James’ religious 
outlook, and I can therefore keep my comments in this section relatively brief.  We just saw 
James’ comment in that essay on “The Dilemma of Determinism” that the “objective,” 
“pluralistic,” common sense approach to life entailed “bringing about some external good” in 
the world, as we are able, and leaving “the burden of the rest [to] higher powers.”  James in 
fact seems to have identified his religious outlook as the common sense view.  In “Reflex 
Action and Theism,” James rejected radical monism for destroying the distinction between 
man and God, TPF646FPT agnosticism for denying we know anything about the nature of Being “and 
how it asks us to behave,” and gnosticism for claiming to know (not merely to believe) just 
“how Being made itself or us.”TPF647FPT   This left ordinary, common-sense theism, which James 
embraced.   “In co-operation with [God’s] purposes, not in any chimerical speculative 
conquest of him, not in any theoretic drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our 
destiny.”  “In the silence of our theories,” in “those rare moments when the soul sobers 
herself, and leaves off her chattering and protesting about this formula or that,” “we…seem 
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to listen, to hear something like the pulse of Being beat; and it is borne in upon us that the 
mere turning of the character, the dumb willingness to suffer and to serve this universe, is 
more than all theories about it put together.”  “Between agnosticism and gnosticism, theism 
stands midway, and holds to what is true in each.  With agnosticism, it goes so far as to 
confess that we cannot know how Being made itself or us.  With gnosticism, it goes so far as 
to insist that we can know Being’s character when made, and how it asks us to behave.”TPF648FPT  
The old, common-sense middle way, it seemed to James, was the most reasonable approach 
to matters of faith. 
 In Lecture XIV of the Varieties, you will recall James’ proposing to “test saintliness 
by common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life 
commends itself as an ideal kind of human activity,” adding that “no religion has ever in the 
long run established or proved itself in any other way.”  Anticipating the objection of some 
of the faithful that “in following this sort of an empirical method we are handing ourselves 
over to systematic skepticism,” he says that, “Skepticism cannot…be ruled out…as a 
possibility against which our conclusions are secure” because “it would be absurd to affirm 
that one’s own age of the world can be beyond correction by the next age.”  Holding to the 
middle way, however, he then says, “But to admit one’s liability to correction is one thing, 
and to embark upon a sea of wanton doubt is another…  When larger ranges of truth open, 
it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previous 
pretensions.”   James concludes:  “He who acknowledges the imperfections of his 
instrument, and makes allowance for it in discussing his observations, is in a much better 
position for gaining truth than if he claimed his instrument to be infallible.  Or is dogmatic 
and scholastic theology less doubted in point of fact for claiming, as it does, to be in point of 
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right undoubtable?” TPF649FPT  This balance, this openness, this acknowledgement of limitations and 
willingness to trust to the “long run” of human experience—this is precisely the common 
sense attitude. 
COMMON SENSE AND SOCIETY 
 James did not write much of a directly political nature, but we have already seen in 
his account of morality and ethics features of a well-considered social vision.  It remains, 
then, only for me to draw together the essential elements of that vision and supplement 
them with a few Jamesian observations about human social life that I haven’t mentioned.  
James said in that 1907 speech at Radcliffe College that, “Mankind does nothing save 
through initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and imitation by the rest of us—
these are the sole factors active in human progress.  Individuals of genius show the way, and 
set the patterns, which common people then adopt and follow.  The rivalry of the patterns is the 
history of the world.” TPF650FPT  The high value James placed on the heroic virtues are evident here:  
“The sole factors active in human progress” are “initiatives on the part of inventors…and 
imitation by the rest of us.”  This conviction was a common refrain in James’ writings.  In an 
essay called “Great Men and Their Environment,” he asserts that, “The mutations of 
societies…are in the main due directly or indirectly to the acts or the example of individuals 
whose genius was so adapted to the receptivities of the moment, or whose accidental 
position of authority was so critical that they became ferments, initiators of movement, 
setters of precedent or fashion, centres of corruption, or destroyers of other persons, whose 
gifts, had they had free play, would have led society in another direction.”TPF651FPT  Again, in Some 
Problems of Philosophy, he said, “The progress of society is due to the fact that individuals vary 
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from the human average in all sorts of directions, and that the originality which they show is 
often so attractive or useful, that they are recognized by their tribe as leaders, and become 
setters of new ideals and objects of envy or imitation.”TPF652FPT  To James, the observation was 
self-evident, a simple matter of common sense.  But he was well aware that the view was 
meeting increasing resistance in the Western world, and so he felt it necessary to say the 
obvious, and repeat it now and then to make sure his readers or listeners marked it well and 
gave thought to it.  He thought the matter important, I think, for the same reason he 
thought free will to be so important:  it is essential to the meaning and significance of our 
lives that we can make a difference in the world—that we can engage, participate, and 
contribute our mite to the whole.  His conviction about the significance of individuals was 
deeply grounded in experience, in his sense of how great men had impacted his own life, 
through books and through acquaintance, and in his profound sense of history.  It was not, 
again, that he discounted the significance of ordinary people—quite the contrary:  he was 
convinced that ordinary people’s lives were decisively shaped for good or ill, degraded or 
ennobled, devastated or enriched by the actions of “great men.”  This was the way of the 
world, like it or not, and he wanted people to understand that it was part of their 
responsibility to try and ensure that men of great capacity served, rather than undermined, 
the common good. 
 In an essay on “The Importance of Individuals,” James expressed his view of the 
inadequacy of the sociological outlook from a human and moral point of view.  “I for my 
part cannot but consider the talk of the contemporary sociological school about averages 
and general laws and predetermined tendencies, with its obligatory undervaluing of the 
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importance of individual differences, as the most pernicious and immoral of fatalisms.”TPF653FPT  
This dry, “scientific” way of looking at human affairs was, he thought, illiberal and 
reductionistic.  It abstracted away from everything interesting and meaningful in human life.  
It discounted the geniuses and made the common man smaller.  Ultimately, it represented a 
thinning out of humanity, and professionally, perhaps more than anything else James wanted 
to restore to the human sciences an appreciation for the richness of human experience. 
Perhaps in part because of the fierceness of this desire and the force of his 
personality, along with his defense of the “will to believe,”TPF654FPT James has often been portrayed 
as a wishful thinker or a sunny optimist.  This, it seems to me, is a serious mistake.  We must 
remember that James was, though impressively energetic, an emotionally melancholy man 
who identified with the “sick souls” he described in the Varieties, one who had been gripped 
by “panic fear” as he stared into the abyss, “that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of 
life.”TPF655FPT  Nor did he respond to that insecurity by escaping into gnostic visions or 
sentimentality.  Rather, he opted for the “strenuous life” of one who risks all for an 
uncertain prize.  One kind of “attractive or useful” trendsetters James described in that 
passage above in Some Problems of Philosophy were the “philosophers,”TPF656FPT and—although of 
course he didn’t say so in the book—James counted himself among them.  He was an 
ambitious man—ambitious, I think, in the wholesome sense of not merely hoping but really 
trying “so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which 
[he could] see.” TPF657FPT  He knew that he was one of the geniuses, one of the trendsetters, and he 
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wanted to make the most of the opportunity.  His call to his countrymen was to face the 
very real evils of their world and wage the “moral equivalent of war” against them.TPF658FPT 
At the same time, as we have seen, he was not a radical, and indeed, resisted 
radicalism as one of those social forces that is liable to evil.  What radical would ever have 
observed, as he did, “how dependent all human social elevation is upon the prevalence of 
chastity,” saying that “hardly any factor measures more than this the difference between 
civilization and barbarism;” or pointed to a natural “hierarchy” of persons based on the 
ability to make decisions accounting for more and more remote considerations, from “the 
tramp” to “the philosopher and saint”? TPF659FPT  His only criterion for judgment in human affairs 
was the verdict of experience, was common sense rightly conceived.  He would support 
revolutionary forces if experience seemed to show their time had come; he sympathized with 
conservative sentiments, but not at the expense of foregoing some great new good that 
experience suggested was now within reach.TPF660FPT  He was ready to fight to the last breath to 
meliorate human devastation, and wait on higher powers for a final remedy, according to the 
possibilities experience revealed to be open to him. 
This was James’ general common sense attitude.  The more directly practical form of 
James’ common sense vision for society may be seen in his account of the civic purpose of 
education.  The title of that Radcliffe College address I have referenced was “The Social 
Value of the College-Bred.”  James had in mind in the speech to impress on his young 
listeners not only the value of a humane education to themselves, but also how such an 
education could fit them to serve their country.  Shortly following his claim that human 
progress is a matter of great initiative and imitation, he challenges his auditors:  We 
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Americans ought to consider soberly the “democratic problem” and try to meet it.  Critics 
say that democracy results in “vulgarity enthroned and institutionalized,” and we should take 
their critique seriously.  “Democracy is on its trial, and no one knows how well it will stand 
the ordeal.”  “Our democratic problem,” to be more precise, is just this:  “Who are the kind 
of men from whom our majorities shall take their cue?  Whom shall they treat as rightful 
leaders?”  It is incumbent upon us, James suggests—“the educated class…the only 
permanent presence [in our democracy] that corresponds to the aristocracy in older 
countries,” who “with all their iniquities, did at least preserve some taste for higher human 
quality and honor certain forms of refinement by their enduring traditions”—it is incumbent 
on us to take moral leadership, so that our majorities take their cue from leaders with the 
capacity, training, wisdom, and virtue to direct others toward the common good.TPF661FPT  James is 
calling for those John Adams and Thomas Jefferson called the “natural aristoi.”TPF662FPT  How 
should we provide such leadership?  James suggests two ways:  First, broadening the culture 
by providing “a wider vision of what our colleges themselves should aim at.”  This relates to 
the concern I mentioned just now about the human sciences.  Second, deepening the culture 
by setting the right moral and spiritual “tone.”  There are some 
who stand for culture in the sense of exclusiveness…feeble caricatures of mankind, unable 
to know any good thing when they see it, incapable of enjoyment unless a printed label gives 
them leave…But every good college makes its students immune against this malady, of 
which the microbe haunts the neighborhood-printed pages.  It does so by its general tone 
being too hearty for the microbe’s life.  Real culture lives by sympathies and admirations, not 
by dislikes and disdains—under all misleading wrappings it pounces unerringly upon the 
human core…  ‘Tone,’ to be sure, is a terribly vague word to use, but there is no other, and 
this whole meditation is over questions of tone.  If democracy is to be saved it must catch 
the higher, the healthier tone.  If we are to impress it with our preferences, we ourselves 
must use the proper tone, which we, in turn, must have caught from our own teachers.  It all 
reverts in the end to the action of innumerable imitative individuals upon each other and to 
the question of whose tone has the highest spreading power.  As a class, we college 
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graduates should look to it that ours has spreading power.  It ought to have the highest 
spreading power.TPF663FPT 
 
In addition to spiritual qualities like vision and tone, however, James knew that even the 
most high-minded of us will be rendered ineffective if we neglect the simpler things.  For 
someone so deeply spiritual,TPF664FPT James was always mindful of how much our lives are 
conditioned by our bodies.  Above all, he well knew, the shape of man’s life personally and 
socially is forged by his habits. 
 “Habit,” James said, “is…the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent.  It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance…  It is well 
for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and 
will never soften again.”TPF665FPT  This is “well” for two reasons, at least:  1) “Habit simplifies the 
movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate and diminishes 
fatigue;”TPF666FPT and 2) “Habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are 
performed.”TPF667FPT  These facts have great importance for education.  “The great thing…in all 
education,” James says, “is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy.  It is to fund 
and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the fund.  For this we must 
make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against 
the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against 
the plague.  The more of the details of our early life we can hand over to the effortless 
custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own 
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proper work.” TPF668FPT  Habit wedded to common sense perception (interpolation) gives us a fund 
of common sense instincts and impressions to draw upon and keeps our thoughts from 
going far astray from reality—keeps us, in other words, living in truth.  Indeed, James’ 
common sense in its broadest meaning is simply funded experience.  The individual may fund 
his experience through faithful, habitual adherence to perceptual experience, and a 
community or society may fund experience in a similar way, sharing observations and 
safeguarding time-tested ideas and practices.  To do this is to develop a “common sense 
tradition.” 
What sets James’ notion of common sense apart from Witherspoon’s and McCosh’s, 
and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers generally, is its organically dynamic quality.  We 
noticed before that James described common sense concepts as “intellectual forms” 
inherited from our ancient ancestors that “have been able to preserve themselves throughout 
the experience of all subsequent time.”TPF669FPT  This understanding of common sense concepts is 
rather different than McCosh’s “self-evident, necessary, and universal truths,” but only in the 
specific sense that on James’ understanding today’s common sense concepts—which have 
indeed been self-evident, necessary, and universal on the basis of the facts that have been 
available—may some day be superceded on the basis of new facts that throw the old ones 
into a new light.  The old concepts then become, strictly speaking, false, but not in that they 
bore no relation to the facts—certainly they fit the facts as we once knew them—rather in 
that they did not fit the facts we would come to discover.  To illustrate:  It was once 
“common sense” knowledge that the sun revolved around the earth.  This was 
commonsensical in that, in our perceptual experience, we witnessed the sun rise in the east 
(on one side of us) and set in the west (on the other side).  But while this common sense 
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view was true to the facts as we once knew them, it was ultimately false, as our increasing 
astronomical knowledge revealed.  The old view was reasonable, but was rendered obsolete 
by the newly gathered information.  James, in conceiving common sense as evolving 
organically over time, dropping old conceptualizations that were no longer adequate to 
experience and incorporating new ones, gave the Anglo-American common sense tradition a 
historical dimension it had been lacking, and did so with a philosophic sophistication 
perhaps not matched in the larger Western common sense tradition since Vico. 
In Pragmatism, James describes the evolution of common sense truth memorably, first 
on the individual, and then on the social, level. 
The process here is always the same.  The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but 
he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain.  Somebody contradicts them; or in a 
reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with 
which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy.  The result is 
an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks 
to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions.  He saves as much of it as he can, for 
in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives.  So he tries to change first this 
opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), until at last some new idea 
comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the 
latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into 
one another most felicitously and expediently. 
 This new idea is then adopted as the true one.  It preserves the older stock of truths 
with a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the 
novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible.  An outrée 
explanation, violating all our preconceptions, would never pass for a true account of a 
novelty.  We should scratch round industriously till we found something less excentric.  The 
most violent revolutions in an individuals beliefs leave most of his old order standing.  Time 
and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one’s own biography remain untouched.  
New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions.  It marries old opinion to 
new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity.  We hold a theory 
true just in proportion to its success in solving this ‘problem of maxima and minima.’  But 
success in solving this problem is eminently a matter of approximation.  We say this theory 
solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; but that means more satisfactorily 
to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently.  To a 
certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic. 
 The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the older 
truths.  Failure to take account of it is the source of much of the unjust criticism leveled 
against pragmatism.  Their influence is absolutely controlling.  Loyalty to them is the first 
principle—in most cases it is the only principle; for by far the most usual way of handling 
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phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement of our 
preconception is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness to them.TPF670FPT 
 
Pragmatism means to emulate this common sense process of grafting new onto old truth.  In 
doing so, “It only follows…the example of the sister-sciences, interpreting the unobserved 
by the observed.  It brings old and new harmoniously together.  It converts the absolutely 
empty notion of a static relation of ‘correspondence’…between our minds and reality, into 
that of a rich and active commerce (that any one may follow in detail and understand) 
between particular thoughts of ours, and the great universe of other experiences in which 
they play their parts and have their uses.”TPF671FPT  Like common sense, “Pragmatism is willing to 
take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most 
personal experiences.  She will count mystical experiences if they have practical 
consequences.  She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact—if that should 
seem a likely place to find him.  Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way 
of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of 
experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.”TPF672FPT 
 It seems fair to conclude that Jamesian pragmatism is common sense reconceived, a 
philosophical methodizing of the common sense attitude and an energizing and “limbering 
up,” as James might say, of common sense concepts.  James’ larger, radically empiricist 
philosophic vision seems, likewise, to be a systematic working out of this newly energized 
common sense outlook.  A “rich and active commerce” with the particulars of human 
experience, not myopically with present experiences only but with the “long run of 
experience,” adapting creatively to new challenges while preserving civilizational 
achievements, is, I think I may safely say, James’ vision for social health and progress.  On 
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the basis of the material presented here, I would argue that James should be classed as a new 
variety of common sense philosopher, and one of the first rank. 
 257
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The foregoing survey allows me now to suggest an extended definition of “common 
sense” as developed philosophically up to date: 
-Immediate sensorial experience, unreflective consciousness—James’ “pure experience.” 
-Our belief-forming faculties in general (Thomas Reid, et al). 
-The power of perception in particular—Aristotle’s koine aesthesis, James’ “interpolation.” 
-Intuition of self-evident, necessary, and universal truths (Vico, Reid, McCosh). 
-Primordial formation of concepts—Denkmittel. 
-Realization that others sense things in the same way we do, that things are commonly 
sensed, and usage of generally accepted concepts to communicate about regular experiences 
generally and practical needs and utilities in particular (Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Reid). 
-Fundamental ways of thinking inherited from our ancestors (James). 
-Handling new experiences and ideas by grafting them on to the old stock of experiences 
and ideas (James and the Pragmatists). 
-Funding of experience and concept (James). 
-Common convictions, shared understandings of the good or the right, elemental sense of 
justice of a community (Vico, Reid, McCosh). 
-Judgments made in accordance with the foregoing. 
-Concept of good, sound judgment based on accumulated experience—“common sense” 
judgment. 
 
From this cluster of meanings I draw the following conclusions.  First, physical sensation 
and trust of the five (or more) senses (provided the sense organs are healthy and functioning 
normally) are foundational to common sense and largely responsible for the “well-
grounded” quality of common sense understanding.  Witherspoon’s statement, echoing 
Reid’s basic claim in his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, that “our 
senses are to be trusted in the information they give us,” and that their deliverances “are the 
foundation of all our after reasonings” TPF673FPT makes the basic point.  Second, and 
correspondingly, the common sense attitude tends to emphasize the rootedness of our 
spiritual selves in the body and our intimate acquaintance with the solid realities of the 
physical world.  Third, the man of common sense for this reason has a keen sense of 
material possibilities and limitations.  Fourth, he trusts the deliverances of his senses and the 
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judgments of his mental faculties unless he has reason to doubt them.  When doubt arises, 
the hard test of common sense opinions is concrete experience.  Fifth, these deliverances 
and judgments provide a rather large mass of givens—impressions and perceptions that can 
be taken for granted in the ordinary course of things.  Sixth, these givens provide a solid 
foundation for making conceptualizations of the world and of human experience.  Seventh, 
communication about perceptions and the conceptions that arise from them is essential for 
objectivity.  We know things to be real and ideas to be truths because others tell us their 
experiences tally with ours.  Eighth, when such communication pervades a community, 
community givens emerge that provide a basis for associated action.  Ninth, among these 
givens are convictions and conceptions of morality and justice.  Tenth, concepts and 
practices based on these communal givens provide the basis for a common sense tradition.  
Such a tradition is strengthened by habit and legal and institutional norms. 
 The value of such a common sense tradition is best seen in its resistance to 
destructive ideologies.  Ideas or theories that cut against the grain of so much funded 
experience will seem unreasonable, if not absurd, to the community or society in which such 
a tradition obtains.  This is why Eric Voegelin was encouraged by the Anglo-American 
tradition of common sense:  it seemed, compared to Germany and other Continental 
nations, impervious to movements like Nazism and fascism and communism.  Voegelin’s 
political project, inspired in part by his discovery that the “common sense attitude” 
preserved in Anglo-American culture was a historical embodiment of the classical 
philosophic attitude as reformed and developed by the Christian intellectual tradition, was to 
refashion political science so as to preserve and promote such cultural and civilizational 
achievements.  In “What is Political Reality?”—the last essay of his Anamnesis—Voegelin 
said that the fundamentals of political science are “commonsense insights into correct 
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modes of action concerning man’s existence in society—ranging from insights concerning 
the organization of government, to insights into the requirements of domestic and foreign 
policy, finance and military policy, all the way down to decision-making in concrete cases.  
We know, for instance, the tendency of those who wield power to abuse it, and we consider 
it expedient, in the interest of order, to place those who are in power under the review of 
competent advisory, controlling, or vetoing authorities.”  His concluding remarks in that 
essay are so apposite to the present study that I quote it at length: 
 The term common sense…must be understood in the sense of the Scottish School, 
especially of Thomas Reid.  For Reid, man is, in Cicero’s sense, rationis particeps; and common 
sense is a compact type of rationality.  ‘There is a certain degree of it which is necessary to 
our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs, and 
answerable to our conduct towards others:  this is called common sense, because it is 
common to all men with whom we can transact business, or call to account for their 
conduct.’  Common sense means the same as ‘a branch or degree of ratio’ for which a 
separate name is justifiable in ‘that in the greatest part of mankind no other degree of reason 
is to be found.  It is this degree that entitles them to the denomination of reasonable 
creatures.’  Common sense, therefore, does not connote a social ballast of vulgar ideas, nor 
some set of idées recues nor a ‘relatively natural world-view.’   On the contrary, it is the habit 
of judgment and conduct of a man formed by ratio; one could say it is the habit of an 
Aristotelian spoudaios without the luminosity of the knowledge concerning the ratio as the 
source of his rational judgment and conduct.  Common sense is a civilizational habit that 
presupposes noetic experience, without the man of this habit himself possessing 
differentiated knowledge of noesis.  The civilized homo politicus need not be a philosopher, 
but he must have common sense. 
 The reference to common sense is meant to make clear once more that, and also 
why, there can be no ‘theory of politics’ in terms of fundamental propositions or principles 
rising above the propositions of an ‘empirical’ science of politics.  For the so-called empeiria 
of politics is the habit of common sense that, although compact, is formed by the ratio as the 
structure [Sachstruktur] of consciousness.  Just as we characterized this habit as that of the 
spoudaios without the luminosity of consciousness, we also could reverse the statement and 
say that Aristotle’s Politics, insofar as it does not deal with the logos of consciousness itself, is 
a common-sense study of typical situations that arise in society and history when man 
attempts to order his entire existence.  Not without reason did Aristotle identify episteme 
politike with the virtue of phronesis. 
 The reflections about the close relation between common sense and classical politics 
were meant to call attention to the limits of common sense as well as to its importance.  As 
far as its importance is concerned, the phenomenon of common sense as a refuge of ratio in 
the modern crisis of order can hardly be overestimated.  Commonsense philosophy arose in 
the eighteenth century as resistance against both theologico-metaphysical dogmatism and 
scepticism—just in time to avoid destruction by ideological dogmatism.  Commonsense 
philosophy is not a secondary ideology like the ‘traditions’ but a genuine residue of noesis.  
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The remarkable strength of the Anglo-American culture sphere in resisting the ideologies 
could be traced to the strong social field of common sense, even though, admittedly, in this 
sphere too the ideologies gain foothold, but have not up to now seriously endangered the 
order of the res publica.  As far as its limitations are concerned, they are given by the noetic 
compactness of common sense.  We are living in the time of ideological dogmatomachy.  
The ideologies, in spite of their dogmatic derailments, are in explicit contention with the 
order of consciousness.  Common sense can rest assured of its ability ‘to judge of things self-
evident,’ but it cannot oppose the ideologies on their level of differentiated argumentation, 
since common sense has at its command no explicit noesis.  The remarkable power of 
resistance of the Anglo-American social field against the above-mentioned ideologies must 
not obscure the equally remarkable sterility of the philosophical struggle against the 
ideologies.  Thus, if common sense is a pragmatic factor of the highest importance for the 
stability of Western society, it still is no substitute in our historical situation for a 
differentiated noesis.  The search for ‘principles’ of political science, on the other hand, 
which was identified above as a potential source of social disorder, seems to me to express at 
the same time a genuine desire to go beyond the relative inadequacy of common sense and 
to attain once more the luminosity of noetic consciousness.TPF674FPT 
 
What Voegelin means by “the luminosity of noetic consciousness” is the awareness of the 
right order of things that comes to one who has experienced the ultimate Ground of 
existence—traditionally called “God.”  This points us to the importance of the religious 
dimension of the thought of Witherspoon and McCosh and James. 
All three of our common sense thinkers recognized a sense of divine presence that 
comes to us most clearly in the form of conscience.  Witherspoon said that conscience 
intimates “a natural sense of dependence” and “belief of a Divine Being” who is “not only . . 
. our Maker, preserver and benefactor, but . . . our righteous governor and supreme 
judge.”TPF675FPT  McCosh described conscience as including a “fear of a supernatural power, and of 
coming judgments,” and added that, “It is this sentiment which, more than anything else, has 
retained the idea of God—in some cases very vaguely—among all nations.” TPF676FPT  In describing 
our “moral sensibility,” James was led to the conception of conscience as involving most 
fundamentally the notion of a “highest possible judging companion,” and concluded that, 
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“This judge is God.” TPF677FPT  In the Varieties James mentioned as a common religious experience 
“a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 
‘something there,’ more deep and more general than any of the special and particular ‘senses’ 
by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed,”TPF678FPT and 
later described the fundamental religious experience as follows: 
There is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet.  It consists of 
two parts: 
1. An uneasiness; and 
2. Its solution. 
1. The uneasiness, reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is something wrong 
about us as we naturally stand. 
2. The solution is a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper 
connexion with the higher powers. 
In those more developed minds which alone we are studying, the wrongness takes a 
moral character, and the salvation takes a mystical tinge.  I think we shall keep well 
within the limits of what is common to all such minds if we formulate the essence of 
their religious experience in terms like these: 
 The individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness and criticizes it, is to that 
extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch with something higher, if 
anything higher exist.  Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even 
though it may be but a most helpless germ.  With which part he should identify his real 
being is by no means obvious at this stage; but when stage 2 (the stage of solution or 
salvation) arrives, the man identifies his real being with the germinal higher part of 
himself; and does so in the following way.  He becomes conscious that this higher part is 
conterminous and continuous with a more of the same quality, which is operative in the 
universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion 
get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the 
wreck. TPF679FPT 
 
This essentially is the breakthrough that leads to what Voegelin calls “the luminosity of 
noetic consciousness”—the awakening of nous (the Greek term for “reason”), that “higher” 
part of the self to which James refers, and the awareness coming with it of a deeper Ground 
of human existence.  Discovery of this Ground becomes a source of order in revealing to 
the man who has experienced it what is the highest Good and thereby how he should rank 
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his other goods.  He becomes quite literally a new man.  Others may experience an “echo” 
effect encountering such a man, and be drawn to an awakening to the Ground themselves.  
In this way, the experience of the divine Ground is, as Bergson puts it in Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, imparted “to a tiny handful of privileged souls which together form a 
spiritual society; societies of this kind might multiply; each one, through such of its members 
as might be exceptionally gifted, would give birth to one or several others; thus the impetus 
would be preserved and continued until such time as a profound change in the material 
conditions imposed on humanity by nature should permit, in spiritual matters, of a radical 
transformation.  Such is the method followed by the great mystics.”  Bergson warns, as 
James does in the Varieties, and as Voegelin does in various places in his writings, that 
“mysticism means nothing, absolutely nothing, to the man who has no experience of it, 
however slight.”  Nevertheless, Bergson continues, “grant this fierce glow [of the originary 
experience], and the molten matter will easily run into the mould of a doctrine, or even 
become that doctrine as it solidifies.  We represent religion, then, as the crystallization, 
brought about by a scientific process of cooling, of what mysticism had poured, while hot, 
into the soul of man.  Through religion all men get a little of what a few privileged souls 
possessed in full.”TPF680FPT  In this way, the experience of the divine Ground of being becomes a 
source of social order.  Religious experience gives way to a morality of keeping the forms of 
faith, which in their comparatively weak but important way, preserves the new order.  New 
breakthroughs and new extensions of order may follow in time, and there is no sure way to 
know how it all will end.  But the social order and cohesion they leave behind are at least 
semi-permanent.  If Voegelin’s thesis is right, the Anglo-American common sense tradition, 
of which Witherspoon, McCosh, and James are primary American representatives, is a legacy 
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of such religious experiences, and James’ hunch that a deep order underlying the flux of 
immediate experience is discoverable through religious experience is sound.  In any case, 
historically, common sense informed by religious experience seems to be the basis of the 
Western tradition of natural right and natural law. 
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PU  A Pluralistic Universe 
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SPP  Some Problems of Philosophy 
VRE  The Varieties of Religious Experience 
WB  The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 
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